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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This essay endeavors to make a scientific analysis of
the American constitutional conception of majority and
minority rights--not the author's conception of what they
ought to be--and to reduce these conceptions to written form.
It attempts to state specifically what is the nature of these
rights--where in they are identical; wherein they differ; when
and where they "begin and end.
It would be most difficult, if not impossible, to study
rights without extending some consideration to the duties
which attend their expression and exercise. Since attention
is directed chiefly to the subject of rights, duties are
treated only incidentally, or by implication. This is not
to say, however, that, for example, the majority 1 s right to
select representatives or to determine policy in any parti-
cular instance is more important than its duty to exercise
forbearance, moderation, and generosity in the enjoyment of
these rights; or, that the minority's right to criticize or
to appeal to "the people" is more important than its duty
to submit willingly to the consequences of electoral defeat.
In fact, the very eminent scholar Abbott Lawrence Lowell in
his "Public Opinion and Popular Government" demonstrates
that without the adequate exercise of both rights and duties
by minority as well as by majority groups democracy cannot
exist. Thus, in this sense, only part of the larger subject

of the rights and duties of American citizens is studied.
This essay is concerned with the rights of individuals
as constituents of a membership association - the right to
think and express thought - the right to express opinion with
respect to approval or disapproval of concrete proposals for
the solution of problems of common interest. It relates to a
procedure agreed to in advance and made a part of the consti-
tution. It carries with it the duty on the part of wvery con-
stituent in this membership association to accept the decision
when reached in pursuance of this procedure for the ascertain-
ment of a consensus of opinion in the spirit of goodwill • and
the duty of each and all to cooperate in the execution of the
decision so reached.
To the end that the demands of incisive analysis and
concreteness of expression be fulfilled, this essay is limited
in scope to the American system of laws. And the key words
symbolizing the fundamental constitutional concepts are
clearly defined at the outset so that the reader may labor
under no misapprehension as to exactly what is the conception
sought to be conveyed by this or that term.
The importance of this study requires no elaboration.

CHAPTER II
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
A. The American Constitution
1. Considerations Basic to the Interpretation of the American
Constitution
"Despite its checks and balances, its conservative tone,
and its emphasis on protection to the rights of property,"
says Munro, the Constitution of the United States "was never-
(1)
theless a landmark in the progress of democracy." What-
ever else this statement may mean, it shows that something
more than the constitution itself must be considered before
its full meaning and importance can be appreciated.
The community must be studied if its constitution is to
be understood. "Nothing but a community can have a consti-
tutional form of government, and if a nation has not become
(2)
a community, it cannot have that sort of polity." In
other words, unless there is a group conscious of common in-
terests, desiring organic unity for common purposes and
therefore possessed of the impulse to find a means for self-
expression, the persons within the group can form no common
judgment, conceive no common end, contrive no common mea-
sures, and there would be no constitution.
(1) W. B. Munro, GUS, 57. The abbreviations which are used
throughout are explained in the bibliography.
(2) Wilson, CG in US, 25.

The people who live in the United States are a community.
They have (a) a common consciousness of needs and purposes
which occupy the center of their attention, (b) common be-
lief s--premises for reasoning and bases for judgment about
the moral and juristic order, and about essentials to common
welfare, (c) common sentiments—emotions or affective dispo-
sitions organized around objects of attachment and conscious
objectives, and (d) common wills--determinations to realize
purposes, to satisfy desires and. to employ commonly accepted
means to the ends sought to be attained, because the people
have sensed these environmental facts, they have discovered
the existence of an empirious necessity for the recognition
of the mutuality of their experiences and interests. This
circumstance has given birth to a kind of faith between them.
It is a faith which sustains democracy: a "faith in human
values, individual and social, not in the accomplishment of
(1)
specific results ". It precedes and is consequent to a
politically-homogeneous population's sympathy with the in-
stitutions of government.
It presupposes a public which is intrinsi-
cally law abiding.... it presupposes a
people which for the most part will conform
to the rules of law.... It presupposes a
public which in the jury box may be relied
upon to enforce law and vindicate justice
between man and man intelligently and stead-
fastly. (2)
It is a faith in the reasonableness of men and in the
(1) Croly, PD, 170.
(2) Pound, SCL, 123.

common desire for goodwill.
The rule of reason is not dependent on the
reasonableness of the rule, but upon the
reasonable application of the rule. Insofar
as rules are reasonably applied, their ra-
tionality is to a decisive extent the result
of the goodwill of the judges.... (1)
The American people have recognized that this mutual
good-faith and goodwill makes possible the realization of the
principle of self-determination. Desiring that each member
of the community be accorded the greatest possible scope of
self-expression and self-determination, recognizing the
value of the individual person's experience and the wisdom
of making the multifarious experiences contribute to the
welfare of the whole community, and realizing that the great-
est efficiency in social action is obtainable by promoting,
maintaining and conserving the goodwill of the constituent
members of the community, democracy came to be accepted as the
American community's philosophy of life. This philosophy is
a social ideal which conceives of the nation, the state, even
the community as means to the end that the individual person
may have a fuller life than he might have had without it.
Our country was conceived in the theory of
local self-government.... It is the founda-
tion principle of our system of liberty. It
makes the largest promise to the freedom and
development of the individual. Its preser-
vation is worth all the effort and all the
sacrifice that it may cost. (2)
(1) Croly, PD, 180.
(2) Congressional Record, Rep. C. A. flumley, Aug. 10, 1937,
11128.

Democracy is that philosophy of life which regards all
(1)
persons as equals: equal not only in rights, but also in
re sponsiMilt ies
.
The people will continue ready ... to do
something for themselves; to achieve their
own greatness; to work out their own des-
tiny.... We cannot look to government, we
must look to ourselves .( 2)
Thus, the theory of democracy was adopted as the plan for
social action most likely to enable the individuals to
achieve their "raison d'etre". Since, by treating all per-
sons as equals, it accords to each the greatest possible
scope of action (physical as well as mental), democracy is
considered to be that way of life most likely to make possi-
ble to each person the greatest appreciation of the values
and meaning of life itself.
What, then, is democracy?
a. The Concept--Democracy
Democracy has been defined, described, discussed, ana-
lyzed, criticised, inspected, respected, reviled, ridiculed,
compared, contrasted, and idealized. It has been hailed as
(3)
the suoreme achievement of civilized man and it has been
(4) (5)
• indicted as the rule by the mediocre and the incompetent.
It has been charged as being a tyrant--the tyranny of the
(1) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 11.
(2) Cong Rec, ibid, p. 11127.
(3) In HUSA, I, 1-3, 602-513, George Bancroft asserts his be-
lief that democracy is the ultimate form of government and
that its operation automatically brings the nearest ap-
proximation to societal perfection.
(4) R. A. Cram, NM, 22.
(5) Faguet, DR, chapters 1-3. See also Faguet's CI =

majority; and it has been proclaimed as the great liberator
of the oppressed--the oppressed masses and/or the oppressed
minorities, whichever the occasion warrants. Democracy has
(1)
been characterized as majority rule ; and it has been
(3)
canonized into a Political Credo with its articles of faith.
(2)
It has also been depicted as a form of government.
Democracy is neither a form of government, a form of the
(4)
state, a form of society, nor any other form. England
with its Monarch, Switzerland with its collegial type of ex-
ecutive, and the United States with its President could not
all be properly characterized as democracies if the test was
predicated on the form of prevailing institutions. Democra-
cy is not a matter of form.
Democracy is that ideal social process in which all per-
sons, as members of the sovereign body, work out together
the mode of conciliating their individual activities with
(5)
the social good. It is based on the belief and principle
that the masses of men, having free opportunity to work out
(1) Elliott, AGMR, 111. Bryce, MD, I, 20.
(2) Maine, PG, 6, 59, 76. Bryce, MD, I, 23-26. cf also, PC.
(3) Training Teachers for Americanization, J. J. Mahoney,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1920, p. 13;
Lessons for Citizenship Training on Basic Principles of
the Government of the United States, Mary L. Guyton,
Massachusetts Department of Education, Boston, 1938.
(4) Giddings in DE, 199-214 and ES, 314-315 undertakes to
establish that democracy may be any of these forms or a
combination of them.
(5) Dewey, ED.

their own destiny, can, in the end, satisfy their actual
(1)
needs. In this government of, by, and for the people, in
which group policy is ultimately determined by the will of
the whole people, the participation of each person in the
various phases of group activity is free from such artificial
restrictions as are not indispensable to the most efficient
functionings of the community. Thus, it is apparent, that
the essence of democracy is the social process—not the for-
mal institutions. Democracy is a way of arriving at decisions
which will be binding on all the members of the community
when the time comes to act. It is a prescription for social
behavior by which all the people rule and are ruled. This
conception of democracy is held by such authorities as iiillhu
Root, Jeremiah Jenks and Woodrow Wilson.
The question is sometimes asked whether a
government elected by a majority of the peo-
ple does not represent the majority and also
the minority. .. .the fundamental intention in
any election is not to favor this or that
man.... it is rather.... a means of finding out
what the majority want. When the will of the
majority is known, all the people, members of
the minority as well as of the majority, want
that will carried out. So the President or
the Governor is the President or Governor,
not of one party, but of the entire people,
whose fundamental principle of government is
that the will of the majority is to rule....
Democratic government has been a success only
in those states where the minority has been
ready to accept the will of the majority as
that of the state and to join with the majority
in the enforcement of law. (2)
(1) Merriam, PTRT
,
"Chap" on Meaning of Democracy.
(2) Jenks, PP, 12.

The declaration of war between the United
States and Germany completely changed the re-
lations of all the inhabitants of this coun-
try to the subject of peace and war. Before
the declaration everybody had a right to dis-
cuss in private and in public the question
whether the United States should carry on war
against Germany.... Everyone holding these
views had a right by expressing them to seek
to influence public opinion and to affect the
action of the President and the Congress....
But the question of peace or war has been de-
cided.,.. When such a decision has been made
....it becomes the duty (of all the people)
to act, to proceed immediately to do every-
thing in their power to succeed in the war upon
which the country has entered.... A democracy,
which cannot accept its own decisions, made in
accordance with its own laws, but must keep on
endlessly discussing the questions already de-
cided, has failed in the fundamental require-
ments of self-government.... (l)
Democracy means first of all that we can gov-
ern ourselves. If our men have not self-
control then they are not capable of democra-
tic government.... We must not only take
common counsel but we must yield to and obey
common counsel. (2)
Democracy may be defined as a politically-organized
society the members of which undertake to accept, for the
purposes of control, the deliberate judgment of some prede-
(3)
termined number of its constituent membership --a majori-
ty, a plurality, or, sometimes, nothing less than 100% of
all participants.
(1) Gaus, DT, "The Duties of the Citizen," E'lihu Root, 163-
181.
(2) Gaus, DT, "What Democracy Means," Woodrow Wilson, 182-
195.
(3) Cleveland and Buck, BHG, 6.

b. The Concept—The United States of America
"Population has destroyed pure democracy. ... the New Eng-
land town meeting is unsuited to larger bodies of men.
wence, the growth of government by selected representatives.
Originally this form of government was intended to exclude
any element of democracy or direct action by the people. The
selected representatives were selected for the very reason
that the electors selecting them trusted their judgment....
Gradually, however, the demos asserted itself.... The inde-
pendent judgment of the representatives became mixed with an
(1)
element of consultation with the represented..." Since
consultation is a conscious process, this necessarily involves
the exercise by "the people" of their discretion and judg-
ment, which obviously entails the modification or curtailment
of independent judgment by the representative. When this oc-
curs, "the theory of representative government is departed
from; (they) cease to be representatives and become mere dele-
gates or agents automatically registering the decisions which
the people have reached. .. .this means that, as to instructed
matters, discussion and debate in the legislative chambers
(2)
is without meaning or result."
The essence of American government is democratic, though
it is a republic in form. Thus, the use of the term "repub-
lic" refers to the established institutional forms through
(1) RCAVP, 12, statement by Judge Clark, U.S. District Court.
(2) Willoughby and Rogers, IPG, 174-175.

which democracy acts. There is abundant evidence to substan-
tiate this -ore-position.
Perhaps the best evidence is the Preamble to the Con-
stitution of the United States which states in clear and un-
mistakeable language that "We, the People of the United
States.... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America." In contrast to the Articles of
Confederation which were submitted to the several states for
(1)
adoption, the Constitution of the United States was sub-
mitted directly to the people to be acted upon by conventions
(2)
chosen by the people of the several States. This is in-
direct democracy and to be distinguished from republicanism.
The people, in their collective and national
capacity, established the present Constitu-
tion.... in establishing it the people exer-
cised their own rights, and their own proper
sovereignty, and conscious of the plenitude
of it, declared with becoming dignity, "We
the people of the United States .. ..do ordain
and establish this Constitution.
To the Constitution of the United States the
term Sovereignty is totally unknown. There
is but one place where it could have been used
with propriety. But even in that place it
would not, perhaps, have comported with the
delicacy of those who ordained and established
that Constitution. They might have announced
themselves SOVEREIGN people of the United
States. (4)
(1) CUSA, 10.
(2) BUL, 447; CUSA, 226; Hawke v. Smith, 253 US 221, (1920).
(3) Opinion of Jay, C.J. in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419,
(1793).
(4) Ibid, opinion by Wilson, J; Tiedeman, UCUS, 38, "In the
United States, the people ordained and established their
constitution and they alone can alter or amend it and any
act of legislatures which transcends the provisions of the
Constitution is unconstitutional and void.." Fed, 321.

(1)
Chief Justice Marshall, in McCullough v. Maryland
insisted that the Constitution was the creation of "the peo-
ple" and not of any other "body, however responsible it might
be eventually to the people, when he said
The government proceeds directly from the
people .... their act was final. It required
not the affirmance, and could not be negatived
by the State governments. The Constitution
when thus adopted. ... bound the States.
This conception that America is a democracy, that the
people govern themselves either directly or through repre-
(2)
sentatives has been the accepted doctrine throughout the
years. It is not the same doctrine as that which declares
that the people elect representatives to govern them.
In 1920, the United States Supreme Court said, "The Con-
stitution of the United States was ordained by the people,
and when duly ratified it became the Constitution of the
United State s .... the power to ratify a proposed amendment to
the Federal Constitution has its source in the Federal Con-
stitution. 1 he act of ratification by the State derives its
authority from the Federal Constitution to which the State
(3)
and its people have assented." Thus it is plain that the
Constitution proceeds from the entire people and not from
(1) 4 Wheat on 316, (1819).
(2) Cong Rec, Aug. 10, 1957, 11127. The American form of
representative democracy is not a device for the removal
of responsibility from the shoulders of the people, but
on the contrary a method that inevitably places the re-
sponsibility there.
(3) Hawke v. Smith, 253 US 221; cf also, Dillon v. Gloss,
256 US 368, (1921)
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the States; that the State legislatures or the State conven-
tions, as the case may be, in ratifying an amendment to the
Federal Constitution, act as the instrumentalities not of
the people of the particular State, but of the people of the
United States.
They exercise a National function and they must exer-
(1)
else it in the way prescribed by the entire people.
In a representative democracy, the convention
is the supreme law-making body.... It is the
primary assembly of the people and the first
expression of their organized sovereignty. It
precedes the government in the order of its
genesis, and ever remains superior to it.
Hence it is the only body capable of making or
amending the organic law of the land known as
the constitut ion. . . . a convention, as the basis
of government, presupposes contract, which im-
plies legal capacity and political equality
between the parties in interest. (2)
Thus, there is ample justification for the proposition
that although in many Instances direct democracy Is impossi-
ble, the democratic process persists; although its form has
been considerably altered.
If democracy is direct participation by "the people" in
the policy-determining procedures, republicanism is repre-
sentative government, i.e., policy-determination by "the peo-
ple" through their selected representatives, not policy de-
termination for "the people" by their representatives. Thus,
it is fair to consider the United States as a democracy and
not as a"republic" In the sense that policy-determination would
i
(1) BUL, 482-483.
(2) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 13, 14, 23.

be performed largely by the selected representatives for
the people.
c. The Concept—American Democracy, as Expressed
in the Constitution
If democracy is conceived of as a principle of social
conduct, then the Constitution should be thought of as a
means by which such principle may become realized. The Amer-
ican Constitution bears that kinship to democracy as a violin
does to a melody; it is the instrument upon which the philo-
sophical melody is given concrete expression. The democratic
melody' calls for individual liberty of expression, religion,
property and security against the tyranny of majorities act-
ing under the pretext of law. The American Constitution
gives vitality to these matters by safeguarding the rights
(1)
and liberties of the individual man.
The quality of these rights under the American Consti-
tution may differ from the quality of the same rights under
another constitution much as the quality of tone of the
violin differs from that of the oboe or flute. What deter-
mined the character of American Constitutional democracy and
the quality of the rights thereunder? H. L. Carson answered
(2)
this question when he said
The proper view is to regard the Constitution
as the offspring of a mighty political gesta-
tion which had lasted for centuries.... Be-
hind the Constitution there stood the Thir-
teen Articles of Confederation: behind these
(1) Bloom, CSL, 1-3.
(2) 'handler, GBPC, Evolution of Representative Constitu-
tional Government ,

the Constitutions of the original Thirteen
States: behind these the Colonial Charters:
behind these the Charters of English Trading
companies: behind these the Charters of
English cities, towns and boroughs and be-
hind these the primitive institutions of the
days of Alfred the Great.
The historical view regards the Constitution as an im-
plement of the sovereign power for the keeping of that so-
cial order which results from the development of democratic
community-life over a long period of time. This interpret a-
(1)
tion of the Constitution as a means of restraint with a
I
view to giving efficacy to the social order is useful, if
properly understood.
The American Constitution is the system by which "the
people" abide so that they may live that brand of democracy
which by training, environment and reason, they most desire.
(1) Hadley, PR, 30. "Constitution serves much the same
purpose in public law which a fence serves in the defin-
ition and protection of private rights to real estate.
A fence does not make a boundary: it marks one."

2. The institution of the United States.
Prom the very beginning and until today there is to be
found a very respectable and eminent group of authorities wh
emphasize the idea that the American Constitution is a writ-
CD
ten document. The most commonly quoted statement affirm
ing this proposition is that made by the Rt. honorable Wil-
liam E. Gladstone, in 1887, when he said, "The Constitution
was the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time
(2)
by the brain and purpose of man." No less an authority
(3)
than Howard Lee McBain said, in 1927
As for the American Constitution we may say
for practical purposes that it is a document
as amended and interpreted to date, which
was drafted by a famous sitting in Philadel-
phia in the year 1787, which was ratified by
conventions called for that purpose in the
several States, and which went into effect
in 1789.
(1) Finer, TPMG, 120; McBain, LC, 13; Cleveland, OD, 295;
The American Constitutional Method, Homer Cummings, p. 2
Young, NAGW, 11, "The government under the Articles (of
Confederation) failed because it could not command the
respect and obedience of the States.... After numerous
attempts, Congress provided for a convention to meet at
Philadelphia in May, 1787, to revise the Articles. This
body .... devised an entirely new Constitution. The new
document was submitted to conventions in the States cho-
sen by the voters...." See also, The Making of the Con-
stitution, M. Parrand; History of American Political The
ories, C.K. Merriam; American Commonwealth, James Bryce;
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States, C.A. Beard; Foundations of American Na-
tionality, E.B. Greene; Cong Rec, Jan. 18, 1938, p.
1008 ff.
(2) Quoted in Chandler, GBFC, 3; Corwin, COC, 8b; cf . Bryce,
MD.
(3) McBain, LC, 11.

Herbert Croly, likewise, postulated in his thinking the
thesis that the American Constitution is a written document
and, therefore, a rigid constitution.
The United States Constitution really came
to be a monarchy of the Word.'l)
The rigid and dogmatic element in the....
Constitution competes with democracy for
the allegiance of the American political
conscience.... The truth is that the Amer-
ican democracy rallied to an undemocratic
Constitution.
The eminent Frederic J. Stimson has asserted, and with-
out equivocation, that the American Constitution is the
(3)
"written will of the people".
....when there is an Act of Congress or a
State legislature on the one hand, and on
the other the permanent will of the people
expressed in a written constitution, and the
two conflict, the courts have to choose which
is the "law"; and that, of course, must be
the higher law, their permanent written or-
ders, and not the act of their representa-
tives.... This latter is not really law at
all; for under the American idea that cannot
be law whether made by Congress or a State
legislature or ordered by the President, of-
ficer, board or commission which clashes with
the written will of the people.
Some publicists, insisting that the American Constitu-
tion is a written document, concede that one must go beyond
the four corners of the instrument if he will understand it
aright
.
(1) Croly, PD, 44.
(2) Croly, PD, 46-62.
(3) Stimson, ACPPR, 18-19.

Our American Constitutions are wholly writ-
ten, with this qualification, that some of
their principles are implied or assumed to
be inherent in our form of government, al-
though not expressed or at least aff irma- . .
tively expressed by any written provision.
*
1
'
And, too, the point of view is expressed that the Ameri-
can Constitution "is not a code of transient laws but a
framework of government and an embodiment of fundamental
(2)
principles." As opposed to this point of view, there are
(3)
those who agree with William B. Munro when he observes
The Constitution of the United States, to use
its own words, is "the supreme law of the
land".... Yet the written constitution....
is shorter than- the constitution of any other
nation and shorter than any of the state con-
stitutions. There are about 4000 words....
which can be read in half an hour.... but these
printed words do not by any means include the
whole Constitution of the United States. They
form only the basis, the starting point....
The architects of 1787 built only the base-
ment. Their descendants have kept adding
walls and windows, pillars and porches to make
a rambling structure which is not yet finished.
That is what the framers of the original con-
stitution intended. It was not in their minds
to work out a complete scheme for the govern-
ment of their country.
Munro believes that the written constitution is not a
framework of government embodying fundamental principles, but
rather "the point of a finger in the direction of the rising
sun"—an indication of the direction in which the people have
agreed to go and a marker pointing out the paths which their
(1) Baker, PLAC, I, 1.
(2) Mr. Rice's argument for the State of Rhode Island in the
National Prohibition Cases, 253 US 350, 355 (1920).
(3) Munro, C-US, 61.

delegated authorities may not pursue.
Let us consider for a moment whether the American Const!- 1
tution is or is not a written constitution.
It must be observed, first, that in addition to the
United States Constitution—be it written or unwritten
—
there are 48 States, each with a State constitution. There-
fore, the Constitution of the United States is not the only
constitution by which the inhabitants of the country live.
The United States Constitution recognized this fact in Arti-
cles IX and X of the Amendments thereto.
The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people. (1)
The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people. (2)
Second, because when the term CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES is used it refers to 4000 word document and not to
the State constitutions, it is both desirable and. expedient
to distinguish between the Constitution of the United States
T3l
and the American Constitution . The former refers di-
rectly to the Federal Constitution which, when adopted by the
(1) Ninth Amendment.
(2) Tenth Amendment.
(3) Such a distinction is made by F.A. Cleveland, TGD, 179,
where he points out that "The constitution of government
in the United States (i.e. the American Constitution) af-
ter the adoption of the federal plan, stated in order of
precedence, was made up as follows: (1) HThe Constitution
of the United States.." Cf also CUSA, 60, 62.

people, bound the States; it is the instrument which de-
fines and limits the powers of the President, the Congress
and the Judiciary; it tells these officers what they may do
and what they may not do; it places interdictions upon the
States: but nowhere does it require any citizen or any other
(2
person (not a properly delegated officer) to do anything.
It is proper, therefore, to distinguish between the Federal
Constitution (i.e., Constitution of the United States) and
the American Constitution. The latter is all-inclusive; it
comprehends all the constitutions (federal, State, local--
written and/or unwritten) under which the people live.
Is the Constitution of the United States wholly written
or is it partly written and partly unwritten? A moment's
reflection on such phenomena as the President's Cabinet, the
Congressional Committee System, the Judiciary's power to de-
clare Congressional enactments unconstitutional leads one to
the irresistable conclusion that there are many matters
—
which are integral parts of the Constitution of the United
States--which are not stated within the four corners of the
document, are not necessarily Implied from the expressly
delegated powers and which have never found sanction ex-
pressed by any "authoritative" pen, but which must be con-
sidered as part of the Constitution of the United
(1) McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat on 316 (1819); BUL, 448.
(2) Cooley, CL, 37, "These instruments measure the powers of
rulers, but they do not m easure the rights of the gov-
erned.... it grants no rights to the people."

(1)
States
.
Let us now turn to a consideration of--Y/hat Is the
nature of the American Constitution?
(1) Tiedemann, UCUS, 38-42, "Federal Constitution contains
only a declaration of fundamental and most general prin
ciples of constitutional law, while the real constitu-
tion, its flesh and blood, is unwritten."

3. Essentials of the American Constitution
a. Constitutional as Distinguished from Other Law
Men always search for the guarantee of the fundamentals
in their own civilization; and what is fundamental is ne-
cessarily construed in the light of the evolving civiliza-
(1)
tion. Thus, because stability and change, settlement
and flux are expected, men hover between these extremes and
struggle for their fixture in constitutions. Human society
does not wait for a constitution to be written. Whenever
urgent matters present themselves, the society establishes
"fundamentals", by laws or conventions, and those "funda-
mentals" which are not included within the written constitu-
tion are thus provided outside its pages. "The institutions
created without (written) constitutional benediction may be
so imbedded in the vital desires of men as to be able to
persist as fundamentals, even when the paper fundamentals
(2)
are swept away...." American society has its fundamen-
tals, and its constitution was established to safeguard
these fundamentals. The theory devised to explain the in-
stitutions so established "is by no means always a final
term, but like the constitutional law, too, is often simply
instrumental of more ultimate ideas, points of view, values,
or, to speak more definitely, is translative of the social
(3)
philosophies, outlooks and predilections...."
(1) Finer, TPMG-, 157. "There are no fundamentals capable of
standing proof against time, except entities so vague
as to be meaningless."
(2) Op. cit.
( 3 ) Corwin.^ GOG , 95^^ =

It Is often remarked that the American Constitution is
(1)
the supreme law of the land; and that ours is a govern-
(2)
ment of laws and not of men.
Made for an agricultural community with a
population of three and a half millions,
the Constitution is today the basic law of
the most highly industrialized community in
the world, supporting a population of nearly
one hundred and thirty millions.... Made
for the age of the ox- cart and the sailing
vessel, it still functions in an era of air-
planes, motor cars, movies and radios.
How marvelously farsighted and wonderfully omniscient
our forefathers must have been! But think--are not men the
producers and laws the products? What life or purpose would
lav/s have if there were no men to interpret and enforce
them?
....the 'living' body of law, this is mere
metaphor. The life of the law is borrowed
life. It is, like the life of man's other
material and intellectual products, borrowed
from the life of man. ( 4 )
This is what Bagehot, Gladstone's contemporary, meant
when he said, t! .«..the men of Massachusetts could work any
(5)
Constitution.
"
(1) Iviunro, GUS, Chap. V; CUSA, 636; Corwin, COC, 100, "Once
the Constitution was adopted it became the supreme law
of those elements of the American population who had op-
posed it as well as of those who had urged it."
(2) Goodnow, PCG, 2.
(3) Ibid, 85.
(4) KcBain, LC, 3; Dimock, MPA, 163.
(5) Quoted in COC, 85.

And so, when we say that the American Constitution pro-
vides for a "government of laws" and not for a "government
of men", we must understand this as connoting a government
in which the governed are told in advance what are to be the
(1)
rules of the game of living together.
By the process of formal revision and amendment as well
(2)
as by the very real process of informal development, the
American Constitution has become the instrument which essays
to guarantee the American democracy's "fundamentals" or
rights by limiting the powers of the delegated authorities;
it does not create rights. It is formless, dateless, and
was not, as Gladstone said it was, "struck off by the mind
(3)
and heart of man".
b. The American Constitution—Its Inclusions
The American Constitution may be divided into three
parts, according to the exercise of powers: (1) the Consti-
tution of the United States, (2) the forty-eight State Con-
stitutions, and (3) the sovereign powers of the people which
were not delegated to the Federal Government but which were
(4)
withheld from the States.
(1) McBain, LC, 4-6; @ page 272, "The Constitution. ... is no
final cause. It is a human means."
(2) McBain, LC, 25.
(3) Ibid, 13.
(4) Tenth Amendment, U. S. Constitution.

Sixty-five powers are given to the Federal
Government and seventy-nine are withheld,
of which thirteen are denied both to that
Government and the constituent States. For-
ty-three of the sixty-five powers given to
the Federal Government are expressly denied
to the States; while as to eighteen powers,
the grant is concurrent. (1)
If a power is not enumerated it is not possessed by the
Federal Government; if it is not excepted, it is possessed
by the State. "The State governments have everything that
is not conferred on the nation or specifically withheld; the
United States Government nothing that is not specifically
(2)
given" or necessarily implied. The federal constitution
and the constitutions of the forty-eight States, complement-
(3)
ing each other, form only the basis of our system. They
were drawn up with ends in view that were almost the opposite
of one another.
What our forefathers were afraid of in the
Federal Government was an aristocratic or
autocratic rule or a remote power which might
come to interfere in their domestic affairs.
Therefore, the influences which restrained
and limited the Federal Constitution were
democratic... The State Constitutions....
were rather aimed at protecting the proper-
tied classes from the omnipotent legisla-
tures.... Therefore, the restrictions are
imposed on the democratic legislatures in
the interest of property or order. ( 4 )
(1) Beck, TCUS, 210; see also Stimson, ACPPR.
(2) Hare, ACL, I, 94-95.
(3) MoBaln, LC, 13.
(4) Stimson, ACPPR, 24.

In one Instance democracy is encouraged, in another it
is distrusted. Something more, therefore, is necessary to
give direction and unity to these powers. That "something"
(1)
is the sovereign power which the people exercise. To-
gether, these three repositories exercise all the powers
under the American Constitution.
The American Constitution is both written and unwrit-
(2)
ten. It is usually, and incorrectly, designated as a
written constitution because it contains certain definite
(3)
written instruments. But it is as much, if not more,
unwritten.
The great body of American Constitutional
law is not found in the written documents 4
popularly called our written constitution.
'
(1) Mathews, ACS, 48; Beck, TCUS, 215; Read, CR, 3, "Funda-
mental Law Behind the Constitution of the United States
C.H. ivicllwain, "the non-enumerated powers are more im-
portant practically than the enumerated...."
(2) Arneson, ECL, 7; Horwell, UAC, 1, Once upon a time some
unknown humorist divided constitutions into written and
unwritten, and since then text-book after text-book has
taken his classification seriously. ... authors of our
text-books, when they speak of written versus unwritten
constitutions .... are not employing "written" and "un-
written" in the vulgar significations of those words.
According to their own account of the distinction, they
use "written" as a convenient abbreviation of "recorded
in a single document and placed out of reach of altera-
tion by the legislature,'* while "unwritten" in the same
code, signifies "composed of a variety of statutes, ju-
dicial decisions, and what not, and capable of being
amended by ordinary legislative enactment, or even by
the adoption of a new custom."
(3) Cleveland, TG-D, 179.
(4) Tiedeman, UCUS, 45.

The American Constitution is comprised of the following:
1. The written charter entitled "The Constitution of
the United States" together with the statutes and
treaties made in pursuance thereof.
2. The written charters in the several States entitled
"constitutions" insofar as they make provision for
the structure and exercise of the powers of govern-
ment .
3. The constitutional provisions of the statutes of
the United States and State Governments within
their several spheres.
a. Executive and administrative rules, orders,
and opinions of federal officials acting
under authority defined by the federal con-
stitution.
b. The structural and organic provisions con-
tained in statutes of the state governments,
including the charters of municipalities,
each operating within its own jurisdiction.
4. The constitutional rules of common law and judicial
precedent
.
5. The constitutional rules contained in customs,
usages, (l) and conventions within and without the
offices of government.
6. Local and municipal ordinances and administrative
acts within the authority conferred by state
governments
.
It is also necessary to stress that the unwritten terms
of the constitution are not only supplementary to the written
words, but often modify, through exception and interpreta-
(2)
tion, and sometimes even supercede, the written documents.
(1) Ma elver, Soc, 17. "Mores are the folkways ... .regulators
of behavior, not merely. .. .ways of behaving. Every so-
cial usage is also in a degree a social control."
(2) "The liberty of contract and the right of private property
which are protected by the limitations of the Constitution
are held subject to the police power of government to pass
and enforce laws for the protection of the public health,
public morals and public safety." Root, AGC, 115.

The following factual circumstances are stated in sup-
port of the proposition (1) that the American Constitution is
fundamentally unwritten, and (2) that the controlling indicia
are not the words of the written documents, but rather the
interpretations construed thereon in order to accord with
the will of the people.
(A) The thesis that the powers of the Federal Govern-
ment are powers expressly delegated or necessarily implied
in the express delegation of other powers is considered to
be elementary. Nowhere in that written delegation of powers
(1)
is Congress authorized to purchase land. Yet, it is a
reasonably logical implication from the conferred war powers
that the Federal Government could subjugate hostile terri-
tory and continue to hold it, even after the cessation of
hostilities, as a consequence of the proper exercise of its
war power.
.•..the power of the United States to
acquire territory and to govern it is an
exercise of the war power. (2)
It is equally reasonable to assert that war powers may
be properly exercised only in time of war. The purchase of
Alaska did not occur under such circumstances; but it would
be justified as a necessary step for national defense. How
far away from the country can the Federal Government go in
peace time in the prosecution of such steps for national
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, 142.
(2) American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511.

defense? The answer to this question is not found in the
written words of the Constitution of the United States.
(B) The Constitution of the United States explicitly
provides that "In case of the removal of the president from
office, or of his death, resignation or inability to dis-
charge the powers and duties of said office, the same shall
(1)
devolve upon the vice-president...." Yet, whenever a
vacancy occurs by reason of death, usage, and usage alone,
transforms the vice-president into a president in such a
(2)
contingency. On the other hand, when President Wilson
went to Paris after the World War, despite the mails and
telegraph, he was unable to perform adequately the duties of
his office. This incapacity to perform the presidential
duties because of distance from the Capitol led no one to
suppose for a moment that Vice-President Marshall would be-
come head of the nation, pro tern. Had he ever imagined such
a situation, "Mir, Wilson's going to Europe would. . . .never have
taken place ....and what happened at Versailles ... .would have
(3)
happened otherwise."
(C) The written Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that the president shall "with the advise and consent
of the senate--—make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
(1) Article II, sec. 1, cl. 6.
(2) Horwill, UAC, 58. "After August 2, 1923 everyone spoke
of President Coolidge and no one of Vice-President Cool-
idge.... It is commonly believed he became President...
this belief is entirely mistaken." Cf. Amendment XX,
sec. 3 of U. S. Constitution. -
(3) Ibid, 86.

senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with the advise and consent of the senate, shall appoint all
....officers of the United States whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall he established
(1)
by law." tjo advisory body other than the Senate is men-
tioned or suggested from the beginning to the end of the in-
strument. Although the consent of the Senate is still re-
quired for the ratification of treaties 8nd for official ap-
pointments, from the very beginning the President has never
met with the Senate in personal consultation, but has sub-
stituted therefor a Cabinet with which he does meet and con-
(2)
fer
.
With respect to making nominations for membership in
the Supreme Court, and other important nominations and ap-
pointments, the president has never taken the Senate's advice
on these matters but has conformed to party practice which,
ordains that he follow the advice of the senator or senators
of his own party, if any, from the State in which the ap-
(3)
pointment is to be made. On entering the White House,
(1) U.S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. II, cl. 2.
(2) Horwill, UAC, 101; Mathews, ACS, 147, Although the framers
of the Constitution evident ly intended by Art. II, sec.
II, cl. 1 and 2 that there would be created executive de-
partments from which the President might require opinions,
"the cabinet as such is not recognized in the Constitution
....the Senate was expected to act as the President's ad-
visory council." Corwin, CWKT, 56, "the principal offi-
cers....' of the executive departments' have, since V/ashing
ton's day, composed the President's Cabinet, a body utter-
ly unknown to the Constitution. They are invariably of
the President's own party and loyalty to the President is
an indispensable qualif ication. ... (there is nothing) to
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Theodore Roosevelt declared this to be his policy
In tie appointments I shall go on exactly as
I did while I was Governor of New York. The
Senators and Congressmen shall ordinarily
name the men, but I shall name the standard,
and the men have got to come up to it. (1)
It is the Senator, therefore, who makes the nomination,
subject to the President's approval, before submission to
(2)
the Senate for its consent.
Furthermore, although the written constitution does not
mention it, it has become settled constitutional practice
that the whole membership of the Cabinet and of the Supreme
Court shall not be drawn from anv one state or even from one
(3)
section of the country. There is no attempt, however, to
keep anything like an exact balance.
(4)
(D) The case of In Re iMeagle further illustrates the
proposition that Federal officers do have powers not speci-
fically delegated nor necessarily implied from those powers
in fact delegated by terms of the written constitution. In
this case, Mr. Justice Field, a member of the United States
Supreme Court, having rendered a judgment unfavorable to
(2) (continued from page 30) prevent the President from mak-
ing his Cabinet up out of the chairmen of the principal
committees of the House of Representatives.
(3) (from page 30) Mo Bain, LC, 26.
(1) J.B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time", 1920,
Vol. 1, 157.
(2) McBain, LC, 26.
(3) Horwill, UAC, 183.
(4) 135 US 1, (1890).

one Terry, was threatened with violence by the latter while
traveling on circuit in California. Under these circum-
stances, the President sent along deputy-marshal Neagle to
act as bodyguard for the Justice. A short time thereafter,
when Terry committed a murderous assault on the Justice,
Neagle shot and killed the assailant. Upon being indicted
for murder in the California State court, Neagle interposed
as his defense the President's order. In upholding the
President's right to issue such an order, the United States
Supreme Court admitted there was no special act of Congress
which authorized the President to furnish bodyguards to
federal judges. Nevertheless, said the Court, an assault
upon a Federal judge while in the discharge of his official
duties is a breach of the peace of the United States as dis-
tinguished from the peace of the State in which the assault
took place.
It is within the power and duty of the Presi-
dent to take measures for the protection of
a Federal judge whenever there is just reason
to believe he would be in personal danger
while executing the duties of his office.
(E) While the Constitution of the United States requires
each House of Congress to "keep a journal of its proceedings
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts
(2)
as may in their judgment require secrecy," it does not
impose upon either Eouse the obligation to hole, its sessions
(1) Mathews, ACS, 147.
(2) Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 3.

in public. If the doors of either chamber were closed during
debate, however, such behaviour would be regarded as a breach
(1)
of the unwritten constitution.
(F) Tradition, not the written constitution, prescribes
(2)
that a President may not be re-elected for a third term,
let, actually our Constitution can be amended today (as it
has been amended for the last 150 years) by process of in-
terpretation.
New senses are given to old words; the grow-
ing political foot, by sheer pressure,
changes the old stiff shoe.( 3V
The United States Constitution does not prescribe any
limit to the re-eligibility of the President. But, since
Washington, in his Farewell Address, declined re-election
on the ground that the safety of republican institutions
demanded imposition of a limit to the President's re-eligi-
bility, this principle has become accepted by the people and
imbedded in our unwritten constitution to such an extent
that it is indeed as effective as it might have been were it
specifically incorporated in the written constitution. But,
if in the future, a President would be elected for a third
term, it would not be regarded as unconstitutional in the
sense that he would be prevented from holding office. His
election for a third term would be regarded as a repeal of
(1) Horwill, UAC, 175.
(2) KcBain, LC, 26.
(5) Weyl, TND, 109.
•I
the constitutional rule previously enunciated
This is an example of a limitation of the
unwritten constitution, which finds no au-
thority whatever in the written Constitu-
tion, and yet as long as public opinion does
not undergo a change, it is as "binding as
any written limitation, and even more bind-
ing than some of the plainest directions of
the written Constitution.
(G) The written Constitution directs that for the
'
election of President and Vice-President of the United States
Each state shall appoint, in such manner as
the legislature thereof may direct, a number
of electors, equal to the whole number of
senators and representatives to which the
state may be entitled in Congress. (2)
The electors shall meet in their respective
states, and vote by ballot for President
and Vice-President .... and shall make distinct
lists of all persons voted for.... and trans-
mit to the seat of government of the United
States, directed to the President of the
Senate .... (who) shall in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open
all the certificates and the votes shall then
be counted. . . . (3)
In no part of the written constitution is any reference
made to political parties or is their use in any way con-
templated. The real living constitutional rule for the se-
lection of a President and a Vice-President is not that they
be selected after deliberation by the electors, but, that
they must be nominated by political parties and selected by
a popular election, indirectly through the choice of the
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, 51-53.
(2) Art II, sec. I, el. 2.
( 3 ) Ame ndment XII
.
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(1)
electors of one party or of the other.
The Constitution decrees that the President
shall be chosen by groups of electors in
the several states.,.. But political par-
ties early decreed otherwise. Candidates
are nominated by parties and electors chosen
thereafter merely rubberstamp these nomina-
tions. The form remains; the substance has
long since passed into limbo. (2)
(H) The first amendment to the Federal Constitution
provides, among other things, that Congress shall pass no
laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. But the
Supreme Court has held that Congress may abridge religious
practices of the Mormons insofar as they provide for poly-
(3)
gamy, because polygamy was made a crime by Congressional
enactment and the exercise of any rights under the Bill of
Rights must be held to be subordinate to the police power.
A vested interest cannot because of condi-
tions once obtaining be asserted against the
proper exercise of the police power. (4)
The police power of the State cannot be ab-
dicated nor bargained away. (5)
Thus, the exceptions to the written constitution which
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, 49; Horwell, UAC, 210.
(2) McBain, LC, 25-26.
(3) Davis v. Beason, 153 US 335, 342, (1890). "Polygamy
is a crime by the laws of all civilized and Christian
countries; to call the advocacy of it a tenet of reli-
gion is to offend the common sense of mankind." Watson
v. Jones, 13 Wallace 679; Reynolds v. United States,
98 US 145$ New v. United States, 245 Fed 710, (1917).
(4) Kadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 US 394, (191b).
(5) Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 US 67, (1915).

existed at common law still exist and must be construed as
(1)
being in force as though they were also written.
The unwritten portion of the American Constitution is
not confined to the unwritten exceptions and the necessary-
elaborations on the written constitutions. There are many-
parts to the American Constitution which are unwritten, in
the sense that they were either not conceived or not con-
sidered within the written documents. These parts of the
Constitution can be understood only in terms of the customs,
usages, conventions and the common law.
Emlin McClain argues that if the written constitutions
do not express the will of the people with reference to the
distribution and limitation of the powers of government,
(2)
then we have no authoritative constitution. The written
constitutions do in fact express the will of the people;
but since there are many matters upon which the people have
not expressed their will in writing, it does not follow
that they have no will or do not express it otherwise.
McClain' s argument postulates the very proposition which he
sets out to prove, i.e., that the constitution is written,
therefore, if the will of the people is not written, there
can be no constitutional provision expressing their will.
Again he argues
(1) CUSA, 589-1011.
(2) McLain, CLUS, 14.
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An example of what purports to be part of
our unwritten constitution is that no presi-
dent shall he elected for more than two con-
secutive terms.... But it is evident that
these so-called rules are no part of our con-
stitutional law... no one would pretend if
such limitation were ignored and a president
nominated and elected for a third term that
he was not lawfully president of the United
States and have all the authority of presi-
dent. No Congress or Court would venture to
say that his election was for that reason
invalid. . .
.
This argument would he valid if its premises were
sound. If in fact it were true that the Constitution were
wholly written, then, of course, it is reasonable to assert
that it could not be amended except as provided. But, the
argument begs the question, again, by assuming that con-
clusion. If the constitution is also unwritten in part,
then why cannot that part be amended in ways other than those
indicated within the limits of the written documents? The
answer is--they can.
Any such general rules and principles, though
they may be said in some sense to be a part
of the unwritten constitution under our form
of government, are not of equal authority
with the provisions of our written constitu-
tions and are not in a legal sense limita-
tions on the powers of government .( 1
)
Here again IJcClain's argument reduces itself to the
proposition, not that the unwritten part of the constitution
is not constitution, but that one part of the constitution
is more important than the other— a suggestion of dubious
quality. He also suggests that the constitution is really
(1) McClain, 10, 15-16.

"in a legal sense limitations on the powers of government".
To accept this proposition is to make the impossible capitu-
lation to the thesis that the American Constitution is sim-
ply a constitution for the control of the authorities. The
reasoning confounds politics with legalistics— and misses the
vital distinctions between the exercise of political power
as a matter of expediency, discretion and/or wisdom and that
of constitutionality or permissibility, as a matter of legal
determination predicated on the political questions previous-
ly determined.
The President exercises the power of removal as well as
of appointment. The written constitution nowhere makes pro-
vision for such power of removal. Where did the President
get it? The American constitutional process, and therefore
the American constitution itself, cannot be understood with-
out the political parties, their caucuses and conventions.
Not a single word is used in the written constitution to
recognize even the existence of political parties. The
written constitution enumerates the powers and duties of the
President, Congress, and the Judiciary. What about the
rights and duties of the ci ti zens--and the others living in
the community. When, and how, must the citizen perform his
duties? What happens if he is guilty of nonfeasance, mis-
feasance, or malfeasance? The written documents are silent
on these matters. The answers to these questions can be
found only by resorting to the unwritten portion of the
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American Constitution.
The American Constitution is composed of two parts;
written and unwritten. The latter consists of the implica-
tions and exceptions to the written documents, and the "pow-
ers reserved to the people", the customs, and the common law.
Custom, based upon the social standard of justice, is
at the "basis of the constitution. "This social constitution
....supplies organic life to the civil institutions .... and
thus reflects both the national conscience and the national
(1)
will." This custom is part of the unwritten American
constitution.
It is the mores of the American community which recog-
nizes the "equality among men as the basis of sovereignty
and the only source whence authority and power can legiti-
(2)
mately originate." The proposition that this is a gov-
ernment of laws instead of persons is sanctioned only be-
cause sovereignty is recognized as belonging exclusively to
the people. It is for that reason that the written consti-
tutions recognize that the delegation of the people's sover-
eignty to the various departments prescribes to each the
limits of its authority and that there is thereby constituted
a government of limited powers. So understood, the written
constitutions complement the unwritten constitution.
(1) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 3-4.
(2) Ibid, 11-12.

Perhaps the most important part of the American Consti-
tution is the common law. What is the common law? It is
the common sense of the community. As the sense of the com-
munity changes, so the common law also changes.
After the Revolution the public was extremely
hostile to England and to all that was Eng-
lish and it was impossible for the common
law to escape the odium of its English ori-
gin. Judges and legislators were largely
influenced by this populer feeling.... Under
the influence of such ideas, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Kentucky legislated against
citation of English decisions in the courts.
There was a rule against such citations in
New Hampshire.... In large part, however, it
was but a phase of the opposition of the
frontiersman to scientific law. There, the
refined, scientific law that weighs and bal-
ances and deliberates and admits of argument
is out of place. A few simple rules which
everyone understands and a swift decisive
tribunal best serve such a community, (l)
The vigorous good sense of the judges made over the
(2)
common law of England for our pioneer communities, and
since then have announced the common law as they have sensed
the mental climate of the public. How is this done?
One judge looks at problems from the point of
view of history, another from that of philoso-
(1) Pound, SCL, 116.
(2) Ibid, 137; 115, "It has long been the orthodox view that
the colonists brought the common law with them and that
the English la\v has obtained in this country from the be-
ginning. But this is only a legal theory. In fact the
colonists began with all manner of experiments in admin-
istering justice without law and it was not till the
middle of the eighteenth century that the setting up of
a system of courts and the rise of a custom of studying
law in England began to make for a general administration
of justice according to the English law."
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phy, another from that of social utility,
one is a formalist, another is a latittudina-
rian, one is timorous of change, another
dissatisfied with the present; out of the
attrition of diverse minds there is beaten
something which has a constancy and uniform-
ity and average value greater than its com-
ponent elements. The same is true of juries.^-'
Thus is the common law discovered. It is the "unwritten
law" of the community.
The question is sometimes pre sented--which. is more im-
portant, or more fundamental, the vritten or the unwritten
constitution? The better weight of authority seems to be
committed to the proposition that "customary government or
the unwritten constitution is subordinate to, and to that
extent modified by both the written constitutions and the
(2)
acts of the legislature."
The constitution overrides a statute, but
a statute, if consistent with the consti-
tution, overrides the laws of the judges.
In this sense, judge-made law is secondary
and subordinate to the law that is made by
legislators. It is true that codes and sta-
tutes do not render the judge superfluous,
nor his work perfunctory and mechanical.
There are gaps to be filled. (3)
On the other hand, there is authority which submits to
the suggestion that constitutional government emerged to
protect vested rights and that, therefore, the independent
judiciary upholds the unwritten constitution by enforcing
(4)
limitations upon the written constitution.
(1) Cardozo, NJP, 177.
(2) Cleveland, OD, 315.
(3) Cardozo, NJP, 14.
(4) Haines, RNLC, 342.

Properly understood, both groups of authorities are
right in their assertions. But it must be understood that
they are discussing different things. When the written
constitutions conflict with the unwritten constitution
—
stated in another way, when the matter of constitutionality
or legality is opposed by the matter of political expediency
--the former must give way. When, however, there is no con-
flict between political capacity and constitutionality, but
there is question as to the proper exercise of the sovereign
power conceded to be authorized, then, it is not a question
of conflict between written and unwritten constitutions, but
rather as to the proper manner of exercising delegated sov-
ereign powers and those having the written sanction must
prevail and be responsible to "the people".

4. Interpretation of the American ConstitutionL p-p-
The Supreme Court is a judicial tribunal. Its power
extends only to actual cases and controversies between bona
fide adversaries in the course of everyday litigation. It
has no legislative power, no executive power, no power even
(2)
to advise a legislature. But it does have the power of
judicial review, the power to determine whether a legislative
enactment is or is not in accordance with the principles of
(5)
the American Constitution. What is the result of the
exercise of such power?
Professor E.S. Corwin' s stand is that the Court, through
its power of interpretation, has largely displaced the Ameri-
(4)
can Constitution with its opinions. For is not the
Constitution what the Supreme Court says it is? And what
limit is imposed upon the Court's power of interpretation
which it has construed for itself?
The amended document of 1789 has become .
little more than a point of reference...^ 5 '
Ernst Freund agrees, substantially, with Corwin that
the Court's power of constitutional interpretation is politi-
cal in nature and has resulted in revising the Constitution.
(1) U.S. Constitution, Art. Ill, sec. 1, "The judicial power
of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court
and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."
(2) BUL, "Supreme Court's Part in Building a Nation", Bowman,
p. 446.
(3) McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat on 315, (1819).
(4) Corwin, COC, 126.
(5) Op. cit.

American constitutional law represents
political action through judicial methods,
dependent for success upon the ignoring,
"by common consent, of the political nature
of the process. To judge the performance
of the courts by purely legal standards is
to misjudge it. (1)
But Mr. Justice Frankfurter agrees with Justice Marshall
that the words of the written constitution not only leave
the Individual justice free, hut, indeed, compel him "to
gather meaning, not from reading the Constitution, hut from
(2)
reading life". Resort to the maxims and principles of
(3)
the common law must be constantly had.
The interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States is necessarily influenced
by the fact that its provisions are framed
in the language of the English common law
and are to be read in the light of its
history. (4)
Some say that it is the Congress, not the Supreme Court,
that has developed, revised, and amended our constitution.
We usually speak of the huge development of
our constitution by judicial interpretation.
Everything, right or wrong, is laid on the
doorstep. .. .espe cially of the Supreme Court.
But the courts have nothing to interpret,
nothing to develop, until Congress or the
State legislatures have acted. Legislative
interpretation, legislative development,
comes first.
The cour ts . . . .ha ve merely permitted what
Congress has prescribed.... In a very real
sense, therefore, it may be said that the
(1) ESS, "Constitutional Law", Vol. IV, 254.
(2) ESS, "The Supreme Court", Vol. VIII, 479-480.
(3) South Carolina v. United States, 199 US 449, (1905);
Gompers v. United States, 233 US 610, (1914).
(4) Smith v. Alabama, 124 US 465, 478, (1888); CUSA, 63;
U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 US 649, (1898).

Constitution has been developed by Act of
Congress. (1)
Yet, we must return to the fact that it is the Court
which determines whether the act of Congress may or may not
be given effect. This function of the Court is condemned as
being out of accord with the American constitutional princi-
ple that the constitution is the property of the people, not
of the judges, and that, therefore, it is for the people
(through their duly elected representatives) and not for the
courts to determine the principles and policies in accordance
with which our constitution is to be interpreted and our
(2)
government administered. Thus, it is contended that when
the court uses its powers of interpretation it it acting as
a super-legislature.
We are governed by our judges and not by
our legislatures. (3)
Is it true that because the Supreme Court does have the
power to declare an act of legislation void--if in its opin-
ion the act contravenes some provision of the Constitution
--that the Court thus does amend the constitution? Is it
true that when the Supreme Court reverses its own former de-
cisions and interpretations of the constitution that it makes
a new constitution for government? Is the American Constitu-
tion what the United States Supreme Court says it is? Does
(1) McBaln, LC, 30-31.
(2) Ransom, MR J, 3-6.
(3) Read, CR, "Constitutional History and the Higher Law,"
H.S. Commager, pp. 231, 236.

the Court seek to impose what seems to it to be the reason-
able construction, or does it seek to find out how "the peo-
ple" think and announce that as the proper interpretation?
The Constitution of any community consists of those
fundamental principles in accordance with which government
is constructed and its orderly administration conducted.
These fundamental principles develop in accordance with na-
tional cultural growth. Since society is dynamic, cultural
changes necessarily modify the fundamental principles which
are conditioned by such factors. Therefore, unless a static
social order can be maintained, the American Constitution
must continue to express itself in different ways. The Am-
erican constitutional method is a process of adaptation and
growth, as well as a means whereby wrongs may be corrected
and governmental measures be attuned to the essentials of
(1)
justice through the orderly ways of discussion and education.
It is not so much what is found in the written
constitution, as the conservative, law-abiding
and yet liberty-loving character ... .which
guarantees a permanent free government to
the. . ..U.S.A. ( 2 )
The American people ordained and established their con-
stitution and, as Sovereign, created governmental agencies
as instruments through which they might express their sover-
eign will. The authorities as agents cannot, therefore, ex-
tend themselves beyond the limits of the reasonable exercise
(1) CT, American Constitutional Method, H. Curamings, 18.
(2) Tiedeman, UCUS, 20.

of the delegated powers. The powers of the Supreme Court,
no less than that of Congress or of the President, are cir-
cumscribed by this principle. The powers of the Supreme
Court are different from the powers of any other authority.
Its power is judicial; to adjudicate or to adjust controver-
sies. How? In accordance with the fundamental law which
represents the will of the people. The American Constitu-
tion and "the laws of the United States ... .made in pursuance
(1)
thereof" is the supreme law of the land. Thus the judi-
cial function necessarily Involves interpretation. This
power of interpretation concerns itself with such questions
as --What are the terms of the constitution? Are the legis-
lative enactments in agreement with the terms of the Consti-
tution? Even if It were conceded that all legislative en-
actments do in fact mirror the will of the people, when any
such enactment does in fact violate a constitutional prin-
ciple which is also conceded to reflect the will of the peo-
ple, then we are confronted with a situation in which "the
people" have two conflicting wills. One must give way.
Which one? The constitution expresses the more fundamental
will and therefore must take precedence. But, as we have
seen, the constitution is unwritten as well as written.
What are its unwritten terms? Have they changed? If so,
to what extent?
(1) U. S. Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 2.

It is plain, therefore, that this necessary function of
judicial interpretation, in obedience to the stress of public
opinion makes the express limitations of the written consti-
tutions mean one thing at one time, and at another time an
(1)
altogether different thing. The court strives to give
efficacy to the will of the people, which, in its largest
part, is unwritten. This necessarily is a matter of inter-
pretation. The judge and the lawyer say "law if found, not
(2)
made"; and from their point of view this is true. The
people, however, find difficulty in understanding this view
because to them law is law, not because it is discovered,
but because, having desired it, they will it and thus create
(5)
it. This is the fundamental law (the unwritten constitu-
tion) which the court finds. The court's function, there-
fore, is to discover the will of the people, which is the
fundamental law. As the people's will changes, so must the
court's decisions. It is not that the Court has changed its
mind; it is that the people have now willed differently.
This is to be expected in a changing society.
Thus, the Supreme Court is part and parcel of the or-
ganic process of a government resting on popular sovereignty
(4)
end registering public opinion in its governmental acts.
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, 44.
(2) Pound, SCL, 99.
(3) 0p. cit.
(4) CT, American Constitutional Method, H. Cummings, 4.

Whenever possible, the court strives to be consistent and
often makes distinctions where no reel differences exist.
When this is not possible, the court simply "overrules it-
CD
self", i.e., the Court in determining present unwritten
constitutional principles must now overrule its earlier
statement of what was the constitutional principle or rule.
(2)
Thus, in the Dartmouth College case the Supreme
Court held that a corporate charter was an inviolable grant
which could not constitutionally be impaired by subsequent
legislation because this would be impairment of obligation
of contract and void under the United States Constitution.
Later in the Charles River Bridge case, the United States
Supreme Court revised the application of this principle by
subordinating its operation to the general welfare of the
community.
While the rights of private property are
sacredly guarded, we must not forget that
the community also have rights and that
the happiness and well-being of every cit-
izen depends on their faithful preserva-
tion. (5)
This constitutional principle was reaffirmed in the
(4)
Beer Company v. Massachusetts case when the Court stated
that there is no impairment of obligation of contract made
(1) CT, A Nation is Brought into Being, H. Cummings, 24.
(2) 4 Wheat on 518.
(5) Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren River Bridge Co.,
11 Peters 420, 548.
(4) 97 US 25; cf also, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 US 678.

with a brewing or distilling corporation that its business
is subsequently destroyed and its property rendered value-
less, by a general prohibition of the manufacture and sale
of intoxicating liquors. This original constitutional prin-
ciple which is substantially modified, if not abrogated al-
(1)
together, arises out of a change in public opinion.
The contracts which the Constitution protects
are those that relate to property rights,
not governmental. ( 2 '
(3)
Likewise, in the E.C. Knight case the Court held
that under the Sherman Anti -trust Act a monopolistic combin-
ation of manufacturers could not be constitutionally reached
by the anti-trust laws since manufacture was not commerce
and therefore was exempt from the control by Congress. A
few years later, after j, the people" had concerned themselves
with this issue, the Court, in reconsidering the Sherman
(4)
Act, held, in the Northern Securities case that while
the Act might affect local conditions it could nevertheless
be constitutionally applied even to transactions local in
character if they ooerated to effect a restraint on inter-
(5)
state commerce.
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, Chap. V.
(2) Stone v. Mississippi, 101 US 814. The repeal of a char-
ter of a lottery company by a new provision of the state
constitution is nothing more than an exercise of police
power and does not impair the obligation of contract.
(3) 156 US 1, (1895).
(4) Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 US 197,
(1904).
(5) CT, The American Constitutional Method, H. Cummings, 8.

There are times when the Supreme Court simply overrules
its earlier decisions. An outstanding instance was when
the Supreme Court overruled the case of HeDburn v. Gris-
(1) (2)
wold with its findings in the Legal Tender Cases.
What then is the true relationship of the Court to the
Constitution? The better view see^s to be that the "Supreme
(3)
Court feels the touch of public opinion". The Court
knows that the Constitution belongs to the people* that its
function is to find the law which the people have made and
to apply it to the controversies which it is called upon to
adjudicate. The terms of the Constitution change with the
times. This is to be expected. The Court must, therefore,
discover the new terms and apply them. The Court attempts
to do this by considering, not merely the "private prefer-
ences of the judges as individuals, but rather .... the im-
pressions produced on their minds by the general public
sense of what is just and what is necessary in the public
int ere st .... such public discussion. .. .is. . . .an important and
valid aid in acquainting them with seme of the weighty fac-
(4)
tors which properly enter into the process of decision."
(1) 8 Wallace 603, (1870).
(2) 12 Wallace 457, (1871). The doctrines of the Legal Ten-
der Cases were reaffirmed in Julliard v. Greenman,
101 US 421, and the "Gold Clause Cases", Norman v. Balti-
more and Ohio R.K. Co., 294 US 240, (1937).
(3) Bryce, AC, I, 273.
(4) CT, American Constitutional Method, H. Cummings, 13-14.

Thus, as the people change the "fundamental law", the Court's
pronouncement of what the constitutional principles are must
change accordingly. Thus, THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DFCISIS
(1)
DOES NOT APPLY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. It cannot; be-
cause it cannot apply to the people's will.
Sometimes, however, the Court is unable to discover the
people's will, or misconstrues it. In this contingency, a
constitutional amendment is in order. Thus, the eleventh
amendment to the United States Constitution had to be adopted
to undo the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Geor-
(2)
gia. The thirteenth amendment eradicated the effect of
(3)
the Dred Scott decision, and. the sixteenth amendment
made a Federal income tax possible over the Supreme Court's
(4)
decision in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Company.
It is the Court's function to interpret the will of
the people and apply that will as it finds it. If and when
the Court fails (and imperfection is possible in any humanly
devised institution) the people express their will which
then prevails over the Court's estimate thereof. The Court's
power of discovering and applying this will necessarily in-
volves interpretative powers. The exercise of such powers
would constitute constitution-making if the members of the
judiciary undertook to apply their personal wills to the
(1) Stimson, ACPPR, 29.
(2) 2 Dallas 419.
(3) 19 Howard 393.
(4) 158 US 601; Finer, TPMG, 120.

Court's business. In the absence of definite proof to this
effect--and all that is forthcoming is a series of infer-
ences and implications to this effect based on circumstan-
tial innuendoes— the presumption of regularity ought to
apply and the Court be considered as properly performing--
to the best of its ability--its delegated powers.

5. Definitive Summary Concept
(1)
The American Constitution is a means to an end.
The Constitution is an instrument of govern-
ment, in general terms, made and adopted by
the people for practical purposes. (2)
(3
Since the Constitution presupposes an organized society,
(4)
it can be considered to be a "framework of government"
in the sense that the government is of, for, and by the peo-
ple. That is what Judge Cooley meant when he wrote that
the American Constitution is that "body of rules and maxims
in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are ha-
(5)
bitually exercised". Thus, this "complex pattern of
(6)
social regulation" might be regarded, not as the funda-
(7)
mental law, but "simply ius civile".
The Constitution itself is in every real
sense a law—the lawmakers being the
people themselves. (8)
The Constitution as a means is "In the nature of a
covenant of the sovereign people with each individual there-
(9)
of".
(1) McBain, LC, 4.
(2) CUSA, 62.
(3) Cooley, CL, 37.
(4) Dimock, MPA.
(5) Cooley, CL. 2; Ordronaux, C Leg in US, 173.
(6) Read, CR, "Afterthoughts on Constitutions", Carl
Becker, 397.
(7) Read, CR, 127.
(8) CUSA, 636.
(9) Cooley, GPCL, 23.

The Constitution did not derive its binding
efficacy from the signatures of the dele-
gates, but from the vote of the Conventions
called for that purpose.... The States ra-
tified the Constitution, not as their act,
but as the act of the people of the United
States . ... (1
)
The Constitution. .. .was adopted by the peo-
ple through delegates elected for the ex-
press purpose of considering and deciding
upon it ... . ( 2
)
The federal and State governments are in fact
but different agents and trustees of the
people .... the ultimate authority, wherever
the derivative authority may be found, re-
sides in the people alone. (3) .
It is evident, therefore, that one of the parties to
this covenant is the community impersonated as "the people"
acting through different agencies as the occasion demands.
The other party to this covenant is the individual person
who strives that his natural rights and liberties be made
(4)
immutable and unassailable and who, to this end, has
become a party to the covenant. Thus, this covenant, the
American Constitution, is the means by which the individual
persons and the community seek to guaranty to themselves
certain ideals. It is the mechanism adopted to effectuate
that social process, called Democracy, which is considered
to be the way of realizing the desired ends by obligating
the parties to the covenant to abide by its terms.
(1) Hare, ACL, I, 92.
(2) Cooley, GPCL, 25-25.
(3) Fed, 321.
(4) Bloom, CSL, 2-3.

This covenant, by Its terms, formulates the rights of
the individual against the community, and reciprocally, of
(1)
the community against the individual. This means that it
" (2)
provides for a government of laws, or, rules of conduct;
otherwise there could be no rights or duties.
For practical purposes the Constitution is
that which the government in its several de-
partments and the people in the performance
of their duties as citizens, recognize and
respect as such, and nothing else is. ...(3)
Thus the Constitution is a living dominant force exer-
cised by the people for their national and individual pro-
tection. "It is literally the voice and will of the Ameri-
(4)
can people ... .their present voice, their present will.
The constitution of a country is made up of
that part of the law which deals with the
essentials of the governmental system....
every political unit has a constitution in
this sense, with parts which may be written
and others which are unwritten. We may pro-
perly speak of the United States having a
constitution in this broad sense.
The American Constitution is conceived of as a covenant
between two persons--the community (i.e., "the people") im-
personated as sovereign and each individual member thereof
impersonated as subject—to follow specified procedures
when making decisions about questions of common Interest,
policies to be adopted, or action to be taken; and by the
terms of which responsibilltiesmay be established.
(1) Wilson, CGUS, Chap I
(2) Goodnow, PCG, 2.
(3) Ibid, 10.
(4) Bloom, CSL, 6.
(5) Arneson, ECL, 4.
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B. Rights
1. Meaning of a Right
Grotius said that a right is that quality In a person
which makes it just for him either to possess certain things
(1)
or to perform certain actions. Taking a cue from this
observation, we may note that the matter of rights is con-
cerned with persons and relationships.
Let us turn, first, to the concept of "person". What
or who is a person? The answer to this question necessarily
depends upon the purpose for which we wish to use the term
"person". A biologist conceives of a person as a physical
organic unity (biological organism) whose parts are related
to each other in a certain way and which behave in a defined
manner under predetermined conditions. The psychologist has
a very different standard for determining what is a person;
to him, a person is any entity which has a mind. The philo-
sopher, likewise, has his criteria; he regards any entity as
a person which is capable of exercising choice between al-
ternatives. The sociologist, the political scientist and
the legalist, too, have their tests for deciding what is and
what is not a person. It should be evident, therefore, that
the term "person" has, depending upon the circumstances in
which it is used, different meanings. Basically, a person is
an institution. It is any entity to which rights and powers,
duties and responsibilities are attributed. Thus it may be
(1) Quoted in SCL, 90.

created or abolished. It is an invention of the human mind
which depends upon the factor of recognition for its very-
existence. Corporeality, tangibility, and human character-
istics are not determinative of such recognition. Thus,
before the Civil War, slaves, human beings, were not, in the
eyes of the law, persons; they were regarded as so many
items of chattel property. After the proper legal formali-
ties were fulfilled, these very same units of personality
became vested, in the eyes of the law, with the attributes
of personality; the "things" had become "persons". This
process of transformation, better still, the "creation" of
the persons, was accomplished simply by recognizing these
entities as having rights and duties which had not been ac-
corded to them earlier. Thus, the fact of legal recognition,
not the fact that they were human beings, made them legal
persons
.
A person need not be a human being nor need he have cor-
poreality. Judge Marshall, in the famous Dartmouth College
case, said that a corporation is a legal person; it is a
"legal entity, invisible, intangible and existing only in
contemplation of the law", 'i'hat contemplation suffices. It
makes the corporation real and alive. The corporation can
sue its debtors, attach their wages, and sell their property
to satisfy its just claim; it can be sued, its property at-
tached and later sold to satisfy any just claims of its
creditors. This person which cannot be seen or touched is

as real as anything in the community because it is recognized
and treated as a person. But it is a person only to the ex-
tent that it has gained such recognition, and no more.
As to the American Civil Liberties Union,
which is a corporation, it cannot be said
to be deprived of the civil rights of free-
dom of speech and of assembly, for the liber-
ty guaranteed by the due process clause is
the liberty of natural, not artificial per-
sons. (1)
Natural persons and they alone are entitled
to the privileges and immunities which
Section 1, Amendment 14, secures for "citi-
zens of the United States". (2)
There are circumstances in which, for certain purposes,
entities are regarded as persons, and for other purposes
they are not so regarded. A minor child, more than seven
years of age, is regarded as a person for the purposes of
criminal law; but, since he is considered as incapable of
forming an adequate intent for this purpose, if he contracts,
(3)
he may avoid the contract although, if over a certain
age (depending upon the State and the sex of the person)
while still a minor he may be bound by the marriage contract.
Thus, I am compelled to disagree in part with the very emin-
ent scholar, Roscoe Pound, when he writes
Whatever the state may do in limiting the
power of corporations to make certain con-
(1) Stone, J. and Reed, J. in Hague v. C.I.O., 59 Sup. Ct.
954, (1939). See also Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Riggs, 203 US 243, 255; Western Turf Association v.
Greenberg, 204 US 359, 363.
(2) Roberts, J. in Hague v. C.I.O, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 959.
(3) Although in the case of necessaries he is required to pay
the fair value of such necessaries; not the amount agreed
upon, unle ss at his choicfT"

tracts, because the corporation gets its
power from the state, it may not limit the
contractual capacity of natural persons,
who got their power to contract from nature,
so that nature alone may remove it. (D
The facts imply do not substantiate this conclusion.
The "state" constantly exercises its police power in circum-
scribing the alleged natural right of contract in the inter-
ests of the community.
Thus, it should be evident that the term "person" can
be properly understood only as a concept relating to any
entity, factual or fictional, to which is accorded the at-
tributes of personality. This entity may be a single human
being, no human being at all, or a whole group of people
acting as a unit. A group of people will have rights as a
group, as distinguished from the individuals composing the
group, therefore, only when and insofar as it is recognized
as having attributes of personality.
The basis of our political system is the
right of the people (2) to make and alter
their constitutions of government. (3)
....not only must minorities be protected
from majorities, but majorities must be
protected themselves .... if true democracy
does operate in terms of majority will,
it is not the will of the numerical major-
ity, (but the will authorized by the whole
people). (4)
fTl Pound. SCL, 101.
(2) Here "the people" is accorded some of the attributes of
personality, i.e., a mind, a will.
(3) Root, AGC, Washington's Farewell Address, 116; Fed, 260.
(4) Read, CR, "Minority Rule and Constitutional Tradition",
Max Lerner, 204. This excerpt is an example of thinking
of groups (majorities, minorities, the whole "people") in
terms of persons; othe rwise, it would not make sense.
^ Persons alone, mrtr thlngs-7~have rights^
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The second dimension involved in considering rights is
the matter of relationships.
(1)
•...rights are hut relationships between persons....
These relationships between persons may be contractual or
quasi-contractual in nature and eminate as a result of claims
"in rem" and "in personam". Thus, there can be no right ex-
(2)
cept as there is also a duty.
Right--as the correlative of duty. . . . signi-
fies one's affirmative claim against another^ '
...(One) does not own rights.... he has them;
because he has them, he "owns" in very truth
the material object concerned.
.
(t )
Rights are intangibles, not objects or things. They
arise from relationships between persons. Obviously such
(5)
relationships may exist in more than one place, and like
other societal circumstances continuously change. Changing
(6)
relationships postulate changing rights.
Rights are described as natural, inalienable, social,
moral, legal, civil, political, substantive and procedural.
However it might be sought to dichotomize rights, their
essential nature is the same
(1) Curry v. McCanless, 307 US 365, 366, (1938).
(2) Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Texas 45, (1887);
Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Kurtz, 10 Ind App 60, (1894).
(3) Hohfeld, FLC, 6-7.
(4) Ibid, 12, 38.
(5) APS, "Constitutional Law" in 1938-1939", R.E. Cushman,
275; Graves v. Elliott, 307 US 383, (1939).
(6) Pound, SCL, 108, ,,iyien are not asking merely to be allowed
to achieve welfare; they are asking to have welfare
achieved for them through organized society."
1

A right is an attribute of personality with which any
entity is endowed or which accrues to it by virtue of its
relations governed by the Law of Persons sactioned by the
community.

2. Essential Characteristics of Rights
a. Natural Rights
The doctrine of natural law regards man primarily as
an individual rather than as a member of human society. All
men, it holds, were endowed by their Creator, and therefore
possess certain rights enjoyed by them in a state of nature,
and which no government can rightfully infringe or deprive
(1)
except with their consent. Liberties do not result
from acts of government or charters of government, which are
really declarations of pre-existing rights, but are founded
" in the frame of human nature, rooted in the constitution
(2)
of the intellectual and moral world."
Liberty, therefore, is not the result of
social compact, not a concession to man
from society, or from government, but it
is the gift of God to every man; liberty
for self-use in order to the attainment
of the ends of his creation. (3)
Because natural law antedated the creation of actual
states, the "rights of man" are older, more fundamental,
more universal and, therefore, more binding than the ius
(4)
civile of any particular state. The American constitu-
tions, State and Federal, were, in fact, created by the
common consent of all the individual members of the community
to the end that their natural rights would be better guaran-
(1) Goodnow, PCG, 257; UCUS, 70.
(2) Haines, RNLC, 55.
(3) Chandler, GBPC, 298.
U) Read, CR, 5-6.
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teed thereby. In his "The Responsible State", Franklin H.
(1)
Giddings points out that with the rise of political or-
ganization the juristic rights of the new order tended to
become the embodiments and expressions of natural rights.
Dean Pound writes
As a theory of rights based upon a social
compact .... (the common law ).... thought of
natural rights as the rights of individuals
who had entered into a contract, apart from
which there would be and could be no law
and nothing for the law to maintain. In
either view, the law exists to maintain and
protect individual interests. .. .the common
law was taken to be a system of giving effect
to individual natural rights. It was taken
to exist in order to secure individual in-
terests, not merely against aggression by
other individuals, but even more against ar-
bitrary invasion by state or society. (2)
Thus the legal rights and duties became the formal ex-
pressions of natural rights and moral duties.
Jurists began by assuming that if they were
moral and to the extent that they were
moral, they were therefore legal. (3)
....the scheme of natural rights that the
law ought to secure, quickly becomes the
scheme of fundamental rights which it does
secure, legal rights being taken to be
merely declaratory thereof.... The law does
not create them, it merely recognizes them. (4)
(1) P. 68.
(2) Pound, SCL, 100-101.
(3) Pound, LM, 31, 32, 88.
(4) Pound, SCL, 91, 92, 106. "Lawyers of the last century
were brought up on the doctrine of natural rights and
the conception that law exists to secure these rights
to the individual as a@slinst state and society. . .. to
believe that the highest social interest was in secur-
ing to every one these natural rights."
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What are these natural rights? Is marriage a natural
right? If so, what kind of marriage--monogamous
,
polygamous
or polyandrous ? Manifestly, natural rights mean simply
those interests which we think ought to be secured; those
demands which human beings may make and which we think ought
to be satisfied. "It is true that neither law nor the state
(1)
creates them." They are based on the assumption that
there is in man an "inviolable something" which is entitled
(2)
to the respect of reason.
Natural rights vary and change with the ethical con-
ceptions of the people; it is for that reason that it is
often asserted that there is no such thing as an absolute
inalienable natural right. "The doctrine of natural rights
may be tersely stated to be freedom from all legal restraint
that is not needed to prevent injury to others ... .the right
(3)
of needless restraint." What is needless must be de-
termined in each circumstance; it is essentially a product
of reason. Therefore, criticisms based on the assumption
that the theory of natural rights presupposes a static so-
(4)
cial order must be discounted.
It is suggested, however, that the theory of social
contract as a means of guarantying natural rights is self-
contradictory.
(1) Ibid, 92.
(2) Read, CR, "Appeal to Reason and the American Constitu-
tion," R. Bainton, 121} Pound, SCL, 92, 96.
(3) Tiedeman, UCUS, 73, 76.
(4) Goodnow, PCG, 257.
i

(The doctrine of jus naturale) reaches the
extreme limits of absurdity in the social
contract, in the claim that all governmental
authority, and hence the binding force of
law is derived from the agreement or consent
of the governed; and that all men are pos-
sessed of certain natural rights, rights en-
joyed by them in a state of nature, and which
no government can rightfully infringe or take
away. (1)
This suggestion (a) fails to recognize the factor of
common consent present in the social contract; (b) it as-
sumes a static society; (c) it removes the all-important
element of human reason so necessary to understand "natural
rights"; and (d) it is based on the thought that natural
law and natural rights impress themselves on the conscious-
ness of the people in the very same way irrespective of the
environment, viz., that the kind of society existing as a
fact, or that there does or does not happen to be a society
is of no consequence (i.e., that the environment does not
affect man's nature and has no bearing on his rights).
Now, it is probably true that natural rights were not
invented but are the products of an unconscious growth
which have held men together in effective social cohesion
for many years before political organization came into being;
in this case, natural rights do serve as the moral founda-
tions of the democratic community. As such, says Franklin
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, 70.
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(1)
H. Giddings
Natural rights are of two categories. There
are natural rights of the community, and
natural rights of the individual. Both the
community and the individual have a natural
right to exist and a natural right to grow
or develop. If mankind or a moiety of the
human race has a moral right to exist, a
community or society has such a right "be-
cause it is only through mutual aid that
human life is possible and only through such
relationships that the intellectual and moral
life of man can be sustained.
Has the individual person a natural right to grow at
the cost of his neighbor?
If society is to endure, individual growth
is subject to imperative limitations. It
must be a function of inhibitions no less
than of spontaneous actions. Natural jus-
tice prescribes limitations. The individual
has a moral right, confirmed in natural
rights, to develop on equal terms. All have
equal, but only equal rights .... they (may
not) grow by murder, theft, or fraud. («0
Thus, it should be plain, that "natural rights" however
conceived, which serve as the roots of moral rights, do
have ethical implications and cannot be asserted or exer-
cised without limitations. "To attack an existing rule of
law because it violates some natural right is like saying
the law is ethically indefensible; in jurisprudence there is
no room for natural rights except as thev are recognized and
(3)
protected by existing law."
(1) The Responsible State, 64.
(2) Giddings, RS, 66-67.
(3) Tiedeman, UCUS, 70.

b. Moral and Legal Rights
Words are "vehicles of thought". The word "right" has
both a moral and a legal sense.
In its moral sense, "right" (i.e., a moral right) ex-
tends over the whole field of human conduct, and refers to
all those actions and forbearances which it is our moral
(1)
duty (as determined by our ethical conceptions) to perform.
It is the product of the social forces which reflect the
prevalent sense of right as it is ethically conceived.
In a legal sense, "right" (i.e., a legal right) refers
only to those actions or forbearances the performance of
which is rendered compulsorv by the coercive power of the
(2)
government. It is a moral right which is enforceable;
13)
it is a moral right plus the power of legal sanction.
Not every moral rule commonly practiced by
the mass of the people becomes a legal
rule, obedience to which is enforced by
legal sanction. Unless the violation of
the moral rule involves some injury to the
public or to other persons, there is never
any public demand for its enforcement by
the imposition of a legal penalty. C*)
Yet, although the legal rule of right reflects the popu-
lar sense of what is a moral right prevalent when it was
formulated, it may not, and because the popular sense of
right does not remain stationery, usually does not conform
(1) Leacock, EPS, 53.
^2) Op. cit.
(3) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 15; Chandler, GBPC , American
Constitutional Government, A, B.
(4) Tiedeman, UCUS, 13-14.

altogether to the popular conception of moral rights in the
later stages of development. It frequently is at such
great variance with the latter as to be a cause of serious
(1)
dissatisfaction. When this occurs, a new legal rule is
formulated either by statutory enactment or constitutional
amendment, or, by judicial interpretation of the old rule
to conform to the popular will. In the latter instance, in
the exercise of its power of interpretation, it devolves
upon the court to determine whether the right asserted is
only moral or whether it has ripened into a legal right.
When does the moral right become enforceable as a legal
right?
The precise boundaries between different
rights .... are evolved from their nature
and purpose by reason and logic. C2)
m
^<=> ^est as to whether the violation of the "right"
precipitates an injury to the public or to other persons
is usually invoked in determining the nature of the
(3)
right. Pound points out that "enforcement depends
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, 9.
(2) Freund, PP,PP,CR, sec. 7.
(3) Tiedeman, UCUS, 13-14.
'I
(1)
ultimately upon the general will" by deciding what
constitutes an injury.
This further observation is apropos: that the same
social forces which create and develop the ethics of a na-
tion create and develop its law. The substantive or funda-
mental law is nothing more than the moral rules commonly
obeyed by the masses and enforced by the courts for the
public good; the ethics of the nation are the rules of
morality espoused by its moral teachers as their highest
conceptions of moral development which are sometimes striven
(1) SCL, 110, 150. Pound writes of legal rights as those
which because they are enforceable on behalf of the
individual are really put above the state and society,
and moral rights as social rights, the product of hu-
man relationships
,
and, therefore, subordinate to the
former. He writes (pp. 110-111) ultimately all inter-
ests, individual and public, are secured and maintained
because ... .the chiefest of all interests is the moral
and social life of the individual; and thus individual
interests become largely identical with social interest
....we must emphasize the individual.
Stephen Leacock, EPS, (pp. 50-52) reasons that since
there are no so-called legal rights which a person has
which the community may not take away, no person really
has a legal right. What are called He gal rights are
really privileges and immunities. Likewise, the individ-
ual person can have no moral rights which he may assert
against society. Thus, if there are any rights in the
community, they belong exclusively to the sovereign
body which "can be under no legal restriction, (for
then) it would not be sovereign.... Thus the conception
of sovereignty, law and right is altogether divorced
from morality and ethics." The "limits" imposed on a
community in its right to interfere with the natural
or moral rights of the individuals (e.g., religion,
private life, etc.) "are of an ethical not a legal
character. Legally speaking the state is almighty."

(1)
for but not habitually practiced by the people. In the
attempt to make moral and legal rights conform to the ethical
conception of right, appeal is made to t he natural rights.
(2)
This confounds "right with rights". Ethically, what is
right is an idealistic conception of rational behavior which
may or may not be realized. The moral law (including moral
rights) is the code of behavior actually adopted and prac-
ticed by the community; more often than not it follows the
general pattern prescribed by the ethics but deviates there-
from in important particulars. The legal rights are those
moral rights which the community considers important enough
to insist upon obedience and observance; "the relationships
between persons, natural or corporate, which the law recog-
nizes by attaching to them certain sanctions enforceable in
(3)
the courts .
"
(1) Tiedeman, UCUS, 15.
(2) Giddings, RS, 59.
T3) Curry v. McCanless, 307 US 365, 366, (1939),
83 L. ed. 1547.

c. Inalienable Rights
Are there any inalienable rights? In 1776, our Declara-
tion of Independence announced
that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed.
Thus, from the beginning, the people of the United
States seem to stand committed to the proposition that there
are certain inalienable rights, and that the American Govern-
(1)
ment was instituted to protect and maintain them. This
doctrine of inalienable rights holds that there are certain
cardinal, or natural, rights which no government ought to,
(2)
and which ours cannot, take away; thus this doctrine
appears to be founded on the idea of natural rights. For,
if rights are not natural (I.e., endowed by the Great Crea-
tor), then they must have been acquired as a result of so-
cial relationships, in which case they can be alienated
through a cessation of such relationships. Thus, as be-
tween natural and other kinds of rights, only natural
rights would be inalienable. In fact, it has been seriously
stated, that man has two kinds of natural rights (alienable
and inalienable); that when he becomes a member of society
(1) Root, AGC, "Experiments in Government", 82-83.
(2) Stims on, ACPPR, 30.
»»
he voluntarily surrenders his alienable rights for the fur-
ther security of his inalienable rights.
The state is a voluntary societjr composed
of those who yield certain alienable rights
in order to safeguard the inalienable. Tl)
Thus, says Elihu Root
Individuals have rights independent of the
State .... against the State ... .government is
not the source of these rights, but is the
instrument for the preservation and promo-
tion of them.... (2;
He insists that the inalienable rights of the individual
to life and liberty, although asserted under government, are
independent of government, and, if need be, may be invoked
(3)
against government. Thus, when inalienable rights are
suspended (as they may be in cases of necessity) the govern-
ment is a dictatorship and the popular will can be expressed
(4)
only through revolution.
Another general proposition which is laid down to prove
that there are inalienable rights in American society is
that this fact is recognized by the American Constitution by
definite limitations of the legislative power of the Federal
(1) Read. CR, "Appeal to Reason and the American Constitu-
tion", Roland Bainton, 123.
(2) Root, AGC, "Essentials of the Constitution", 98.
(3) Ibid, 99. The government he is talking about is, of
course, the democratic government in the United States.
(4) Ibid, 114-115.

74
and State Governments as to the rights "which have been es-
(1)
tablished by God and Nature".
There are eternal principles of justice
which no government has a right to disre-
gard.... Some acts, not expressly forbid-
den, may be against the plain and obvious
dictates of reason. (2)
It is claimed that the individual does not possess in-
alienable rights through the state, "but by his own nature
he has inalienable rights and indefeasible rights" which
spring not from man but from God and Nature, and that when
the individual enters the community he establishes the con-
ditions of his membership therein and the state holds fast
(3)
to these conditions as rights.
Our Constitution imposed its limitations upon
the sovereign people and all their officers
and agents, excluding all the agencies of
popular government from authority to do the
particular things which would destroy or im-
pair the declared inalienable rights of the
individual. ... all powers of government find
their justification only in their adaptation
to secure (these) rights of the individual. (4)
It occurs to this writer that there are several inherent
defects in this theory of inalienable rights. In the first
place if there were in fact an inalienable right natural to
man with which he was endowed by God and Nature, then it
really seems futile to discuss the alienability of inalien-
(1) Jellinek, DRMC, 81; CR, "Constitutional History and the
Higher Law", H.S. Comrnager, 228. Judges of state and
federal courts have suggested natural law limitations
distinct from and superior to even written constitutions.
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 586. Wynehamer v. Peo. , 13 NY 376
(2) Bank of State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg (Tenn) 599, (1831).
(3) Jellinek, DRMC, 48, 80, 82.
(4) Root, AGO, 100, 167.

able rights. If a right were inalienable, it simply could
not be alienated by anybody; neither by the man who possesses
it nor by any other man because God created the man, and
this inalienable right is part of the man. If this inalien-
able right became alienable, the individual would then cease
to be man. The Declaration of Independence and many writers
avow that there are not only inalienable rights, but, indeed,
some of them are certain
,
viz, life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness. Do the facts substantiate the theory? Life is
alienable; the community may compel the individual to give
his life to defend the country. It may be argued (a) that
although life is alienable the right to life is inalienable,
and (b) that the individual consented to fight for his coun-
try by his continued membership in the community. But, even
if a distinction is made between Life and the right to Life,
if the right to Life were inalienable its possessor could
not alienate it even with his consent. To admit that in-
alienable rights may become alienable in a certain contin-
gency is to admit that there are no inalienable rights.
Second, the doctrine of inalienable rights accords
rights to man because he is a human being. It has already
been amply demonstrated that human beings as such do not
have any rights; that it is only as they acquire recognition
by the community as beings "persons" that they have rights,
not otherwise. The Declaration of Independence proclaims
that all men are created equal, not that all men are born
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(1)
equal. It was seriously contended by such eminent
thinkers as John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis, before the
Civil War, that men are not born; that babies are born and
they grow to be men. When does a child become a man? The
transformation is created by societal recognition. Society
creates men. In this light, we can properly understand the
proposition that all men are created equal and are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.
The most friendless and lonely human being
on American soil holds his right to life
and liberty, and all that goes to make them
up, by title indefeasible against the world,
and it is the glory of American self-govern-
ment.... (2)
In other words, the inalienable rights which the per-
son enjoys are inalienable because he is a member of society
and to alienate such rights would mean the end of such socie-
ty. Life and liberty of the person may be alienated with
(3)
due process of lav/. Any process is not due process;
the Torocess must accord with and be sanctioned by democratic
(4)
customs and usages. The inalienable rights which the
community safeguards to the person are those which, if denied
to the individual person, would necessarily mean the end of
that society. Thus, the inalienable rights are not determinec
(1) Jellinek in DRMC erroneously interprets the Declaration
of Independence to say (56) that all men are born free
and equal.
(2) Root, AGC, 112.
(3) U. S. Constitution, Amendments V and XIV.
(4) Public Clearing House V. Coyne, 194 US 497, 508, (1904).
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by the nature of man as a human animal, "but rather by the
nature of man as a social person.
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d. Social Rights
It is plain that rights come into being only as a re-
sult of sanctioned relationships entered into between persons
or individuals who are recognized as being competent to enter
into sanctioned relationships. In this way, community organ-
izations are created and a society is born. Thus, rights
are social incidents and do not exist except as there is a
society within which they may find expression and as per-
taining to relationships actually entered into.
When writers concern themselves with "natural rights,"
"inalienable rights," or "inherent rights," they really are
(1)
discussing powers, not rights. It is as a result of
such confusion of terms, and therefore a confusion of ideas,
that so much misunderstanding has arisen and so many palpably
mistaken, misleading or false propositions are enunciated.
An endowed power which is inherent in Man, as such, is quite
different from an endowed right inherent in the person. The
(2)
sources of endowment are quite different.
Powers eminate from the nature of man as a human being.
Rights eminate from the social relations to which the person
(3)
is a party. Society is the creator of all rights, but
(1) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 15; GBPC, 298.
(2) Tiedeman, UCUS, 78. "The prevalent doctrine of natural
rights was formulated and made a part of the organic law
of the land to be respected and enforced until repealed
or changed by the proper authority."
(3) Kent, CAL, II, 1. "Right itself, in civil society, is
that which any man is entitled to have, or to do, or
to require from others, within the limits prescribed by
law."

not of all powers. Certain powers inherent 5n the nature of
man, as such, cannot be alienated so long as man is man: "but
there are no rights which society may not take from any per-
son. Therefore, all rights are social rights; as such,
they mav he exercised only within the limits of the social
(1)
order and may not he claimed as absolute or irrevocable.
An example of such confusion of thought follows. In
"The Revival of Natural Law Concents, Charles G. Haines
(2)
quotes E. V. Abbot as saying that "there are a number of
constitutive principles of private right which have been so
wrought into the fabrics of our institutions that they cannot
be abrogated" and that "among these indilutable rights....
(is) the use of natural powers.... as long as they do not
(3)
thereby injure others."
Here we find the idea that natural powers are private
rights, distinguishing between social rights and private
rights, or, distinguishing between those rights which affect
only one person and those which affect more than one. Such
(1) Holcombe, PMC , 352. The Freedom of assembly was re-
stricted by at least three limitations: First, people
could not assemble for an unlawful purpose; Secondly,
they were bound to conduct their assembles peaceably;
and, Thirdly, they could not persist in assembling, if
their assembly, though lawful and peaceable, would pro-
voke such resentment in the community as to create a
clear danger of uncontrollable disorder.
(2) "Inalienable Rights and Eighteenth Amendment," Col. Law
Rev., Feb. 1920.
(3) Haines, RNLC, 339.

distinction seems to "be made for the sole purpose of using
the term "rights" in characterizing the natural powers of
the individual so that It may he asserted, in terms, that
there are inalienable rights. There seems to be no real or
good reason for the substitution of terms except that through
such substitution it seems to be possible to prove what the
writer has set out to prove. In other words, in order to
prove that there are inalienable rights, the term "inalien-
able rights" is substituted for the term "natural powers";
therefore, by proving that there are natural powers it seems
that the existence of inalienable rights has been proved.
The fallacy is obvious.
When such a substitution was attempted by claiming that
there are natural and inherent rights (confusing rights with
powers) which may not be alienated by constitutional amend-
ment and that therefore such amendment must be held to be
(1)
invalid, the United States Supreme Court in the National
(2)
Prohibition Cases refused to countenance the thesis that
there are inalienable rights, rejected all the arguments in
favor of limitations on sovereign power in recognition of
such rights, and sustained the validity of the Eighteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(It was argued that) the power to amend was
limited to changing the subject matter
(1) Haines, RNLC 338; T.M. Cooley, "Power to Amend Federal
Constitution", Michigan Law Journal, April, 1893.
(2) 253 US 350, (1920).

already in the Constitution. The amendment
did, for the first time in our history, touch
directly the lives of private individuals....
this might mean practically an annihilation
of the several states as sovereign -political
unit s . . . . thi s argument did not convince the
Supreme Court, (l) There does not seem to be
any limitation upon the power to amend the
Constitution, except that no state may be
deprived, without its consent, of its equal
suffrage in the Senate. (2)
All rights (no matter how private or personal may be
their consequences or exercise) are created by society and
may be circumscribed or repudiated by it.
(1) Arneson, ECL, 14-16.
(2) Op. cit. The exception here noted also results from
a contractual social relationship.

3. American Constitutional Conception of Rights
It is important to recognize that there are several
conceptions basic to a proper understanding of the American
scheme of life: (a) natural powers or "natural rights"
which existed before a society was established, (b) the
theory of social contract which necessarily assumes a con-
stitution based upon a compact or covenant the exact manner
of making and time of execution of which is not exactly
stated nor its details precisely set forth but which is
necessarily based on a corollary proposition which does bear
(1)
proper authentication, i.e., popular sovereignty, and
(c) constitutional rights, a consequence thereof. These
conceptions result from an historical evolutionary process
through which the natural powers of man, which individuals
possessed in that state of nature antedating organized pol-
itical life, are transformed into the fundamental or substan
(2)
tive rights of the civic PERSON under the constitution.
(3)
There are those, of course, who, like Carl Becker,
insist that "the Constitution did not create rights, it mere
ly recognized them; it did not restrain human impulses, it
merely gave them the right of way.... Imprescriptible right
have such validity only as prescriptive law confers upon
them." This theory fails to explain existing facts. In
the first place, the theorists employ the trick of using
(1) Goodnow, PCG, 258-259.
(2) Haines, RNLC, 58; CAL, Vol. II, 1.
(3) Read, CR, "Afterthoughts on Constitutions", 394, 396.
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1
the word rights for natural impulses or natural desires to
prove that there are natural rights, and then find themselves
in the embarrassing enigma wrought by their logic that their
natural and therefore imprescriptible rights are prescripti-
ble. In the second place, the proposition is based on the
assumption that the written constitution is the only consti-
tution under which the people of the United States live.
They have not explored all the circumstances which their
proferred theory undertakes to explain. Does the Constitu-
tion create rights? The United States Supreme Court says
yes and lists a few of them: "To demand the care and pro-
tection of the Federal Government over life, liberty, and
property, when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction
(1)
of a foreign government, the writ of habeus corpus, etc.."
Thus, the facts and the better authority compel acceptance
of the proposition that the American Constitution did create
rights. In fact, this is the raison d'etre of the Consti-
tution. It helps solve "the great puzzle of civilization
—
how to secure permanent concert of action without sacrificing
(2)
independence --through the establishment of constitu-
tional rights.
Constitutional rights are of two kinds: substantive
and procedural. Authorities differ as to the proper classi-
fication of constitutional rights. Some say that the
(1) Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace 36, 37, (1873).
(2) Fiske, API, 94.

fundamental distinction is between political rights and
individual rights.
The enjoyment of political rights Is simply
a means for accomplishing the ultimate re-
sults of affording the best protection to
individual rights, i 1 )
Some say that the distinction is properly made only
when considered in terms of civil versus political rights.
In general it may be said that the rights
protected by the equal protection clause
are civil rather than political. Civil
rights are more fundamental, while political
rights may from one point of view be con-
sidered as auxiliary to civil rights in the
sense that, in order to protect the latter,
political rights are granted. (2)
(3)
Some differentiate between political and legal rights.
This distinction is made with the view that political rights
concern themselves with policy determination, deal primarily
with fundamental or substantive rights and that the legal
rights are concerned with matters of restraint pursuant
(4)
thereto.
It is apparent that although the different authorities
make what appear to be separate and distinct classifications
of constitutional rights, basically, they all entertain the
same idea which takes different forms and appears in terms
of different concepts. The concept through which the idea
expresses itself varies according to the point of view of
(1) McClain, CLUS, 292.
(2) Mathews, ACS, 429.
(3) Wilson, CGUS, 4, 5, 16, 23, and authorities therein cited.
(4) Priedrich, CGP, 185; LC, 5.

the particular approach made. In fact, constitutional
rights are either substantive or procedural. Sometimes the
same act may "be properly interpreted as being in the exer-
cise of a procedural right as well as the exercise of a sub-
stantive right. The same act may partake of the nature of
each different kind of right because of the different rela-
tionships under which it may become exercised. So also, the
act of speaking may be a substantive right, interpreted by
some as a civic right or civil right, i.e., a right belong-
ing to the person by virtue of his membership in the civic
community, as well as a procedural right, called by some a
political right because it is exercised in the performance
of a political function. This act , both as a substantive
or civil right, as well as a procedural or political right,
is a legal right because it is enforceable. The same act
of speech may also be considered as a moral right. The na-
ture of the right is conditioned upon its background. Con-
stitutionally speaking, all ri$it s are social, and are pro-
perly regarded either as substantive or procedural, since
they are concerned with civil and political affairs.

a. The "Rights of Man"
Does the individual human being, who lives in American
democratic society, have any other than constitutional rights?
In other words, is the American Constitution the source of
all rights to which any one or any group of "the people" may
lay claim? Are there no other than constitutional rights?
The written provisions of the Federal Constitution offer
no answer to these questions. The State Constitutions—that
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for example --do present
the solution.
All men are born free and equal, and have
certain natural, essential and unalienable
rights; among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties; that of acquiring possessing and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking
and obtaining their safety and happiness
.
The Preamble to the same constitution announces that
The end of the institution, maintenance, and
administration of government is to secure the
existence of the body-politic, to protect it
and to furnish the individuals who compose it
with the power of enjoying in safety and tran-
quility the natural rights, and the blessings
of life; and whenever these great objects are
not obtained, the people have the right to
alter the government and to take measures
necessary for their safety, prosperity and
happiness . . .
.
(2)
Thus, the American constitution recognizes that it is
an instrumentality conceived and utilized for higher ends;
that the rights of persons which the society has created
(1) Mass. Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Art. I.
(2) Mass. Constitution, Preamble.

through the constitution are means to other— and more impor-
tant--ends, viz., the natural rights or powers (whichever is
preferred) of men and women as human "beings as distinguished
from the rights of the same individuals constitutionally
recognized as civic and/or legal persons.
In this sense, the American Constitution does recognize
and sanction the natural rights of man. Indeed, it was for
the preservation and maintenance of such rights that the
Constitution was horn. Constitutional rights exist for
legal persons so that by their exercise the natural rights
of the same individuals as human beings might be enjoyed.
Were this not so, there would be no right of revolution.

b. Rights Are Not Absolute
Since society is always in a fluent state, rights are
interpreted and enforced under constantly varying circum-
(1)
stances. Changes in economic and social conditions
properly require a new interpretation of the conceptions of
rights which are based on the new relationships between per-
sons. If new interpretations of the relations between per-
sons were not forthcoming (i.e., new concepts of the appli-
cation of the principles of right) progressive development
(2)
would be obstructed.
To consider a specific example: the right of liberty.
The principle is "that there must be the freest right and
opportunity of adjustment". This principle must remain un-
altered and absolute. Liberty suggests, not only freedom
of action, but the unrestricted enjoyment of the result of
beneficial action so far as such freedom is not inconsistent
(3)
with like freedom on the part of others. But the ideal
of liberty as a right cannot and should not be fixed from
generation to generation; were the right of liberty fixed,
(4)
it would not be liberty at all.
The conceot of the right of liberty has evolved and
(5)
taken on new significance. In the Coppage Case, it was
(1) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 600.
(2) Goodnow, PCG, 269.
(3) McClain, CLUS, 293.
(4) Wilson, CGUS, 4-5.
(5) Coppage v. Kansas, 236 US 1, (1915).

declared that the employer's right of liberty includes the
right to "hire and fire", which embraces the right to force
an employee to choose between his job and his labor union.
(1)
In the Wagner Act Cases, the Supreme Court decided that
the right of employees to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations and to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing "is a fundamental right" growing out
of the fact that employees are helpless singly to deal with
an employer and that "discrimination and coercion to prevent
the free exercise 'of this fundamental right' is a proper
subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority."
From a purely negative concept restrictive
of legislative power liberty thus becomes a
positive concept calling for legislative
impleme ntation and protection. (2)
(1) NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation,
301 US 1, (1937).
(2) Corwin, COC, 124.

o. Substantive Rights
In a broad sense the American Constitution is itself a
(1)
bill of rights because it is the embodiment of all those
social relationships out of which rights arise. It recog-
nizes rights of persons which are not included in the writ-
ten constitution.
Their non-enumeration in the Constitution
cannot primarily affect their existence; and
the provision against their denial or dis-
paragement is in the nature of an affirmance
of their retention by (the people). (2)
This fact explains the reasoning of the authorities
who, conceiving the American Constitution to be a written
document, write that natural rights have an existence apart
(3)
from the law, and why they say that the Constitution
(4)
did not create any rights which did not antedate it.
The written constitution assumes the existence of fundamental
or substantive rights and undertakes to protect them against
encroachment.
They are assumed to exist--they never are
expressly granted to the people, as such a
(1) Fed, II, 57.
(2) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 269.
(3) Goodnow, PCG, 259; Thorpe, EACL, 195, "The supreme law
cannot violate them. They comprise the Bills of Rights,
or Declarations of Rights of the State constitutions
and. the first ten Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
(4) CUSA, 589; Barran v. Baltimore, Peters 243, (1833);
U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 US 542, (1876); Brown v. Walker,
161 US 591 606, (1896); Davis v. Beason, 133 US 333,
340, (1890).
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grant would heve been inconsistent with
their character as natural rights--and the
government is forbidden to violate them.
What are substantive rights? Substantive rights are
(2)
sometimes called "individual natural rights". These
(3)
socially recognized natural rights are not inalienable.
Foremost among these are the fundamental
or absolute rights, as Blackstone called
them, of personal security, personal liber-
ty, and private property of which no person
may be deprived without due process of law. (4)
...-The natural, inalienable, inherent
rights of the cit izen. . . . sp ring from the
very nature of free government ... .have no
force either to restrict or extend the....
provisions of the Constitution. .. .the doc-
trine that the "spirit" of the Constitution
is to prevail over its language has no more
legal validity than has the doctrine of na-
tural law. (5)
They are not absolute
.
....The person.... is entitled to his funda-
mental rights; so are the several States and
the United States entitled to their respec-
tive fundamental rights; but they are sover-
eignties: the person is not, and his funda-
mental rights to life, liberty and property
give place to the rights of the sovereign
....As against sovereignty, the person in
the final test has no rights whatever; that
is no rights that are recognized and pro-
tected by constitutional law. (6)
(1) Goodnow, PCS, 261-262.
(2) Pound, SCL, 102-103.
(3) Contra: Goodnow, PCG, 267, "Courts of the United States
have really taken the position that there is no due pro-
cess of law by which the individual may be deprived of
these absolute, substantive, whereat, natural rights.
(4) Eol combe, PMC , 341.
(5) W. W. Willoughby, PCLUS, 40-41.
(6) Thorpe, EACL, 199-200.

To argue that these rights are absolute is to argue
that the person, as an individual, is possessed to some ex-
tent, at least, of sovereignty. Obviously, this is not true.
Substantive rights are those attributes of personality
without which endowed powers cannot be exercised and which
exist only as they are formulated and established as being
superior to the constitutional implementations.
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d. Procedural Rights
If it is true, as it has been suggested, that the rights
not delegated, but retained by the people, are the fundamental
(1)
rights, then both substantive and procedural rights are
fundamental. Yet, no matter how fundamental the rights may
be, they are always subject to the constitutional limitations.
No man can make a plea of a fundamental right
as making him "above the law". The law ac-
cords with the fundamental right. (2)
i
Since substantive rights are those which have been formu-
lated and established as being superior to the constitutional
implementations, procedural rights must be those which result
from the processes inaugurated to effectuate the terms of the
Constitution. They are those rights which insure due process
(3)
of law and which, therefore, give meaning and practica-
bility to the substantive rights. Thus, such procedural
rights as trial by jury, the right of confrontation, and the
(4)
right to counsel make the substantive right of equal pro-
tection of the laws significant. They are complementary.
Yet, it is important to note that although procedural rights
complement the substantive rights, they can have no justifi-
cation without the substantive right upon which they are
based. The converse of this proposition is not true. There-
fore, in the exercise of a procedural right, a substantive
(1) Thorpe, EACL, 194-195.
(2) Ibid, 197.
(3) Beck, TCUS, 214, "conformity with these fundamental
decencies of liberty".
(4) Goodnow, PCS, 263.

right may not be abridged.
Political rights are procedural rights. Persons have
political rights, not as ends in themselves, but as means to
serve other ends. Thus, voting and citizenship are not co-
extensive. Although the rights of citizens to vote may
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, previous condition of servi-
(2) (3)
tude or sex , there may be educational disqualif ica-
(4)
tions. These disqualifications, however, must apply
equally to all who seek to become endowed with the procedural
rights, i.e., the qualifications for procedural rights cannot
be exercised or maintained in such a way as to deprive per-
sons of their substantive rights, i.e., in the exercise of
procedural rights and the incidents accompanying it must
always be in subordination to the substantive rights of per-
(5)
sons as members of the civic society.
(1) Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wallace 162, 178, (1875); U.S. v.
Crulkshank, 92 US 542, (1876).
(2) U. S. Constitution, Amendment XV; Nixon v. Herndon,
273 US 536, (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 US 73, 89,
(1932). A State Democratic Convention which restricts
membership to whites and which is not subject to State
control is acting constitutionally--5th Amendment does
not prohibit wrongful individual acts. Grovey v. Town-
send, 295 US 45, (1935), James v. Bourman, 190 US 127,
(1903).
(3) Ibid, Amendment 19.
(4) Williams v. Mississippi, 170 US 213, 220, (1898).
(5) Previtt v. Wilson, 242 Ky. 231, (1932). A statute which
imposed literacy test on women voters, not required of
men, is unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 240
Mass 601, (1922); 83 NH 589, (1927), where to be a quali-
fied elector renders one competent as a juror, women be-
came jurors, also. Comm. v. Welosky. 276 Mass 398, (1931);
certiorari denied, 284 US 684, (1932). State v. Walker,
192 Iowa 823 (1921); State v. Jame^-96- NJ Law ^32-, - ( 1921 )
.
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Civil and political equality for members of
all races alike is one of the obvious charac-
teristics that distinguish a commonwealth
from superior kinds of states. There was
nothing inconsistent with the principle of
civil equality in the subsequent recognition
by the Supreme Court of the validity of ra-
cial distinctions in American law, provided
that they did not serve to camouflage unjust
discriminations against the weaker race.
But it was a mistake to carry the principle
of political equality so far as to ignore real
differences in the political capacity of in-
dividuals, irrespective of race, as was done
by the Reconstruction Acts of 1867. (1)
Thus, procedural rights accrue to the person as a result
of his recognized capacity to fulfill certain functions.
1 They are those rights which eminate from the willed-relations
entered into pursuant to the established law and which may
'
be exercised properly by the person to whom they accrue only
(2)
within the limits of the constitution.
(1) Hoi combe, PMC, 163-164.
(2) Ibid, 341, 352, freedom of assembly is restricted.
1
1
•

C
. Majority and Minority
1. A Group Conception
Irrespective of the theory of social "behavior advanced
--be it atomism or organicism--there are some facts which are
certain and concerning which there can be no controversy--
although there may be reasonable disputations concerning
their proper interpretation, meaning, importance and signifi-
cance. First, there can be no community or society without
people. Second, each person in the community has various
special interests and points of view appropriately consonant
therewith. More or less conscious of his community of inter-
est with others, instinctively or by reason of his special
interests, the individual person tends to flock together with
those others whose interests are similar. Third, through
(1)
this operation of the herd instinct, groups are born.
Fourth, society is composed of groups as well as of individual
persons
.
The rulers of states consequently have to
deal, not only with the individuals who are
its members, but also with the groups into
which those individuals are more or less
definitely herded. (2)
A society is not made up primarily of individ-
uals. It is made up of an innumerable number
of smaller societies. Ken and women become
associated together for the accomplishing of
an infinitely large and various number of
purposes, and each of these different associa-
tions constitutes a society, whose reality is
(1) Modern Dsychologists prefer "fundamental urge" to "in-
stinct".
(2) Holcombe, FMC, 207.

determined by the tenacity and the scope of
the purposes which have orompted the associa-
tion, u)
And fifth, the same individual person may "be a member of
more than one group.
In the sphere of politics, there is no such
creature as the economic man.... The politi-
cian must deal with actual men, not with
logical abstractions. Voters are men animated
not only by the desire for wealth, but also
by other desires and feelings. They are men
of this or that race and color as well as
economic and social condition, or this or that
creed and culture as well as class. Politi-
cians do not know men merely as men or even as
breadwinners; they know them also as Masons,
Odd Fellows, or Knights of ^olumbus, or Rotar-
ians, Elks, or I.W.W.'s, as members of the
American Legion, the Grange, or the General
Federation of Women's Clubs. Among the bonds
of union in these various groups are the
property interests and other economic consid-
erations, which undoubtedly play a great part
in the actual process of government. (2)
Thus, we see that groups are aggregations of persons who
are behaving in concert to the end that they may thereby bet-
ter achieve their interests than they might have done individ-
ually. The different groups, therefore, have differing inter-
ests .
We represent different constituencies. The
judge has a city with a compact constituency,
largely trading and industrial. I represent
the far-flung grazing grounds and wheat fields
of the high plateaus of eastern Oregon. It
is natural that we should have differing
points of view on many questions and different
interests, but we are both vitally concerned
(1) Croly, PD, 164-200.
(2) Kol combe, PMC , 208.

with the matter of control and distribution
of that power at Bonneville. (1)
Yet, the individual person, performing different func-
tions, has different interests and is a member of different
groups. As a consumer he wants low prices, as a producer he
wants high prices; as an investor he tries to make money ex-
pensive, and as a borrower he prefers cheap money; as a tax-
payer he strives for economy in government, and as a citizen
he demands more service. Co his interests as a taxpayer con-
flict with his interests as a citizen--or--Is the taxpayer's
group opposed to other civic groups? Does one deny the other?
(1) Rep. Pierce in Cong Rec, March 11, 1936, 3715.

a. Groups versus Classes
At this point, it is well to distinguish between groups
and classes. The class theory protagonists divide the entire
social membership into two or more classes—usually into only
two classes--from which classification, once established, the i
individual oerson can never escape by his own efforts. In
terms of classes the interests of one are necessarily anti-
thetical to the other. Social mobility as a consequent of pri-'
vate initiative and ability is not even conceived of as a
possibility. Thus, the class theory postulates a static so-
ciety by putting the control over the change of individual
interests beyond the power of the individual person, and by
insisting that there can be but one interest upon which the
whole life of the individual is, or should properly be, based.
Thus, for example, the class theorists might say that the
American community is divided into two camps, those who pay
!
the taxes and those who reap the benefits from the taxes; if
you are in one camp, you cannot be in the other at the same
time. for the rights of the one are adverse to the rights of
(i)
the other.
Those who conceive of society as the gross sum of in-
dividuals and groups composed of these same individuals assert
that the person does have differing interests and does belong
to different groups to better enable him to achieve these
several interests. The group theory proponents can see nothing
(l) Holcombe, FMC, 208.
I!

inconsistent in the actions of the individual person who he-
longs to the taxpayers' league (which seeks to reduce taxes)
and the Citizens Better Welfare group which insists on more
and better service from the government. He says that al-
though the immediate interests of both groups may seem to be
adverse one to another--inasmuch as you cannot get more ser-
vice if you reduce the funds for operating the government--
the groups are not conflicting at all.
In fact, both groups are working for the same end, but
through differing means. Both want greater efficiency in
government. One says, not that we want less service and,
therefore, cut taxes, but give us the same service at a re-
duced cost. The other group says, not that we want to raise
taxes to have better service, but that if we are already pay-
ing such taxes let us get the service which is due us. In
other words, both groups are dissatisfied with the service
rendered for the taxes paid; one group seeks to maintain the
same service and yet reduce the taxes, the other to increase
the service for the taxes paid. Are the interests of these
groups adverse one to another? Possibly. But, these groups
"instead of being essentially hostile elements in public
opinion become supplymentary. They interpenetrate one with
(1)
another .
"
Thus in comparing the concept of a class with the con-
cept of a group we find (a) both are used for purposes of
(1) Croly, PD, 303-329.

classification, (b) both may serve useful functions in the
community, and (c) both may represent a dichotomy of con-
flicting interests among the people. Here the similarity
ends
.
The class theory proponents postulate conflict between
the interests, deny the factor of "social mobility" as a
significant factor in the social order, and insist upon a
single, primary, and all-important determinant of human ac-
tion as the only proper basis for considering society; thus,
they perceive in the community two or more conflicting and
hostile interests about which the individuals are compelled
by circumstances to rally--these Interests being immutable
and the alignment continuous so that the society is static.
The group theory advocates see no all-consuming desire and
interest by which any individual person is necessarily en-
gulfed so that he can be a father, a manufacturer, and a
taxpayer and thus become affiliated with the interests repre-
sented by such groups as the Parent-Teachers Association,
National Association of Manufacturers and the Taxpayers' Al-
liance. They admit of the phenomenon called social mobility
and say that a person can have a certain personal interest
today and an entirely different interest tomorrow; that no
one single factor predominantly motivates all behavior of all
persons at all times.
We may, of course, expect to see in any body
of men.... very different combinations of the
parts upon different points. Kany of those
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who form a majority on one question may be-
come the minority on a second, and an asso-
ciation dissimilar to either may constitute
the majority on a third. (1)
The democratic philosophy is concerned with groups--
not with classes. The groups are conceived of as small socie-
ties--or action systems--which have a purpose to achieve and
which, once such purpose is achieved, no longer have any rea-
son to exist. Groups, therefore, are always means to ends.
Majorities and minorities are groups as distinguished
from mere aggregations of individuals or classes of persons.
Although the method for determining which group exists is one
(2)
of regarding numbers, this is by no means the whole story.
Counting, let us say, one hundred persons does not create a
group of that number. It is only as persons are actuated by
a common sense conditioned upon a common impulse of passion
or interest that a group comes into being. The numerical
count serves only to determine whether the grouo is a majority
(3)
or a minority, and nothing else.
(1) Fed, II, 168.
(2) Fed, I, 260.
(3) Finer, TPMG.

2. Majority and Minority Defined
"Majority" is a term which may be variously interpreted;
yet, the general concept that it refers to a number of per-
sons in excess of fifty per cent always prevails. Does it
refer to the entire membership, to a quorum, or to those per-
sons actually participating in some act?
The same principle prevails in incorporated
societies as in the community at large....
The majority here means the major part of
those who are present at the regular corpor-
ate meeting. There is a distinction taken
between a corporate act to be done by a se-
lect and definite body, as by a board of
directors, and one to be performed by the
constituent members. In the latter case, a
majority of those who appear may not act;
but in the former, a majority of the defin-
ite body must be present, and then a majori-
ty of the quorum may decide. (D
It is necessary, therefore, to understand the constitu-
tional rule invoked in determining how a majority is to be
determined. Inasmuch as we are concerned with a democracy,
all persons having rights cannot avoid the responsibility
of their proper exercise through nonfeasance. In the absence
of positive action, inaction is construed as acquiescence;
otherwise, social action might become impossible. The gener-
al rule is, therefore, that "majority" refers to that number
of persons, in excess of fifty per cent, actually participat-
(2)
ing in a designated procedure.
(1) Kent, CAL, vol. II, 293.
(2) Cooley, GPCL, 40.

"Majority" with reference to a question on
the ballot, shall mean more than one half
of those voting upon the question. (^)
"Majority vote" and "two thirds vote", respec-
tively, (shall mean) the vote of a majority
or two thirds of the voters present and voting
at a meeting duly called. ... t 2)
There are instances, however, when, due to the importanc
and gravity of the questions to be decided, or the nature of
the body to which power is delegated to determine certain mat
ters of policy, a different rule has been adopted, and the
number of votes is more definitely ascertained. Thus, in ra-
tifying amendments to the Federal Constitution, the "three-
fourths" rule prescribes ratification by legislatures or con-
stitutional conventions in thirty-six States, and not simoly
ratification by 75% of the States which may take action.
Yet, the two-thirds vote in each House which is required
in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the mem-
bers present--assuming a quorum--and not two-thirds of the
(4)
entire membership, present and absent.
Another example is the rule to discharge a committee in
the Congressional House of Representatives. The general rule
(5)
is that when a quorum is present, the House does business
(1) Mass. General Laws (1932 ed.), chap. 50, sec. 1.
(2) Ibid, chap. 44, sec. 1
(3) United States Constitution, Article V.
(4) National Prohibition Cases, 253 US 350, 386, (1920)-
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 US 276, (1918).
(5) Manual for the General Court of Mass., 1939-1940. Rules
of Mass. House of Representatives, Rules 63-69. Notes of
Rulings on the Senate Rules, Rule 55.

through the vote of a majority of the Congressmen actually
(1)
voting on each matter. House Rule XXVII, however, pro-
vides for a determination of a majority in terms of the
total membership of the House, and not in terms of the Con-
gressmen participating. Mien such a provision is made, it
supercedes the general rule.
It is in the interest of proper and orderly
parliamentary procedure that the number of
signatures .... should be definitely known and
ascertained in advance. The number required
should be stable and not variable from moment
to moment. It might well be that deaths of
members could happen without the House being
advised at the very moment. Likewise, re-
signations, which properly are sent to the
Governors of the States, might not at the
immediate moment be called to the attention
of the House ....
....the Chair is constrained to hold that
under the "discharge rule" of the House,
requiring "a majority of the total membership
of the House", the exact number of 218 mem-
bers was intended, and is necessary before a
discharge petition is effective, and no less
number wili suffice, irrespective of tempor-
ary vacancies due to death, resignation or
other causes. (2)
The same principle is applied also in local affairs,
only when so specified.
"Majority vote".... as applied to cities
(shall mean) the vote taken by yeas and nays
of a ma jority. . . . of all the members of each
branch of the city government where there are
two branches, or of all the members where
(1) "When a majority of the total membership of the House shall
have signed the motion, it shall be entered on the Journal,
printed with the signatures thereto on the Congressional
Record, and referred to the Calendar of Motions to Dis-
charge Committees."
(2) Cong Rec, April 15, 1936, 5732-5734.
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there is a single branch of city government,
or of a ma jority . . . . of the commissioners
where the city government consists of a com-
mission. (1)
A minority is ascertained in the same manner as is the
majority, except, of course that a minority is less than fif-
ty percent of the membership.
By a majority is meant those persons "united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion or interest" numbering more
than one -half the number of persons present and participating
in a socially predetermined, commonly accepted, institutional
procedure. This institutional procedure may specify that
more than one -half of the total group membership or of a quo-
rum is required. The essential principle which obtains in a
democracy is that the rule which shall govern must be defin-
ite and known in advance.
A minority consists of those persons acting in a group
whose constituent membership is less than one -half the mem-
bership which under the predetermined rule constitutes a
majority.
(1) Mass. General Laws (1932 ed.), chap. 44, sec. 1.
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3 . American Constitutional Conception of Majorities
and Minorities
a. Intra-Group Relationship
American society, the creation of interdependent beings,
involves relationships in which each person complements the
other. It is to be expected that in any society of free men,
differing points of view will be entertained by different
(1)
groups of men on different subjects; yet always, the dif-
ference is subordinated to the likeness of ideals.
It is because they have like wants that peo-
ple associate in the performance of unlike
functions. (2)
Thus, we find that there exist in the American community
groups of persons seeking the same ideals, but possessed of
varying opinions as to the best way to achieve their common
ideals
.
The more highly civilized the society becomes, the more
highly developed become the sensibilities of the persons and
the more sensitive do they become to social variations. This
impels persons to associate with other like-minded persons
to better achieve commonly desired objectives. But the more
highly civilized persons become the less likely are they to
think alike on all subjects and, therefore, the greater do
they realize the need for associating in groups. They sub-
ordinate their minor differences to their basic agreements.
(1) Fed II, 168.
(2) Maclver, Soc, 7-8.

As the society develops the number of associations in the
(1)
community increase, and we discover even more shades of
opinion. A "pseudo-social-mitos is " occurs in the community's
thinking. This becomes evident when groups appear. Each
group thinking its own way about the community. Most groups
are small; some are large. There are many minority groups;
but, only one majority group on any one question at any one
time
.
The very terms "majority" and "minority" indicate that
they are conceptions of only a part of a larger whole. The
majority is that major part of something even bigger j the
minority is a minor part which is quite inadequate and in-
complete without the other parts. Thus majorities and minor-
ities are groups within groups. They exist only as other
groups also exist. Thus, the very terms majority and minority
connote an intra-group relationship.
(1) Maclver, Sec, 16, "An organized group is an association."
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b. Majorities and Minorities as Democracy's
Instrurae nt all ties
1. Matter of Expediency
A democracy is that kind of a society the members of
which undertake one with another to accept, for the purposes
of self-government, the deliberate judgment of some predeter-
mined group within their midst. Democracy is a social pro-
cess by means of which all the people in the community parti-
cipate in the formulation of decisions for common action
which will be binding upon them all. It is a system of so-
cial behavior by means of which it is sought to arrive at
solutions to common problems which might prove satisfactory
to the many variant opinions in the community, thus preserv-
ing universal goodwill and cooperation. This is achieved,
democratically, through the integration of thought and will.
The grout) idea is a composite idea evolved
through free admission of difference. In fact
the only use for my difference is to join it
with other differences. To begin with in-
dividual thinking and end with "joint think-
ing." The differences are not lost in the
result, they are integrated. There results
from the process "a mutual appreciation and
conservation of all the values which all the
groups to the conflict hold as vitally signi-
ficant". Integration. ... demands a unity on
* the intellectual lev/el. We come together
thinking differently and end thinking alike.
We evolve a composite idea in which all of
the different viewpoints of the members are
harmonized--as though the group itself became
a mind with an idea of its own—and the result
is a way of joint action which appeals to
everyone concerned because it comprehends the
desires of all. (l)
(1) Maclver, Soc, 242-244.
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Thus, the main concern of the politics of democratic
government is not representation; it is the modes of associa-
tion. It is not a matter of majority or minority rule; it
(1)
is rather the interweaving of "majority and minority ideas".
(2)
Democracy cannot mean "majority rule". If it does, then
the minority would be ruled but would not rule. This would
(3)
be but a step away from "majority tyranny". But democra-
cy does not mean that the majority rules. Many times the
will of a mere majority does not prevail and more often a ma-
jority Is not required. And when democracy allows the major-
ity will to prevail, we discover that in fact "the government
is not confided to any one majority but to a succession of
(4)
majorities .
"
To repeat, democracy does not mean that the majority
governs. Democracy cannot be said to exist unless all the
people, majorities and minorities, actually do participate
—
positively and constructively— in government. But the func-
tions of majority groups in the processes of democratic go-
vernment are quite different from the functions of minority
groups. Each group has its own functions essential to demo-
cratic government to perform. These functions are supple-
mentary and complementary. Thus, majorities and minorities
(1) Pollett, NS, 146.
(2) To the effect that democracy does mean "majority rule",
see Ransom, MR J, 71-72.
(3) Friedrich, CGP, 258, writes that the dangers of majority
tyranny are implied in"thorough democratization".
(4) Croly, PD, chap. 15.
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are devices which democracy employs in government. They are
the techniques used to aid in the solutions to problems.
The American Constitution is a democratic constitution.
The very fact that it has imposed limits upon the majority
(1)
group and circumscribed its power to control through the
system of checks and balances makes it democratic. The prin-
ciple of checks and balances is democratic because it recog-
nizes that both majorities and minorities have rights and
duties
.
The American Constitution treats majorities and minori-
ties as devices by means of which certain ends may be accom-
plished.
The Constitution is neither wholly national
nor wholly federal.... In requiring more
than a ma jority. . . . it advances toward the
federal character; in rendering the concur-
rence of less than the whole number of states
sufficient, it ... .partakes of the national
character.
...•as all exterior provisions are found to
be inadequate, the defect must be supplied by
so contriving the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent
parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
means of keeping each other in their proper
places .... all the appointments .... should be
drawn from the same fountain of authority. (2)
(1) Smith, SAG, 214-215, "Minority domination must be care-
fully distinguished. .. .from majority control.... a system
of constitutional checks which hedges about the power of
the majority on every side is incompatible with majority
rule .
(2) Fed, I, 260, 353.

Thus, majorities and minorities are the techniques whi
democracy uses to solve its problems in the judicial courts
the legislative courts, in the forum of public opinion.

2. A Trial and Error Process
This democratic technique of finding answers to the
problems under consideration is essentially a trial and error
process. No pretext is made that the majority is always
right. It is assumed, however, that in matters concerning
general policy determination, a solution based on a more com-
prehensive integration of multifarious experiences is more
likely to be right than one not so determined. But the prin-
ciple of infallibility is not indulged.
To balance a large state or society. ... is a
work of so great difficulty, that no human
genius.... by the mere dint of reason and re-
flection, is able to effect it. The judg-
ments of many must unite in the work; exper-
ience must guide their labor; time must bring
it to perfection, and the feeling of incon-
veniences must correct the mistakes which
they inevitably fall into in their first tri-
als and experiments. (1)
In using majorities and minorities as an aid in deter-
mining a course of action, the very practical question arises
as to how large a majority must be before the democracy will
adopt its opinion as its will. This problem must be con-
sidered In terms of the Importance of the question presented
and the demonstrated capacity of groups charged with the re-
sponsibility to handle such situations. The founders of the
Constitution and those now in charge of its operations rea-
lize that "there is no panacea for error, and no substitute
(1) Hume's Essays, "Rise of Arts and Sciences, I, 128,
quoted in Fed, 170.

(1)
for wisdom. " Hence, majorities and minorities, as de-
vices used in government, are applied differently in differ-
ent situations with the aim "to satisfy all the parties to
(2)
the compact".
Thus, when a decision is rendered by the Supreme Court
of the United States or the Supreme Court of any State, the
majority principle in its highest form is applied. A bare
majority is regarded as adequate. Five to four decisions are
not uncommon. But the decision of the Court so obtained may
be wrong. The majority and minority technique may again be
applied to correct this situation. How the technique will be
applied depends altogether on the way in which the situation
is again considered. If the Court reconsiders its decision
(by a 5-4 vote), a mere majority again suffices. But where
the question is to be considered in terms of a formal consti-
tutional amendment, then a mere majority might not be ade-
quate. Thus, after the United States Supreme Court delivered
(3)
its decision in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution reversed
the decision; but the reversal here required a different ap-
plication of the majority principle.
Likewise, when the New York Court of Appeals rendered a
series of "unpopular" decisions against the constitutionality
(1) Beck, TCUS, 204.
(2) Fed, II, 169.
(5) 2 Dallas 419, (1795).

of laws providing for minimum wages and maximum hours for
(1)
government employees "an exasperated public reversed them
all and removed all constitutional barriers by constitutional
(2)
amendment
.
n
Thus, the democratic technique of using majorities and
minorities to attain solutions to problems must be regarded
as a trial and error process. The aim is to achieve an in-
tegrated will.
Democracy means the will of the whole, but
the will of the whole is not necessarily
represented by the majority, nor by 2/3 or
3/4 vote, nor even by unanimous vote; major-
ity rule is democratic when it is approach- (3)
ing not a unanimous but an integrated will.
The technique does not guarantee that the proper results
will be achieved each time; but it does allow for improvement.
(1) People ex rel Cossey v. Grout, 179 NY 417, 420.
(2) Ransom, MR J, 77-78; N. Y. Constitution, Art. XII, sec. 1.
(3) Pollett, NS, 142.

a ' Significance of the Requirement of Unanimity
The democratic process requires a socially integrated
will os a condition precedent to the execution of the deci-
sion finally agreed upon. In fact, a true democratic deci-
sion for action is impossible unless all the members of the
group and/or all the groups within the community have found
a solution with which their opinions are in accord; in other
words, a true democratic decision and the integration of the
several wills in the society are cotaneous.
Early in the history of the evolution of democratic pro-
cesses, when man's needs and problems were comparatively
simple, man's instruments, devices and techniques were rela-
tively simple. Democracy, from the earliest times until to-
day, insists on doing nothing unless and until there is con-
currence. The easiest way to achieve concurrence is to col-
laborate and discuss until all agree. In early days this was
relatively simple: "the people" would sit around and talk
and talk until all agreed on the final result. Unanimity was
the rule. The society did nothing until and unless all
agreed. They had to arrive at a decision, too; they either
all agreed, or they did not leave until they found a propo-
sition on which all agreed.
As society developed, it became more and more difficult
to arrive at a solution upon which all agreed because of the
multifarious interests which had meanwhile blossomed.' "The
people" could not sit around and discuss the matter
i
I

indefinitely; an answer had to be attained within a limited
time, since other interests equally as important clamored for
attention. Something had to "be done. So, "the people" fin-
ally and unanimously declared it to be their will that from
that moment on they would all concur in any and all decisions
made by the group, if the decisions were arrived at through a
certain formula. This formula permitted the adoption of so-
lutions by the whole group if and when more than half their
number were of the same mind. There were many matters, how-
ever, which were conceived to be of greater importance--as
to them, a mere majority was considered inadequate; something
more should be required— a two-thirds or three-fourths vote,
perhaps. And thus was created the democratic devices for
achieving the necessary integrated will.
Yet, there were certain matters which were considered
to be of such importance that the democratic techniques of
expediency should not here apply. Principle must not be
sacrificed to expediency, however euphamistic be the rationale
thereof. Thus the American Constitution requires that no
person may be convicted of any crime unless a petit jury be
of that unanimous opinion.
The jury is pre-eminently a political insti-
tution; it should be regarded as one form of
the sovereignty of the people : when that
sovereignty is repudiated, it must be re-
jected, or it must be adapted to the laws by
which that sovereignty is established. The
jury is that portion of the nation to which
the execution of the laws is intrusted,
r
as the legislature Is that part of the na-
tion which makes the laws; and in order that
society may be governed in a fixed and uni-
form manner, the list of citizens qualified
to serve on juries must increase and dimin-
ish with the list of electors. (1)
In a jury. .. .there is no question of count-
ing up similar ideas--there must be one idea
and the effort is to seek that. (2)
(3)
The Federal Constitution provides "that no state,
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the senate". This is another example of the vestigial re-
mains of the principle of unanimity in American Constitution-
al democracy.
(4)
"If a time should come," writes Herman Finer, when
the rich and populous States . . . .feel they cannot any longer
wield equal authority in the Senate to smaller and poorer
States, there is likely to be extraconst itutional violence to
settle the question. There is a theoretical point where,
since the vote is of permanent and alterable significance,
elections would cease to be fought by rhetoric and where mur-
der would be instituted as the only effective electoral pro-
cedure short of this." The United States Supreme Court has
held, since the time of this pontifical pronouncement, that
(5)
any part of the Constitution can be amended. Therefore,
although under the present terms of the American Constitution
(1) De Tocqueville, D in A, 363.
(2) Follett, NS, 110.
(5) Article V.
(4) TPMG, 122.
(5) Hawke v. Smith, 253 US 221, (1920); Rhode Island v.
Palmer, 253 US 350, (1920).

a State cannot be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Sen-
ate without its consent, this part of the Constitution can "be
amended without its consent, effectively depriving it of its
suffrage without its consent.
Unanimous opinion, in the sense of yesteryear, that all
persons must have like mind as to what should "be done in par-
ticular cases, is not much more than a guiding post in Amer-
ican Constitutional law. The principle of unanimity under
the American constitutional system is achieved by abiding
with the instituted procedures, devised for the circumstances
of the case. Since, as a matter of practicability, strict
adherence to the principle of unanimity would produce so many
impasses that very little, if anything, would be achieved,
expediency has dictated that the interpretations and prac-
tices of the principle be modified as occasion demands, even
though the theory be construed to prevail.
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b' Role of a Majority
The majority is a device which the American democracy
uses to formulate decisions for action. But, unless there is
unanimous approval, express or implied, that the subject is
a proper one for determination via this method, tyranny of
the majority results.
The power of acting by a ma jority. .. .must be
grounded on two assumptions; first, that of
an incorporation produced by unanimity; and
second, an unanimous agreement that the act of
a mere ma jority. ... shall pass with them and
with others as the act of the whole. (1)
Majority rule, therefore, does not mean that the major-
ity decides what to do and then carries out its decision.
The majority does not govern. American Constitutional govern-
(2)
1 ment is not based on the unlimited confidence in majorities.
1
....upon what, then, is that of majority
rule founded? First, waiving the impossibil-
ity of an objective measure of the importance
of such person or group, it is clear that,
normally and in the long run, the majority
possesses overwhelming power, physically and
mentally. (It always gets the army on its
side in the end.) Secondly, since, on the
democratic assumption, every conscience is as
worth as any other, and there is eternal doubt
who is right, the majority has a sound claim
to rule. Thirdly, unanimity is impossible to
achieve. Fourthly, to admit the right of a
minority to rule involves the difficulty, which
minority? It gives all minorities equal right,
that is, it destroys the integration of socie-
ty. Majority rule serves as an integrative
associative force--you must overcome your
(1) Friedrich, CGP, 140.
(2) Cooley, GPCL, 41, "Restraints are imposed on temporary
majorities; MPP, Vol. I, 322, Jefferson's First Inaugural.
If will of majority is to prevail, it must be reasonable.
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(1)
differences, and unite in order to rule.
Yet, although its actions or decisions need not have any
binding or moral authority, the maioritv rule is a "necessary
(2)
constituent of any practicable democratic organization".
If "majority rule" does not mean that the majority rules,
and if democracy means government by all the people, then
what does "majority rule" mean? "Majority rule" is the title
given to a rule of conduct under which the community operates.
American constitutional democracy uses the "majority rule" as
a method for deciding in certain cases what its course of
action ought to be; it uses the majority rule when it sees
fit to do so and discards it in other instances.
The place and function of the majority is de-
limited by general ideas as to the ends for
which government should strive, the means
that should be used to attain these ends, and
the principle that should actuate all the
members of a free democractic community. The
sole reason for the appeal to the majority
is found in the fact that the will of the ma-
jority is as close as we can get to an accur-
ate expression of this consensus of opinion
and sentiment which is the ultimate source of
authority. (3)
When the "majority rule" is constitutionally invoked, a
repudiation of the will of the majority is tantamount to a
repudiation of government. The operation of the "majority
rule" sometimes produces consequences which are indeed ano-
malous .
(1) Finer, TPMG, 69.
(2) Croly, PAL, 280.
(3) ISE, 166.

There was the party of Clay, of Adams, of
Calhoun and of Jackson, and the election of
1824 was fought out among these factions.
Andrew Jackson received the largest number
of votes in the electoral college but not a
majority of all the votes caste, and when
the election was thrown into the House of
Representatives, a combination of Clay and
Adams resulted in the election of the lat-
ter. (1)
Perhaps the majority of the American people did not con-
cur in the final result of the election. Yet, the "majority
rule" was practiced.
The points to be observed are, first, that -the "majori-
ty rule" is a device for doing some thing which may or may
not be fitted for accomplishing the end sought; and second,
"majority rule" neither means "people'? rule" nor does it
guarantee democracy. A majority is only a democratic tech-
nique of action.
(1) AGMR, 67
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c' Functions of a Plurality
A plurality consists of that number of persons less
than half the whole number (whether determined in terms of
participation or membership) but larger than any other
group. It is the largest minority when there is no majority.
A plurality is frequently accorded those rights and
powers which would normally be possessed by the majority
group.
In elections, the person securing the high-
est number of votes for an office shall be
deemed and declared to be elected to such
office; and if two or more are to be elected
to the same office, the several persons, to
the number to be chosen to such office, re-
ceiving the highest number of votes, shall
be deemed and declared to be elected; but
persons receiving the same number of votes
shall not be deemed to be elected if there-
by a greater number would be elected than
are to be chosen. (I)
In many States, if no candidate receives a majority
vote, a second run-off election is conducted between the can-
(2)
didates who received the largest pluralities. Thus,
i irt indi of : 1> ' ,; '
where the "majority-rule" principle is strictly adhered to,
vgrpu s
a plurality candidate is nominated rather than elected. But
where the plurality rule also prevails (especially is this
true in the Northern and Eastern States) candidates for local
and minor offices, particularly, achieve election by receiv-
ing a plurality vote. Here the plurality assumes the role of
the majority.
(1) Mass G.L., chap. 50, sec. 2; Mass. Const. Amend. 14.
(2) Cleveland, OD, 291. This is true most frequently in the
Southern States.

d' What Minorities Do
The minority group, as well as the majority group, la
a device employed in democratic government. The function
of minorities is not alone to criticise. Indeed, the minor-
ity has a very important and effective role in democratic
government. Its powers and rights operate as positive inhi-
bitions against the majority. Especially is this true when
an extraordinary majority is required before action can be
taken.
There are provisions forbidding the legis-
lature to expel a member without a vote of
an extraordinary majority, usually two-
thirds. The advantage of such provisions
to small minorities is very evident. (1)
As the majority is concerned with the problem of con-
sent, the minority is concerned with the problem of con-
straint. "The minority is the expression of the relation
which exists between the problems of procedure and constitu-
(2)
tional government."
From another point of view, the importance of the ser-
vice which minority groups render needs no amplification
when, in the absence of majorities, minorities become plural
ities
.
(1) Cleveland, DIR, 450.
(2) Friedrich, CGP, 382.

4 . When Majorities and Minorities Have Rights
As we have already seen, majority groups and minority
groups are devices wh* ch democracy uses for solving some of
its problems. These entities are clothed with certain powers
for the better fulfilment of those functions with which they
have been charged. As entities clothed with powers, it be-
comes necessary to exercise those powers. This entails a
matter of relationships between these entities and other en-
tities or persons. As these groups, used as devices, are
clothed with rights and charged with duties, they correspond-
ingly acquire the attributes of personality and assume the
characteristics of a person.
Whether any group, which is always an artificial entity
--be it majority or minority—has any rights is altogether a
matter of impersonation. To the extent that the entity is
regarded as a person having powers to exercise and a claim
on others for the fulfilment of obligations, to that extent
does the group have rights.
Since majorities and minorities are used for different
purposes, they are given different powers. Because they are
persons having different powers, they are accorded different
rights which are the attributes of personality with which
they have been endowed.

The nature of and the scope within which the rights
attributed to majorities and minorities may be exercised are
determined by the right of the American people to have its
policies and service personnel determined by the constitu-
tional method, i.e., voting. Thus, majorities and minori-
ties, as groups, are limited in the exercise of their rights
to that of policy determination and the selection of service
personnel.
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CHAPTER III
COMMON GROUP RIGHTS
A. The Right of Association
The very idea of government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition
for a redress of grievances. (1)
The right to assemble peaceably and the right to asso-
ciate for lawful purposes are rights of personal liberty se-
cured by the American Constitution to all persons without
(2)
regard to their citizenship. The right of association is
the right of persons to join one with another to the end that
(3)
they may become organized for collective action. It is
the right of persons to organize into groups, as functional
entities, to achieve socially approved ends through socially
approved means. The right of association apolies with equal
(4) (5) (6)
force to religious, labor, educational, and
(7)
civic groups. Although the exercise of this right, like
(1) U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 552, (1876); CUSA, 599.
(2) Stone and Reed, JJ. in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 59 Sup Ct 954, (1939); Gitlow v. New York,
268 US 652; Whitney v. California, 274 Us 357; Stromberg
v. California, 283 US 359.
(3) Hughes, J. in N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 US 1, (1937).
(4) Watson v. Jones, 13 7/allace 679, (1872).
(5) National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, sec. 7.
(6) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, (1923).
(7) Hague v. C.I.O., 59 Sup Ct 954, (1939); Kent, CAL, Vol. II,
279, "At common law, every parish or town was a corporation
for local necessities, and the inhabitants of a county or
hundred might equally be incorporated for special ends....
American law (affords) numerous examples of persons and
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the exercise of other rights, is subject to the police power
(1)
of the state, its exercise is necessary if the American
Constitution is to continue to be a democratic constitution.
....labor has the right to organize .... espio-
nage has become the habit of American manage-
ment, until it is stamped out the rights of
labor to organize, freedom of speech, freedom l
of assembly will be meaningless phrases. Men
cannot meet freely to discuss their grievances
or organize for economic betterment; they may
not even express opinions on politics or re-
ligion so long as the machinery of espionage
pervades their daily life. (2)
The right of association is the right of persons to
form groups. In other words, a group comes into being be-
cause its constituent personnel has exercised the right of
association, and the group's right to exist depends upon the
right of these persons to continue to associate. As demo-
cracy's instrumentality, a group is given powers so that
democratic ends may be achieved. The functions to be per-
formed by these entities, called groups, determine what these
powers will be. The group, as an entity endowed with certain
|
powers, acquires rights without which it could not properly
exercise these powers. Thus, the group becomes a person with
rights and duties commensurate with its endowed powers— and
(5)
no more. -As a person, every group has the right to
collective bodies of men endowed with a corporate capa-
city, in some particulars declared, and without having in
any other respect the capacities incident to a corporation. f '
(1) Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 US 43, sustaining Comm. v.
Davis, 162 Mass 510.
(2) VFSRL, Preliminary Report, No. 46, Senate Committee on
Education and ^abor, 2-3, 8.
(3) Although freedom of speech and assembly are rights secured

associate with other persons so that it may better perform
those functions for which it was created. This right of as
sociation, which is common to all persons living in a demo-
cracy, is enjoyed in common by all groups which come to be
sanctioned within the framework of American constitutional
democracy.
by all persons by due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, natural persons, not corporate persons, are
authorized to maintain a suit in equity to restrain in-
fringement of rights of freedom of speech and assembly.
U. S. Code Annotated, Title 8, sec. 43.
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B. The Right to Exist
The American Constitution was ordained and established
"to protect the people's rights, the rights of the whole peo-
ple, or of any part of the people, or even of one individual
(1)
as against the people". It was also established to pro-
(2)
vide for the common defense. No argument is required to
demonstrate that these propositions would be untenable unless
the people had a right to exist. There is no point in defend-
ing a person's rights unless that person were supposed to
have the right to live. Our attention centers, therefore,
not on whether "persons" (groups and individuals) have a
right to exist, but on what is the constitutional conception
of the right to exist.
Through the ages, from the days of Tacitus to the era
of John Dewey, thinkers have concerned themselves with the
simple, yet profound, question—What is Life? Whenever they
have arrived at a conclusion, it has always been, in sub-
stance, that Life is activity. "To be is to do." Life has
no meaning except in terms of action. To exist must mean to
live; to live must mean to do. All groups, no less than any
other persons, therefore, have the right to participate in
social activities. What the groups may do and what they may
not do depends upon the functions they are supposed to per-
form. For exampl e:
(1) Stimson, ACPPR, 27.
(2) Constitution of the United States, Preamble; Holcombe,
PMC , 339.

On the afternoon of Memorial Day, May 30,
1937, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, ten
people received fatal injuries when city
police dispersed a large group of striking
steel workers and their sympathizers who
were marching in the direction of the plant
The cause of and responsibility for the en-
counter has "been the subject of sharp dis-
pute by the police, the union, and the pub-
lic. The police have charged the demonstra-
ters with conspiracy to capture the Republic
Steel plant by violent means and assert that
the casualties were a regrettable but neces-
sary incident to their efforts to disperse
a riotous mob. The union, on the other hand,
accuses the police of a brutal attack upon a
group of citizens in the exercise of their
constitutional right peacefully to assemble
and nicket. (Un-
it Is plain, therefore, that the manner in which each
group behaves, thus exercising its right to exist, is deter-
mined by the purposes for which It was created. Every group,
whose methods and ends carry social approbation, has a right
to exist. Neither a majority nor a minority group, as such
,
has any right to exercise powers. Majorities and minori-
ties, as democratic techniques, can only express concurrence
or dissent as a means of reaching group decision with re-
spect to proposed action to be taken by the whole community. ,
As the American Constitution imbues majorities and minori-
ties with personality, they come to have rights and duties;
but they remain, nevertheless, artificial persons created for
certain purposes. As such persons, the right to function as
a properly sanctioned and integrated unit in the social order
(1) VFSRL, Report of Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
July 22, 1937-^ Report Jfo^_A6^-Bart--&y~p« 2.

Is common to all groups. This Is the American Constitution-
al conception of the right to exist.
Since Being is Activity, the American Constitution
recognizes the liberty of the "person", as distinguished
from the entire group, and undertakes to protect this liber-
(1)
ty by regulating the conduct of others. Thus our Demo-
cracy holds that the right to exist can itself exist only
(2)
when all persons are equally free.
They refrain from attacking the rights of
others in order that their own may not be
violated. (3)
If an infraction of such equality of rights occurs,
American Courts are open to all "including even aliens,
(4)
without discrimination". A person's constitutional
right to exist is always trespassed upon when any other
"person" undertakes to deprive or to deny to him the right
to exist. When this occurs, the person so transgressing has
acted ultra vires, has rendered a disservice and has for-
feited his own right to exist.
For example: When a corporation has acted ultra vires,
the court may order its dissolution, and it becomes dead;
if a natural person is convicted of murder, this person for-
feits his own right to exist, and execution or life impri-
sonment effectually causes this person to cease to exist;
(1) Root, AGC, 86, 91.
(2) Pound, SCL, 86.
(3) DeTocqueville, D in A, I, 315.
(4) Smith, CIR, 2.

If any group, not an incorporated association, behaves in a
manner not constitutionally sanctioned, it may be prohibited
from functioning in any one of several ways—police power
may be invoked to prevent the group from meeting, the mem-
bers of the group might be convicted of conspiracy, an in-
junction may issue, etc.—and the group no longer has a
right to exist. Because all groups have a right to exist,
no group has the right to exert upon any other person (in-
dividual or group) force or duress, without the latter f s
consent, thus curtailing or abridging its right to exist.
A seeming exception is in the instance of that group
called "the government", the politically-organized group
instituted for the purpose of effectuating "the will of the
people" by compelling conformity thereto in accordance with
the instituted procedures. But this is no real exception,
however, because this group is the only one which carries
the community's sanction, i.e., is constitutionally endowed,
in the use of force within the defined limits of the Ameri-
can Constitution.

C. The Right to Self -Determination
Since rights spring from social relationships entered
into between "persons", every right, which is really a
claim of interest in one's favor against another "person",
carries along with it a duty. Thus where A and B have en-
tered into some contractual relationship, a right may accrue
therefrom to A and a duty to B. But in the exercise of this
right, A has the responsibility, usually implied, not to ex-
ercise his right in a way that would be unnecessarily injur-
ious to B, and B has the right to have A exercise his right
reasonably as agreed.
Groups, like other persons, have rights. Why does the
community clothe groups with rights? ^t is because the
community expects the groups to do something. Groups, de-
mocracy's instrumentalities, are endowed with rights because
the community expects them to render service. The duty to
render service is the only justification for any "person"
(majority or minority) to exist. Service is every group's
raison d'etre. To perform this obligation, the American
Constitution accords to every group the constituent right,
as determined by the law governing that form of organiza-
tion, to self-determination by giving to its members the
right to share in the control and management of the group,
the right to hold the servants responsible to them, and,
consequently, the right to give support to or withhold sup-
port from the group leaders.

....all persons have equal rights.... in the
employment of their faculties as they see
fit, so far as the public welfare does not
require that they be restricted in order
that others may have the same enjoyment of
life, liberty and the employment of their
faculties . ... (1)
The "faculties" which group-persons use in determining
what their lawful behavior will be are the constituent
groups
.
If the community is to be a democracy, its constitu-
tion must provide for self-determination by those persons
(2)
who compose its membership. This explains why the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution pro-
tect the right to contract to every person by the due pro-
(3)
cess clause.
^t could not have been intended to enforce
social, as distinguished from political,
equality, or a commingling of the two races
upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
The right of self-determination means that every "per-
son" is free to choose what he will do.
Thus a university can determine for itself what the
requirements for admission and attendance shall be and the
persons seeking to study therein are free to decide for them-
selves whether they will or will not comply with such
(1) McClain, CLUS, 289.
(2) Eol combe, PMC, 206.
(3) CUSA, 637.
(4) Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537, 544, (1896).
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(1)
requirements and thus acquire rights.
On inarch 1, 1875, Congress passed "An Act to protect
all citizens in their civil and legal rights", commonly
(2)
known as the Civil Rights Act.
Section 1. All persons within the juris-
diction of the United States shall be en-
titled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the accomodations, advantages, facilities
and privileges of inns, public conveyances
on land or water, theaters and other places
of public amusement, subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by
law, and applicable alike to citizens of
every race and color, regardless of any
previous condition of servitude.
Section 2 of this law made any violation of the pre-
ceding section a penal offence and provided for the punish-
ment for such offenders. In considering, on appeal, the
convictions of several defendants for violating the terms
of this law by refusing accomodations and privileges to
negroes in an inn, a hotel, in the dress circle of Magulre 1 s
Theater In San Francisco, in the Grand Opera Eouse in New
York, and in the ladies car on the Memphis and Charleston
Rr. Co. , the Supreme Court of the United States declared
(3)
this law to be unconstitutional and void. The Fifth
Amendment prohibits the Federal Government and the Four-
teenth Amendment deprives the States of the power to inter-
(1) Hamilton v. University of California, 293 US 245, (1934)
Fourteenth Amendment does not confer on a conscientious
objector the right to attend a State university without
taking the prescribed military training course.
(2) 18 Stat. 335.
(3) Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, (1883).
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fere with the rights of persons to self-determination; hut
when it comes to a question of private rights between persons
gentlemen and ladies choose friends and as-
sociates for themselves; there can be no
system of legislation that compels A to in-
vite B to his house or treat him in a friendly-
manner. The farthest point reached by the
law is that the objection of A shall not pre-
vent B from the use of public facilities; and
the farthest social right that can be claimed,
without bringing down the denunciation of the
community, is the right of C to invite B and
treat him as a friend, whether A would in-
vite him or not. (1)
The Court declared, through Mr. Justice Bradley, that
it would be absurd to affirm that, because the rights of
life, liberty and property (which include all the civil
(2)
rights that men have) are protected against invasion by
Federal and State governments, "that Congress may therefore
provide due process of law for their vindication in every
case". If a "person" other than a politically-organized
entity invades the rights of another "person" without sanc-
tion of the State, constitutionally authorized, the rights
of the injured party" remain in force and may ore sumably be
(3)
vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress."
(1) Hart, AGAC , 32.
(2) Twining v. Mew Jersey, 211 US 78, (1908); Re Quarles,
158 US 532, (1892).
(3) Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 17, "The wrongful act of
an individual unsupported by any such authority is
simply a private wrong." Whether interstate passengers
of one race should, in any portion of their journey, be
compelled to share their cabin accomodations with pas-
sengers of another race is a question of interstate
commerce and to be determined by Congress alone. Louis-
ville N.O. and T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 US 587,
590, (1890). A Louisiana statute requiring interstate

Thus, the right of self -determination is recognized by the
American Constitution through the inhibitions it has levied
(1)
on the Federal and State governments and by protecting
this right in the Courts when any other person attempts to
impair it.
The right of self-determination, however, like all
other constitutional rights, is construed in the light of
the principle Salus Populi est Suprema Ley ,
The enjoyment of life and liberty with the
right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happi-
ness and safety, is subject to such re-
straints as the Government may prescribe
for the good of the whole. (2)
In the effort to enforce this constitutional principle,
Congress enacted and the Supreme Court sustained the Anti-
(3)
trust Act, Railways Hours of ^abor Acts of 1907 and
(4) (5)
1926, the Employers' Liability Act of 1908, the
(6)
Adamson Act of 1916, and the National Labor Relations
(7)
Act of 1935.
carriers to permit Negroes and whites to intermingle
freely in all parts of their trains or ships was held to
be a regulation of interstate commerce and therefore in-
valid. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 US 485, (1878). But when an
interstate railroad established rules and regulations
permitting white and colored passengers to occupy separ-
ate compartments, and Congress had not made any regula-
tion in the matter, it was held a reasonable regulation
irrespective of the fact that a state statute also re-
quired that there be separate accomodations. Chiles v.
Chesapeake and 0. R. Co., 218 US 71, (1910), McCabe v.
Atchison, T and S.F. R. Co., 235 US 151, (1914).
(1) Colgate v. Harvey, 296 Us 404, 430, (1935).
(2) Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash (US) 371, (1823).
(3) 26 Stat 209.
(4) 34 Stat 145; 48 Stat 1188.
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The National Labor Relations Act, Section 7 provides
j!
Employees shall have the right to self-
organ ization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choos-
ing and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.
Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, the United States
(1)
Supreme Court said that under the N.L.R.A. the reore-
sentatives designated by a majority of employees in any bar-
gaining unit are the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in this unit for purposes of collective bargain-
ing. The N.L.R.B. is empowered to designate units, thus
giving them constitutional recognition. In answer to the
argument that this law is unconstitutional because it re-
strains employers in their right to determine for themselves
with whom they will bargain and that it interferes with the
right of self-determination by the minority of employees in
a designated bargaining unit, the Court reiterated, in ef-
fect, that the right of self-determination, a fundamental
right which the American Constitution accords to all per-
sons (employers, labor, major! tv groups, minority groups),
(2)
cannot be asserted in derogation of the general welfare.
In other words, the right of self- determination must be ex-
ercised to accord with the principle that the welfare of
(5) 35 Stat 65.
(6) 39 Stat 721.
(7) 49 Stat 449.
(1) N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301
US 1, (1937).
(2) Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Co., 279 US 253,
£61 , (lflP.9) . -

the whole people deserves first consideration. To insist
that an employer must bargain with the representatives of
his employees and that the employees must bargain collective-
ly through representatives chosen under the "majority rule"
is not to curtail the constitutional right of self-deter-
mination by the employer or by the minority of the employ-
ees. (The employer is not in business to hire employees
and the latter do not hire out to the end that they may
bargain individually or collectively.)
The right of employees to se If -organizat ion
and to select representatives of their own
choosing for collective bargaining or other
mutual protection without restraint or co-
ercion by their employer is a fundamental
right, interference with which is a proper
subject for condemnation by competent le-
gislative authority. (1)
'
Employees, as a unit, have the right to self-determin-
ation and the minority is simply a part of the larger
group, with procedural rights. Minority groups, as such,
do not have rights; it is only as they come to be imper-
sonated that they acquire rights. In this case, unless the
minority -group of the employees can achieve recognition as
a separate unit or group, it serves only as a technique for
choosing the representatives of all the employees in that
unit, and no more. Whether the minority-group ought to be
designated as a separate group with its right of self-
(1) Edward J. Corwin in Cong Rec Aug. 13, 1937, 11383. Cf
.
New Republic, Aug. 4, 1937, "The Court Sees a New Light."

determination can be answered only "by considering all the
circumstances of the case.
The right of self-determination is enjoyed in common
by all "persons" to the end that each might render service
(1)
to the community.
(1) What is and what is not serviceable must be determined
in every case by the community.
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D. The Right to Law
The man whose protection from wrong rests
wholly upon the benevolence of another man
or of a congress, is a slave --a man without
ri ghts . --Benjamin Harrison.
A law is a rule of conduct or a principle of behavior
which the members of the community accept for the governance
of their actions.
•...no constitutional provisions can give
power, to the courts unless there is a rever-
ence and respect for law in the hearts of
the people and a firm disposition on their
part to abide by and uphold the decisions
which their judges render. (1)
Rights accrue to persons as a result of the operation
of the Law. The sum of all the laws comprises the constitu-
tion. Thus, the essential and primary characteristic of
constitutional government is that it is a government of
(2)
laws
.
The Const itution. ... stands as a citadel of
principle s . . . . (3)
Therefore, the first, and in some respects, the greatest
(4)
of all the rights, is the Right to Law.
One of the principle reasons why the American Constitu-
tion was contrived was to establish justice. The very es-
sence of justice postulates a process of adjustment of con-
(1) Willoughby and Rogers, IPG, 58.
(2) Ibid, 57.
(3) Chandler, GBPC, 24.
(4) Stimson, ACPFR, 27, 31.
!
l
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(1)
flicting interests. To know when justice has come, i.e.,
when the process of adjustment is complete, some standard or
criterion is necessary. The Law serves as the measuring
stick. Law is not intended to control the actions of the
(2) (3)
great majority of people j the Law is intended to coerce
a rebellious minority into observing "those rules of conduct
(4)
the infraction of which will inflict injury upon others."
The Right to Law is the right of every "person" in a
constitutional democracy to a definition of those principles
of social behavior which are accepted and acted upon by the
community. The right to due process of law is the right to
compel everybody else to conform to the Law; it is the right,
common to all "persons", to have all other persons living in
the community perform their duty to obey the law. The right
of due process of law is the right to have the law inter-
preted and applied in consonance with the terms of the Ameri-
can Constitution.
(1) Holcombe, FMC, 210.
(2) Whenever this fundamental thought is overlooked, legis-
lation produces nothing but a bunch of dead letters,
still-born laws that never did and never could become a
living rule of conduct. The legal rule is therefore
fashioned after the prevalent sense of r ight--Rechtsge
-
fuehl.
(3) Giddings, RS, 69.
(4) Tiedeman, UCUS, 3-5.
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1. Due Process of Law
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment se-
cures to all persons the democratic liberties as they come to
be practiced in terms of freedom of speech, freedom of press,
freedom of religious worship, and freedom of peaceable assem-
(1)
bly for any lawful purpose.
The right of free religious worship is a constitutional
1
right belonging to all persons who are members of the Ameri-
can democracy. It is a constitutional right, enforceable in
the courts. It allows every person "to entertain such no-
i
tions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties
they impose as may be approved by his Judgment and conscience,
and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he
may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of
others .
"
1
In this country, the full and free right to
entertain any religious belief, to practice
or teach any religious principle or doctrine
which does not violate the laws of morality
and property, and which does not infringe
personal rights is conceded to all. (2)
'.Then any person undertakes to exercise his right of
free religious worship in a way not deemed constitutionally
permissable, such free exercise may be abridged or curtailed
only by due process of law. Thus a person's right of free
religious worship may be properly abridged if in the exercise
(1) Hague v. C.I.O., 59 Sup Ct 954, (1939); Git low v. New
York, 268 US 652; Whitney v. California, 274 US 357;
Stromberg v. California, 283 US 359.
(2) Watson v. Jones, 13 Wallace 679, 728, (1872).
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(1)
thereof, for example, he attempts to defraud others or
(2)
to practice polygamy.
The right of free speech and free press cannot be denied
or abridged to any person except by due process of law. Due
process of law, in such circumstances, is not invoked unless
the person has himself violated his constitutional right.
Due process of law is used to prevent wrongdoing and to en-
force substantive rights. Freedom of speech and of press
"does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or
indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public
(3)
morals or private reputation". When this occurs, the
due process clause is invoked to curtail this kind of an
exercise of these rights.
Due process reqtiires all persons to obey the law. No
person may seek to evade this duty by claiming some substan-
tive right. Thus, when the N.L.R.B. ordered the Associated
Press to restore employees discharged because of their union
activities, the Associated Press could not successfully claim
(4)
that this order violated its right of freedom of the press.
(1) New v. Unit
(2) Reynolds v.
David v. Be
a crime by
countries;
gion is to
(3) Frohwerk v.
Newspaper C
(4) Associated
ed States, 245 Fed. 710, (1917).
United States, 98 US 145, 163, (1879);
ason, 133 US 333, 340, (1890), "Polygamy is
the laws of all civilized and Christian
to call the advocacy of it a tenet of reli-
offend the common sense of mankind."
United States, 249 US 204, (1919); Toledo
o. v. U.S., 247 US 402, 419, (1918).
Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 US 103, 133, (1937).

The Fifth Amendment which requires that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law protects all persons within the United States from
unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary treatment by the Federal
(1)
Government. Thus when Congress attempted to stabilize the
soft coal industrv with the passage of the Bituminous Coal
(2)
Conservation Act of 1935 which "authorized a specified
majority of producers and miners to fix maximum hours and
minimum wages within the several districts, compulsory u^on
(3)
the minority by virtue of the tax rebate to members of
(4)
the coal code, and denial of government purchases", the
Supreme Court decided that Congress was depriving certain
persons thereby of personal liberty and private property
without due proces
s
of law and that, therefore, this consti-
tuted an unconstitutional interference by Congress and was
(5)
void. Congress cannot make any process due process. The
Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State to deprive any person of
(6)
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
(1) Wong Wing V. United States, 163 US 228, 238, (1896); but
see Stoehr v. Walla ee, 255 US 239, 245, (1921), "There is
no constitutional prohibition against confiscation of
enemy property."
(2) 49 Stat 991.
(3) 13j$ of the 15% tax on coal at the mine.
(4) CUSA, 636.
(5) Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 US 238, 311, (1936).
(6) Kodges v. United States, 203 US 1 14, (1906); Reinman
v. Little Rock, 237 US 171, (1915); Nixon v. Eerndon,
273 US 536, (1927); Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, (1883)

Due process of law refers to that law of the
land in each State which derives its authori-
ty from the inherent and reserved powers of
the State exerted within the limits of those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and
political Institutions. (1)
Due isrocess of law protects against arbitrary or unrea-
(2)
sonable conduct.
The American constitutional conception of due process
of law concerns itself with the rights of the "person". It
provides that the Federal Government may not act beyond the
scope of its delegated powers and it insists that no State
(3)
exercise any power prohibited to it. If either of these
and
contingencies occurs ,/a "per son" suffers thereby, he may suc-
cessfully oppose the enforcement of this law as being uncon-
stitutional because it deprives him of his liberty or proper-
(4)
ty without due process of law.
Liberty thus guar anteed. ... denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraints, but also the
right of the person to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to ac-
quire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
(1) Ex parte Kemmler, 136 US 436, 448, (1890): Enterprise Ir-
rigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 US 157,
(1917) held that the State defines rights in land and if
State Courts hold such supposed rights to be non-existent,
the 14th Amendment can afford no protection to rights
which do not exist. Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Com-
mission, 274 US 651, 657, (1927), Missouri P. R. Co. v.
Humes, 115 US 512, 520, (1885).
(2) Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 US 522, 534, (1923).
(3) US. Constitution, Amendment X.
(4) Munn v. Illinois, 94 US 113, 123-124, (1877).
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home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own con-
science and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit "by free men. (^)
Other substantive rights so protected to the person are
(2)
freedom of speech and of press and the right of peaceable
(3)
assembly. Yet, always, the principle Salus Popul* est
Supreme Lex prevails and therefore, for example, the legisla-
ture in the exercise of its discretion may provide for com-
pulsory vaccination, or physical examination as a condition
(4)
precedent to marriage, in the exercise of its police power.
In dealing with the relations of employer and
employed, the legislature has necessarily a
wide field of discretion in order that there
may be suitable protection of health and safe-
ty, and that peace and good order may be pro-
moted through regulations designed to insure
wholesome conditions of work and freedom from
oppression. (5)
But if the right of contract, which is a right of per-
sonal liberty, be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with,
so that a person might not contract for personal employment
(1) Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399, (1923).
(2) Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652, (1925).
(3) De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 US 353, 364, (1937). Eut see
Waugh v. Univ. of Mississippi, 237 US 589, (1915). A
statute condemning the display of a red flag as a sign,
symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government,
even though peaceful and orderly opposition by legal
means, is unconstitutional. Stromberg v. California,
283 US 359, (1931).
(4) Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US 11, (1905); Zucht v.
King, 260 US 174, (1922).
(5) West Coast Eotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US 379, (1937).
i

or other services which are exchanged for money or other
forms of property, there is a substantial impairment of liber-
ty in the long-established constitutional sense and there is
a deprivation of liberty and property without due orocess of
(1)
law. Thus, Congress cannot make any process due process.
If the Federal or State authorities act within the scope
of their authorization, then the "person" is entitled to
due process in the application of the law . Kany of the
rights protected by the first eight amendments against na-
tional action are also protected from State infringement "not
because they are enumerated in the first eight amendments,
but because they are of such a nature that they are included
i
in the conception of due process of law and a denial of them
(2)
would be a denial of due process." These rights include
(1) the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unre a son able searches and seizures,
(2) the right to be informed of the nature ana cause of the
accusation, (3) the right not to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb, (4) the right not to be compelled in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself, (5) the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, (6) the right
to be confronted with witnesses against him and to cross-
examine them, (7) the right and opportunity to prepare a de-
fence with assistance of counsel and to summon witnesses in
(1) Coppage v. Kansas, 236 US 1, 14, (1915).
(2) Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 US 233, (1936).

his favor, (8) the right to reasonable bail, (9) the right
not to have an excessive fine or cruel and unusual punish-
ment inflicted, (10) and the right to appeal a decision to a
higher judicial court (including the right to a writ of habe
us corpus, except in times of emergency).
Thus, the American Constitution, providing for a govern
ment of laws, safeguards to every person that the laws will
be properly enforced, in substance and in procedure, to the
end that no constitutional right of any person be abrogated
without his consent. The guaranty of due process of law in-
sures continued constitutional democracy.
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E. The Right of Revolution
1. The Right to Participate in Government
(1)
"We , the people," a sovereign body, devised the Am-
erican Constitution as a democratic instrumentality. The
constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to
protect the people against the oppression of the minority and
(2)
the tyranny of the majority even though unanimous consent
(3)
by all the people is seldom required. Democracy rarely
demands unanimity; the "majority rule" is most frequently
(4)
used in democratic government. Thus majorities, minori-
ties and pluralities are the means employed by "the people"
in their "self-government". These groups are endowed with
powers so that they may perform their duties. If groups
are used in the scheme of government, then they must be given
the right to participate in government. Therefore, this
right belongs to all groups functioning as persons in Ameri-
can constitutional democracy.
(1) Walt, RP, 4.
(2) Cong Rec, Aug. 4, 1937, 10607.
(3) Tufts, RBL, 391.
(4) See discussion supra.
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2. The Right to Revolt
Is there a constitutional right to revolt? Are persons
or groups accorded the right of revolution as one of those
rights which accrue to them as members in a constitutional
democracy? As it might be expected, authorities are divided
in their views.
Some publicists reason that there is no right of revo-
lution. In a constitutional democracy, it is claimed, "the
people" convert their public servants into governors and ren-
der themselves subject to their legislation. Hence, rebellion
can have no legal justification in a democracy; for this would
be "an attempt at political suicide committed by a felonious
(1)
minority"
.
This reasoning, however, omits to consider that impor-
tant circumstance in which the "governors" persist in govern-
ing despite the wishes of "the people". Do "the people" then
have the right to revolt against their governors?
The distinguished authority, Emlin Mcclain, noted that
"in a strict sense there are no rights recognized by the Law
(2)
except legal rights". Since, if there were a right of
revolution it must exist outside the constituted order, he
reasons, it cannot be said that there is a right of revolu-
tion. Further, the Constitution does not nrovide for this
(1) Ordronaux, C Leg US, 38.
(2) McClain, CLUD, 290.
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(1)
right
.
The preponderance of authority, as well as the better
(2)
reasoning, affirms the right to revolt.
The "compact theory", the doctrine of indefeasible per-
sonal rights, the doctrine of constitutional limitations on
government as a way of preventing occasions for dispute, and
the doctrine of checks and balances which attempts to provide
automatic machinery to prevent the encroachment on the right -
of one group by the members of another group, writes Albert
B. Hart, are all ideas based on the fundamental doctrine of
revolution, that is, of the right of the governed to take
arms if the impalpable restrictions on government are not
(3)
observed.
The Declaration of Independence proclaimed the right of
revolution and undertook to justify its use in 1776.
The Declaration was not primarily concerned
with the causes of this rebellion; its pri-
mary purpose was to present those causes in
such a way as to furnish a moral and ]e gal
justification for that rebellion. .. .Having
formulated a philosophy of government that
(1) James M. Beck. TCUS, 203 writes that the words "ordain
and establish in the U. S. Constitution imply perpetuity.
"They make no provision for the secession of any State,
even if it deems itself aggrieved by federal action."
(2) Cooley, GPCL, 28. V.lien a State is once in the Union, there
is "no place for reconsideration or revocation, except
through the consent of the States." Texas v. White,
7 Wallace 700, 726.
(3) Hart, AGAC , 36.
i

made revolution a right under certain condi-
tions, they endeavored to show that these
conditions prevailed.... (1)
Was this right subsequently defeated? It has never been
repudiated by word or act. Indeed, if the annual Independence
Day celebration on the fourth day of July has any signifi-
cance, it is to reaffirm those principles incorporated in
that document.
The right of revolution, says Mr. Justice
Wilson, should be taught as a principle
of the Constitution of the United States
and of every state in the Union. (2)
The real question is when may this right be properly
exercised. There are certain rights of so fundamental a
character that "no free government may trespass upon them
(5)
whether they are enumerated in the Constitution or not."
When these rights are infracted, the right of revolution may
be exercised.
The Declaration of Independence was not, as it is often
stated, "a declaration of the right to throw off an established
(4)
government and institute a new government in its place";
it was, in fact, the active insistence upon the rights of the
established constitution.
(1) Carl Becker, DI, 7, 16.
(2) Roscoe Pound, EM, 89.
(3) Corwin, CWMT, 113. "The course of our constitutional
development has been to reduce fundamental rights to
rights guaranteed by the sovereign." Calder v. Bull,
3 Dallas 386.
(4) McClain, CLUS, 290.

It is true that the colonists in the incipi-
ent period of the change planted themselves
upon established rights, instead of seeking
or desiring a revolution. Their purpose,
therefore, was to maintain the old established
principles of the Constitution instead of
overturning them. . . . it was the fact that the
exercise of imperial power in the particulars
complained of was tyrannical and in disregard
of constitutional principles. (1)
The right of revolution is a social, not an anti-social,
right. As such, it is properly exercised only with due re-
gard, for the rights of other persons.
The right of revolution may be said to exist
when the government has become so oppressive
that its evils decidedly overbalance those
which are likely to attend the change, when
success in the attempt is reasonably certain,
and when such institutions are likely to re-
sult as will be satisfactory to the people. (2)
It is properly exercised only as a last resort.
(Declaration of Independence) asserts the
right of revolution, when there is no other
remedy. This does not mean the right to en-
gage in insurrection and rebellion, when
doomed to certain defeat, but it does mean
that when the people are united, and find
the government under which they are living
intolerable, they have a right to revolt and
establish a new government if they can. (3)
Thus, no group has a right to revolt except when the
predetermined constitutional procedures for reaching a decision
(1) Thomas M. Cooley, GPCL, 25.
(2) Cooley, GPCL, 26; Chandler, GBFC, H. L. Carson, 20.
"Revolutionists knew that rational liberty could only be
secured through self-restraint; that the safety of the
minority lay in curbing the wild impulses of the majority,
and even that the well-being of the majority could only be
secured by a government of checks and balances."
(3) Baker, FLAC, II, 673.

are denied to it. Conversely, when such procedures are de-
nied, the right of revolution is assumed as a remedial pro-
cedure of last resort—the members of such group, however,
assuming responsibility for their acts. Thus, the residual
right of a community to revolt against the usurpation of
powers constitutes its right to re-establish the American
Constitutional system of law and order.
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CHAPTER IV
MAJORITY GROUP RIGHTS
"The voice of the people can only be heard when ex-
pressed in the times and under the conditions which they
themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the constitu-
(1)
tion." Thus, it is all "the people" who speak; the ma-
jority is simply an instrumentality which "the people" may
use for this purpose in one instance, and may not use in
another case.
The original idea of American elections was
that everybody must get a clear majority.
At present, almost everywhere in the United
States, a plurality elects.... (2)
(3)
A plurality, which always consists of a numerical
minority of the whole group, functions in the prescribed
instances in the same way as does the majority.
If American Democracy meant, and the American Constitu-
tion provided for, "the supremacy of the will of the numeri-
cal majority", as many authorities write, American Constitu-
tional democracy would mean that the majority rules the minor-
(4)
ity. If it could be proved that the majority does not
(1) Cooley, CL, 598.
(2) Hart, AGAC, 77.
(3) To the effect that the theory of the "concurrent major-
ity" was rejected in favor of the theory of the "numeri-
cal majority", see Elliott, AGMR, 84.
(4) DeTocqueville, D in A, 324, "The very essence of demo-
cratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty
of the majority; for there is nothing in the democratic
states which is capable of resisting it". Elliott,
AGMR, 144.
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in truth rule, then, since somebody must rule somebody else,
as postulated, the only remaining alternative would be that
(1)
the minority rules the majority. Thus, constitutional
democracy is conceived of as maintaining one or another form
(2)
of despotism. This view of constitutional democracy is
(3)
both short-sighted and incorrect. (See discussion supra)
Constitutionally speaking, "the people" have a right to
(4)
do anything. This is not to say that the majority has a
right to do anything.
The Supreme Court, an organ of government
which interprets the Constitution and laws
of Congress. .. .may forbid the carrying out
of the expressed will of the majority. It
necessarily follows that the authority which
can thus overrule the majority and enforce
its own views of the system is an authority
greater than the majority. ( 5 )
The majority, as an entity with delegated powers, has
defined rights which it may assert by virtue of its authority.
As an entity with powers and rights, a majority is a person.
A majority taken collectively is only an in-
dividual, whose opinions, frequently whose
interests, are opposed to those of another
individual, who is styled a minority. If it
be admitted that a man possessing absolute
power may misuse that power...., why should
(1) Elliott, AG-MR, 146.
(2) DeTocqueville , D in A, 340, "I attribute the small number
of distinguished men in political life to the ever-in-
creasing despotism of the majority in the United States.
(3) Cooley, CL, 598.
(4) DeTocqueville, D in A, 330.
(5) Smith, SAG, 296.
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not a majority "be liable to the same re-
proach? (1)
With other persons
,
the majority has a common and equal
interest to promote and provide for the general welfare of the
(2)
nation. Therefore, it is endowed with the powers and
rights common to all persons in the community. In addition,
our constitutional democracy undertakes to make further use
of the majority-groups under the the ory that the only just
principle of government amongst men, equally free, is that
of popular sovereignty directed by the will of an intelligent
(3)
majority. Therefore, majority-groups were endowed, in
certain defined circumstances, with additional powers and
were given added rights. Let us now examine these rights.
(1) DeTocqueville, D in A, 530.
(2) Wait, RP, 6.
(3) Ibid, 6.
i
i

157
A. The Right to Determine Policy
Jefferson proclaimed the acceptance of the judgment of
the majority as a rule of political justice to be one of the
(1)
fundamentals of democracy. Experience has proved the
wisdom of this principle.
The equipping of a majority party with ade-
quate power to impose its will upon a re-
sisting minority makes.... for practical re-
sponsibility. (£)
It is obvious, for example, that there should be a de-
termination of the rules and limitations of debate on all
questions up for consideration before a body. When all rele-
vant arguments have been advanced, the debate ought to come
to an end. But who is to say when this is the case? The
American Constitution has given this richt to the majority
(3)
group.
Where there is free discussion and free bal-
lot, we think that the choice of the majori-
ty is, on the whole, the only practical way
to settle any question. If the majority does
not rule, then the minority rules. In the
long run, the majority would seem to be more
likely to be right, provided that matters have
been thoroughly and fairly discussed. (4)
(1) Cleveland and Buck, BRG, 44-45. He described it as
"acquiescence in the decisions of the majority."
(2) Willoughby and Rogers, IPG, 14 9; Chandler, GBFC, Compro-
mises of the Constitution, R. Harrison, 294.
(3) Friedrich, CGP, 391; Willoughby and Rogers, IPG, 148-
149.
(4) Tufts, RBL, 391.
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Then again, since it is impossible that "the people"
should consider and adopt their own laws, when a law has
been perfected or when it is deemed desirable to take the ex-
pression of public sentiment upon any one question, Public
pinion is once more expressed by the majority's vote.
Whether a majority should comprise a majority of those vot-
ing, a majority of the total membership of the whole body, a
majority of a quorum, or whether more than a bare majority,
and, if so, how much more, should be necessary to determine
policy or formulate group judgment are matters which are de-
termined in accordance with the importance of the issue, the
custom of the community and the common sense of the people.
The Federal Constitution provides that
Each house shall be the judge of the elec-
tions, returns and qualifications of its
own members, and a majority of each shall
constitute a quorum to do business. (2)
Here, the mere presence of a majority gives to each
(3)
House the capacity to transact business. Since the Con-
stitution does not prescribe any method of determining the
• • •
"
• J
presence of a majority, "it is therefore within the competen-
cy of the House to prescribe any method which shall be rea-
(4)
sonably certain to ascertain the fact."
The House of Representatives has the exclusive power of
impeachment by a majority vote, "that is, a majority of a
(1) Cooley, CL, 598.
(2) Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 1.
(3) CUSA, 113.
(4) U.S. v. Ballin, 144 US 1, 5-6, (1892).
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(1)
quorum," although no person may be convicted by the Sen-
ate on the Impeachment "without the concurrence of two-thirds
of the members present", viz, two-thirds of a quorum at
(2)
least. But to exoel a member from either House, a major i-
(3)
ty of two-thirds is necessary.
In enacting legislation, the bill under consideration
must be concurred in by a constitutional majority which con-
sists of a simole majority of a quorum, unless the constitu-
(4)
tion establishes some other rule. The two-thirds vote
(5)
of each House required to pass a bill over a veto means
(6)
two-thirds of a quorum; the terra "House" refers to that
body upon which legislative power is conferred by the Consti-
(7)
tution, viz, a majority of the members. Consequently,
the contrary opinions and judgments voiced by such eminent
authorities as De Tocqueville, Locke, Burlamaqui, Montesquieu,
John Adams, Jefferson and Rousseau must be rejected when they
hold that
(1) Article I, sec. 2, cl. 5; Corwin, CWMT, 6. An impeach-
ment is a charge of misconduct, and is comparable to an
indictment by a grand jury.
(2) Article I, sec. 3, cl. 6; Corwin, CWMT, 8.
(3) Article I, sec. 5, cl. 2. A member may be expelled for
treason, conspiracy against the Government, high mis-
demeanor. In* re ChaDman, 166 US 661, 669, (1897); CUSA,
114.
(4) Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111 297; Supervisors of Schuyler
Co. v. People, 25 111 183; Southworth v. P. and J. Rr. Co.,
2 Mich 287; State v. McBride, 4 Mo 303; Cooley, CL, 2.
(5) U.S. Constitution, Article I, sec. 7, cl. 2; Mass. Con-
stitution, Part the Second, chap. I, Article II; Cooley,
CL 2
.
(6) CUSA, 120.
(7) Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 US 276, (1919).
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the majority has the whole power of the
community naturally in them and may employ
all that power in making laws. (1)
(1) Read, CR, Gaetano Salvemini, "The Concepts of Democracy
and Liberty in the Eighteenth Century", 105: De Tocque-
ville, D in A, 336.

1 . Right to Amend the Constitution
A constitution is in no proper sense the em-
bodiment of the will of the people unless
it recognizes the ri ght of the majority to
amend.... Constitutions which are really
democratic contain such checks.... as are cal-
culated to insure the deliberate expression
of the popular will. (1)
The American Constitution has been criticised, times too
numerous to mention, as being an undemocratic constitution;
that it protects "vested interests" from "the people"; that
the majority cannot amend the constitution because the terras
of amendment almost prohibit change in the two- thirds and
(2)
three-fourths requirements and because the powers of le-
gislation by direct action of the people is impossible by its
terms. It has also been charged that the Supreme ^ourt has
taken away from the majority in Congress iiie vestigial right
to amend through legislation. Elihu Root has answered the
latter charge when he pointed out that the difference be-
tween overriding the Constitution by a majority vote of Con-
gress and amending the Constitution in accordance with the
defined procedure is "the difference between breaking arule
(3)
and making a rule".
An amendment to the Constitution of the United States
can only be proposed by a two-thirds vote of the House and
the Senate, or, by a convention called by Congress on the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the
(1) Smith, SAG, 63.
(2) Ibid, 56, 61.
(3) Root, AGC, "Court and Majority Rule", 113-114.
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States. "Two-thirds of both houses" means two-thirds of
(2)
a quorum of both houses. The proposed amendment can be-
come a part of the constitution only "when ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by
(3)
conventions in three -four ths thereof". A proposed amend-
ment may be ratified in no other way; not even by direct vote
(4)
of "the people". The State legislatures or State Con-
ventions, in ratifying the amendments, do not act as repre-
(5)
sentatives of the States or of the population thereof;
they act, quoad hoc, as federal agencies performing a speci-
fic function imposed unon them by Article V of the Constitu-
(6)
tion. The American constitutional conception of the ma-
jority's right to amend the constitution is not that any ma-
jority acting in any way, making its desires known, has
the right to amend, but that predetermined majorities by
conforming to the constitutional requirements do have the
right to amend the constitution. In the observance of the
(1) Ransom, MR J, 206.
(2) National Prohibition Cases, 253 US 350; CWKT, 87, "Legis-
latures" means legislative assemblies of the States and
does not include their voters. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 US
368, (1921). That the President has no power to veto
such proposals because this is not legislation, see Hol-
lingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dallas 378, (1798); CUSA, 555-
556.
(3) U. S. Constitution, Article V.
(4) U. S. v. Sprague, 282 US 716, (1931). Congress deter-
mines upon which of the two modes of ratification will
be pursued.
(5) Leser v. Garnett, 258 US 130, (1922); Smiley v. Holm,
285 US 355, (1932)
.
(6) Eawke v. Smith, 253 US 221, (1920); Corwin, CWMT, 88;
CUSA, 557-8.
1

procedural formalities, not only are majorities' rights ef-
fectuated, but the rights of "the people" and the rights of
minorities are likewise safeguarded. The exercise of the
right to amend in any other way would he majority tyranny; it
would lack the self-restraint essential to constitutional gov
ernment. In fine, a majority simply because it is a majority
does not have the right to change the constituted order. A
majority has the right to amend, the Constitution only if and
when it conforms to the terms thereof --and not otherwise.
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B. Right to Select Representatives
The American Constitution provides machinery for the
placing in authority, by the people, of representatives who
will be able to give effect to the general will and who may
be held responsible for the manner in which they execute this
(1)
mandate. The selection of representatives involves two
distinct procedures; the nomination of candidates, and the
election, i.e., choosing between the aspiring nominees. In
both cases, the usual procedure followed is the ballot vote
by which the person receiving the largest number of votes is
declared selected for the post. The constitutions of nearly
all the States declare that the persons having the highest
(2)
number (a plurality) of votes is declared elected. Under-
lying this policy created in the interests of expediency is
the principle that "the majorities must be secured the right
(5)
to nominate"
.
The evident purpose of a direct primary is to
make the choice of candidates dependent upon
the will of the numerical majority. The con-
vention was introduced because the caucus had
deprived the people of their freedom of choice
and in course of time the convention became a
cunningly devised instrument for securing a
choice of candidates whose nomination was
(1) Willoughby and Rogers, IPG, 148.
(2) F. J. Stimson, LPSC, sec. 232, pp. 214-215. "A plurality
of votes given at any election shall constitute a choice,
where not otherwise directed in the Constitution." Au-
thorities cited. Cooley, CL, 620, "Unless the law under
which the election is held expressly requires more, a
plurality of the votes cast will be sufficient."
(3) J. P. Quincy, FM, 59-63, 65.

(1)
dictated "by the "bosses of "the machine"
.
However, because of the usually large number of candi-
dates for office and the expense, effort and time entailed in
a second run-off election, it is customary when there is no
majority to give to the largest plurality the powers and
rights normally exercised by the majority. In some states,
when there is no ma,jority--or in case of a tie vote—provi-
sion is made for election either by the majority vote in the
joint session of the legislature or in a second run-off elec-
tion between the two candidates receiving the .largest plural-
(2)
it ies
.
The popular election, one of the fundamental r>rinciples
(3)
of American constitutional democracy, is conducted on
the principle that the majority of qualified electors have
the right to select the candidate for office. The question
involved in every case is
Was the party who has taken possession of the
office the successful candidate at such elec-
tion "by having received a majority of the
legal votes cast? (4)
(1) Elliott, AGMR, 113.
(2) P. J. Stimson, LFSC, 215. Cooley, CL, 614. Where, how-
ever, two offices of the same name were to be filled at
the same election, but the notice of election specified
one only, the political parties each nominated one candi-
date, and, assuming that but one was to be chosen, no
elector voted for more than one, it was held that the one
having a majority was alone chosen; the opposing candidate
could not claim to be also elected, as having received the
second highest number of votes, but as to the other offi-
cer there had been a failure to hold an election. (People
v. Kent County Canvassers, 11 Mich. Ill)
(3) Cleveland and Buck, BRG, 44.
(4) Cooley, CL, 625.
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"I cannot avoid the conclusion," said Mr. Justice
(1)
Christiancy in People v. Cicotte, "that in theory and
spirit our constitution and our statutes recognize as valid
those votes only which are given by electors who possess the
constitutional qualifications; that they recognize as valid
such elections only as are effected "by the votes of a majori-
ty of such qualified electors." An outstanding example of
the necessity of constitutional qualification as a condition
precedent to the majority's right to elect is found in the
instance of election of President of the United States. The
Twelfth Amendment stipulates
The Electors shall meet in their respective
states and vote by ballot for President..,.
The person having the greatest number of
votes for President shall be the President
if such number be a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed; and if no per-
son have such majority, then from the persons
having the highest numbers not exceeding
three on the list voted for as President, the
Eouse of Representatives shall choose imme-
diately, by ballot, the President. But in
choosing the President, the votes shall be
taken by states, the representation from each
state having one vote; a quorum for this pur-
pose shall consist of a member or members
from two-thirds of the states, and a majority
of all the states shall be necessary to a
choice
.
Here the States act as electors, "each state having one
vote which is arrived at through votes of the representatives
(2)
elected by districts".
(1) 16 Mich 311; Cooley, CL, 628-630.
(2) McPherson v. Blacker, 146 US 1, 26, (1892).

Here again the majority is given the right to say what the
vote of the State shall he. To determine which way the State
shall vote, the representatives from the several districts
therein vote and the majority principle is invoked.
Therefore, it may be said that the constitutionally
qualified majority has the right to determine questions of
fundamental policy, to legislate, and to select representa-
tives and executives to effectuate the general will.

CHAPTER V
MINORITY GROUP RIGHTS
A . Substantive Rights
Minority groups like other groups are devices which "the
people" use for their self-government. Like majority groups,
as minorities are endowed with certain powers they become
"persons" sharing those rights which are common to all enti-
ties functioning as persons in the constitutional order. The
American Constitution protects every person (individual and
group) against the legislatures, and, in their natural or
cardinal (i.e., substantive) rights, "minorities against ma-
(1)
joritles, even the individual against the mass."
The American Constitution recognizes and protects the
substantive rights of minority groups in several ways.
First, the Constitution places interdictions upon the
Federal and State legislatures so that their substantive
(2)
rights may not be impaired. Thus, for example, the First
|
Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibits the Congress
from making any law abridging the freedom of the press. The
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts granting
full power and authority to the General Court "to make ordain
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders,
i
laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions,
(1) Stimson, ACPPR, 18; Finer, TPMG, 69, "Minorities accept
their situation on terms.... not to be oppressed while in
a condition of minority."
(2) Beck, TCUS, 206. "The great limitations of the Constitu-
tion forbid the majority or ever, the whole body of the
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either with penalties or without; so as the same he not re-
(1)
pugnant or contrary to this constitution," declares that
"The liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained
(2)
in this commonwealth."
The Constitution of the United States and the constitu-
tions of all the States contain certain positive inhibitions
against governmental action which, although they accrue to
the benefit of individuals as such, are politically signifi-
cant because they constitute the great bulwarks of minori-
(3)
ties
.
Second, it circumscribes the limits beyond which no con-
stitutional majority may go in exercising its right to deter-
(4)
mine policy. One of the underlying principles upon which
the American Constitution is based is "the protection of the
minority. ... against the danger of the oppressions bv majority
(5)
rule." Thus the Massachusetts Constitution provides,
for instance, that the right of the freedom of press cannot
House and Senate to pass laws either for want of authority
or because they impair fundamental rights of individuals.."
(1) Part II, chap. I, sec. I, Article IV.
(2) Part I, Article XVI.
(3) Cleveland and Schafer, D in R, 449.
(4) Ibid, 448.
(5) C. G. Haines, RNLC, 82.
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(1)
be the subject of an Initiative or referendum petition.
This is not to say that freedom of the press can never be
limited. It would require a constitutional amendment, how-
ever, to do so.
No part of the constitution specifically ex-
cluding any matter from the operation of the
popular initiative and referendum shall be
the subject of an Initiative petition; nor
shall this section be the subject of such a
petition. (2)
And third, it requires that every "person" in the com-
munity be tolerated in its constitutional right to exist.
•
....the Commonwealth must be founded upon
purposes that may be held in common by all
its peoples, not merely by those who belong
to a privileged group.... In the United
States national toleration is no less essen-
tial than religious toleration to the unity
of the body politic. ( 3 )
Permitting all the different groups to function within
the law, the rights of minority groups are in little danger
from an unjust combination of a majority. The degree of se-
curity depends on the number of interests.
In the extended republic of the United States
and among the great variety of interests,
parties, and sects which it embraces, a coa-
lition of the majority of the whole society
seldom can take place on any other principles
than those of justice and the general good. (4)
Yet, no matter how extensively the substantive rights
are guaranteed and protected, no matter how imperative their
(1) Amendment XLVIII, II, sec. II, cl. 3.
(2) Ibid, cl. 4.
(3) Holcombe, PMC , 158-159.
(4) Fed, 356-358.

exercise, no rights are absolute.
There is no absolute right of free speech, no
absolute right of free assembly. Ail consti-
tutional rights must be exercised with due
regard to the equal constitutional rights of
other citizens. If assembly takes place, it
must be a peaceable assembly, and it must be
for a lawful purpose. Nor can any one insist
upon the right to use public property if that
right impairs an equal right to use of the
same property for other citizens for other
lawful purposes. (1)
The minority group's right to exist as a person necessar-
ily implies that it is to exist as a free person. Therefore,
it must have the right of self-determination. . This is the
right to regulate its own conduct, provided It "does not im-
pair the rights or injure the well-being of its neighbor".
Thus, it must be free to protect its "person", property, re-
putation and must be at liberty to do those things for which
it was created. The minority's right of self-determination
requires that the majority abjure any tendency it may harbor
to act in loco parentis .
The majority should not try to act as judge
or conscience for the minority. ... in matters
which, in reality, concern the minority
alone . (3)
It is the right of the minority to participate in those
affairs of government which concern its destiny.
A consequence of the foregoing is that the minority has
171
(2)
(1) Rep. Pettengill, Cong Rec, Kay 20, 1938, 9510-9511; U.S.
v. Cruikshank. 92 US 542; 12 Corpus Juris, 954, 955.
(2) Abbott, TRK , 250.
(3) Ibid, 249, 244-246.

the right to be represented in the councils of government.
This is not to say that the minority has the right to deter-
mine policy.
For lack of a better method most matters in
popularly controlled governments are deter-
mined by majorities.... The re suit.... is
that in each case in which a decision is ar-
rived at, those in the minority appear to
have their wishes wholly disregarded. They
may constitute almost half of the electorate
and yet, if the vote be for members of the
legislature, obtain no representatives what-
ever in that body.... a certain amount of
minority representation is secured by divid-
ing an area of considerable size into smaller
electoral districts.... Thus opportunity is
offered to those parties which may be in a
minority. ... to elect representatives in these
individual districts in which they may happen
to be in a majority. (1)
The right of representation means the right to exercise
(2)
influence through a smaller number acting in one's behalf.
The minority has this right.
The minority is accorded representation....
in proportion to its numerical strength.
In every committee, therefore, there are men
representing both party views, and it some-
times happens that the arguments of the minor
ity members are very influential in shaping
reports made upon measures concerning which
no sharp party lines have been drawn. (3)
(1) Willoughby and Rogers, IPG, 171-172.
(2) Friedrich, CGP, 264.
(3) Cleveland, OD, 97.

B. Procedural Rights
To serve as a device in democratic government, minority
groups are endowed by the Constitution with certain rights
which they are expected to exercise in the democratic proced-
ure for arriving at group decisions.
Minority groups have the right to criticise the majority's
program and administration.
One group should be in power trying to carry
through its program, and the other should be
in opposition, criticizing the majority and
advancing alternative proposals. (1)
This right to criticise is not the right to obstruct.
It is the right to scrutinize the majority's behavior and
publicize its acts.
....the Yeas and Nays of the members of either
House on any question shall, at the Desire of
one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
Journal. (2)
The purpose is "to insure publicity to the proceedings
of the legislature, and a corresponding responsibility of the
"(3)
Members to their respective constituents". It is designed
to compel each member to assume his due share of responsibilitv
(4)
in legislation.
The minority has the right, too, to check the majority's
(5)
acts. The assumptions still prevail that this is a society
(1) Dimock, MPA, 115.
(2) U. S. Constitution, Article I, sec. 5, cl. 3.
(3) Field v. Clark, 143 US 649, 670, (1892); CUSA, 115.
(4) Cooley, CL, 140.
(5) Smith, SAG, 212.
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of free men who govern themselves, that majorities as well
as minorities are fallible, that no person should be op-
pressed, and that constitutional government gives security
to the persons living under it by insisting upon restraint--
(1]
the self-restraint of the majority or checks by the minority.
It has been argued that to give a minority a negative
upon the majority (which is always the case where more than
a majority is requisite to a decision) is, in its tendency,
to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the
(2)
lesser. This view neglects to consider the sense of all
the people that the constitutional processes are to prevail
in all circumstances. It has also been asserted that
a very small percentage of American people
can permanently thwart the will of an enor-
mous ma jority. ... there can be no justifica-
tion for such a condition on any possible
theory of popular sovereignty. (3)
No justification, perhaps, except that no majority per
se has the right to legislate on any matter except as all the
people so constitutionally agree.
The minority can exercise its right to check the acts
of the majority in its control of government (1) where more
than a bare majority is necessary, by mustering enough votes
to frustrate the majority's attempt to secure the designated
(1) CR, "Minority Rule and Constitutional Tradition," Max
Lerner, 194. "The official theory assumes that a funda-
mental law must be superior to all legislative enactments. 1'
(2) Fed, I, 145.
(3) Croly, PAL, 36.

majority, (2) by dilatory procedural tactics (e.g., fili-
bustering, demanding roll call on the point that no quorum
is present, preventing suspension of the rules to expedite
(1)
matters near the close of a session), and (3) by appeal
to the courts to have enacted legislation declared unconsti-
tutional.
The minority group has also the right to petition for
a redress of grievances and the right to appeal for leader-
(2)
ship.
A minority that does not cry aloud almost to
shrieking pitch, will not be heard for the
roar of greater numbers.... A disunited
minority is a nonentity; it has neither co-
hesion nor force nor available rights. (3)
The I. R. R. which theoretically enable the majority to
govern because they furnish the means whereby any issue can
readily be referred to a popular vote, are really expedients
which minorities use to appeal to "the people" for leadership
or to redress their grievances.
All of these direct government expedients
may be set in motion by very small minorities.
Where five, eight, ten, or even twenty-five
percent of the voters possess the power by
petition to force a popular vote, whether it
be on a measure framed by them, or on a mea-
sure passed by the legislature, or on the re-
moval of a public officer, they possess no
(1) Cleveland and Schafer, DIR, 459.
(2) Read, CR? 202. Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45, (1905);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 262, (1932), where
people of Oklahoma wanted to restrict the number of ice
plants; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, (1810), where peo-
ple of Georgia wanted to undo a corrupt grant of land.
(3) J. Rickaby, RM, 16.
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small amount of political power. As a matter
of plain truth they have more power to force
action than is enjoyed by any but the most
overwhelming legislative majorities. (1)
The minority usually exercises its right of Initiative
anc Referendum as an appeal to the people for a redress of
grievances when it is unsuccessful with the legislature or
(2)
in the courts.
The minority invokes its right of Recall, especially
in the case of elected officers, as an appeal for leader-
(3)
ship in the communitj'-.
(1) Cleveland and Schafer, DIR, 460.
(2) Root, AGC, 110, 458; Ransom, MRJ, 10.
(3) Elliott, AGKR, 135.

C. Minority Rights In Time of War
In a democracy, the minority groups must at all times
be free to dissent from the majority will, "to protest in
speech, to agitate and persuade, to conduct campaigns openly,
and endeavor in all peaceful and lawful ways to detach indi-
viduals from the majority and win them to the support of a
minority in the hope that thereby the minority may presently
(1)
become the majority." This is equally true in time of
war as it is in time of peace. The American Constitution,
with the single exception of providing that "the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
(2)
may require It" in no way indicates or allov/s that the
rights of any person may be abridged in time of war. Minor-
ity groups, therefore, are entitled, constitutionally, to
exercise all their rights In time of war.
Yet, much has been said, and even more written, to show
that no matter what the theory concerning this may be, in
fact minority groups do have many of their rights, especially
free speech and free press, abridged and sometimes curtailed,
(3)
in time of war; and, therefore, it is argued, the American
(1) F. S. Giddings, RS, 75.
(2) U. S, C onstitution, Article I, sec. 9, cl. 2.
(3) Z. Chafee, FS; R.H. Eliel, "Freedom of Speech: during and
since the Civil War", 18 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 712, (1924);
T. J. Norton, "Our Courts and Free Speech", 13 A. 3. A.
Journal 658, (1927); A • T - • Cathcart, "Constitutional Free-
dom of Speech and of the Press", 21 A.B.A. Journal 595,
(1935)
.

Constitution does not guarantee and secure to minority
groups, in time of war, those rights which they enjoy in
time of peace. Is this criticism justified?
In peace time, minority group rights do not extend to
the practice of obstructionist tactics.
Open or disguised obstruction may not be
tolerated. (1)
The exercise of all rights must be coordinated as far
as possible to respond to the public, and not to private
(2)
ooinion. It is for that reason that all rights must be
(3)
subservient to the police power of the state. A person
may not, for example, exercise his right of free speech
with impunity if he thereby commits slander, criminal libel
or makes obscene or indecent remarks in public. The police
power, however, may not be invoked under specious pretexts
(4)
to abridge a person's constitutional right of free speech.
States insure domestic tranquillity by im-
posing salutary restraints upon the conduct
of refractory individuals and mobs.
(1) Giddings, RS, 77.
(2) Kolcombe, PMC, 434.
(3) Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace 36, (1873). "Private
interests must be made subservient to the general in-
terests of the community." MR J, 74, "Neither in theory
nor in fact is there foundation for the view that the
due process clause or any other part of the constitu-
tion confers rights which a decisive majority may not
limit, change or withhold in general or particular
cases." Rathbone v. Wirth, 6 NY (AD) 277, 287, (1896).
(4) Commonwealth v. Nichols, 18 N.E. (Mass) (2) 166, (1938).
(5) Hoicombe, PMC, 384.

Amongst other things^ the American Constitution was
established to provide for the common defense. Congress
was given the power
To declare war.... To provide for calling
forth the militia to execute the laws of
the union, suppress insurrections and repel
invasions; To provide for organizing, arm-
ing, and disciplining the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be em-
ployed in the service of the United States
(1)
.... \ /
Thus, ^on^ress is empowered to engage in war as one of
(2)
the incidents in the conduct of affairs of state. When
this occurs, the police power merges into the' war power;
but the same constitutional principles and rights persist.
The minority may still talk and it may continue to try
to persuade people, but it may not engage in any activities
(3)
which would induce other persons to break the law or
which would obstruct the proper execution of decisions con-
st itutionally developed. It was for that reason that
the Espionage Act of 1917 was declared to be const itution-
(5)
al. The right of free speech, like all other rights,
is a constitutional right arising out of the relations en-
tered into between the members of the community. As such
it may be exercised properly only in accordance with the
terms prescribed by the Constitution. In wartime the nation,
(1) U. S. Constitution, Article I, sec. 8, cl. 11, 15, 16.
(2) Holcombe, PMC, 339-340.
(3) Debs v. United States, 249 US 211, (1919), Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 US 204, (1919).
(4) Op. cit.
(5) Op. cit.
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ex necessitate, makes demands upon its members which it
does not make in timi of peace. The new demands create
new relationships between the persons comprising "the peo-
ple". These new relationships demand that the constitution-
al rights which persons have must now be exercised differ-
ently than they had been. The varied experiences which
individual persons and minority groups obviously encounter
in the exercise of their constitutional rights, therefore,
is not due to the fact that these rights are suspended or
abolished in war time or that the instituted procedures
are different or that the American Bill of Rights becomes
(1)
inoperative, but rather that the manner in which such
instituted rights may be exercised by any person to earn
approbation is different. In other words, because wartime
conditions are conditions of struggle for national existence,
the exercise of procedural rights which would tend to impair
the efficacy of group action must of necessity be modified.
(1) In Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, (1867), the Supreme
Court held, unanimously, that the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus did not confer
any right to try and convict a person under arrest, to
whom the privilege of the writ was denied, except in
accordance with due process of law.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
In no part of the widely variant field of Political
Philosophy have greater inconsistencies of reasoning deve-
loped—in none of its meanderings has "democratic" dogma
"been more basely degraded to serve undemocratic exploitative
ends--than in the voluminous literature which deals with the
postulated "rights" of majorities and minorities. In these
circumstances there is need for incisive analysis and con-
creteness of expression. The need for concreteness makes
two initial demands: (1) that analjrsis and discussion he
limited to a single system of laws; and (2) that the key-
words used to classify data and interrelate concepts be
clearly defined.
The first condition is met by limiting the discussion
to the American system of laws.
Definitions follow:
Rights in a legal and constitutional sense are those
attributes of personality with which free, self-determining
units of the community--individuals
,
corporations, or other
groups or things--become endowed. These attributes, called
rights, accrue to "persons" by virtue of relations which
are sanctioned by the recognized dominant or governing
group within the community.
Natural rights do not exist in society, unless and
except as the term be used to mean the attributes which

naturally accrue to constituent members of a se If -determining
group who as such have the right to participate in and/or
share the benefits of the instituted or constitutional social
processes. The "natural and inherent" rights of a "person"
as a member of a majority group are social rights "inalien-
able" as long as this person maintains a participating member-
ship in the constitutional group numerically adequate to make
decisions. When, in the process of taking a division, the
individual is not in the determining group, he automatically
becomes a member of a minority group.
The relationship of major or minor carries with it no
right or benefit other than that which accrues to the member-
ship as a whole. Each has the right to think, to feel, to
give expression to his thoughts and feelings and be recorded
for or against any alternative formally presented. In either
case the relation of major or minor is incidental to a pre-
determined procedure established for the common welfare of
all members alike.
Each plays the same role--voting; an expression of con-
currence in or opposition to a specific proposal. This is
not a "natural and inherent" right. It rests on a constitu-
ent agreement which is superior to the institution to which
the procedure is applied— a rule of association adopted by
the membership group to mark out the manner of reaching de-
cisions with respect to assumed benefits and responsibilities
that are to be commonly shared. The term inalienable

constitutional rights is one sadly abused in common parlance
when applied to "majorities and minorities".
Rights, as has been said, are attributes of "persons".
The term "persons" is used in this case to distinguish the
constituent membership units of the community who have entered
into and established the association to which this procedure
applies. Human biological beings, as such, have no rights or
duties or responsibilities. They are not, as such, constitu-
ent units of a community. As biological units, individuals
and groups are "things". They become persons only if and
when they have rights attributed to them in the fundamental
agreement called the Constitution.
An outlaw is not a person. A dead man is a thing; but
his estate is impersonated. Any entity, corporeal or incor-
poreal, which is recognized to have the capacity to enter
into relations governed by the "Law of Persons" has rights
determined by those sanctioned relations accordingly consum-
mated. Consequently, only to the extent that groups (majori-
ties or minorities) are endowed with attributes of personali-
ty through impersonation in the American system of laws gov-
erning one or another group of persons, may they be held to
have rights— and in the American system the right relates to
the democratic process of group self-determination.
Our Constitution embodies two conceptions of rights:
fundamental substantive rights; and fundamental procedural
rights. Fundamental substantive rights (e.g., those set up
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in "the Bill of Rights") are recognized as superior to and
sanctioned by the people as formulated in the Constitution.
They are attributes of personality without which endowed
powers cannot be exercised and which exist only as they are
formulated and established as being superior to constitutional
implementations. Fundamental procedural rights are part and
parcel of or subject to the Constitution. They are those
attributes of personality which eminate from the willed-rela-
tions entered into pursuant to the established law and which
may be exercised properly by the person to whom they accrue
only within the limits of the constitution. Thus, constitu-
tional rights, both substantive and procedural, even as they
may not be abridged or denied without due process of law,
j
may not be exercised w ithout restraint. The so-called "natur-
al rights" are really those substantive rights which eminate
from the relations existing between the governors and the
governed; they are the rights which persons have against
the usurpation of delegated powers by the agents of the com-
munity.
The American Constitution is conceived of as a covenant
between two persons—the community (i.e., "the people") im-
personated as sovereign and each individual member thereof
impersonated as subject--to follow specified procedures when
making decisions about questions of common interest, policies
j to be adopted, or action to be taken; and by the terms of
!
which responsibilities maybe established. Since this complex

pattern of social adaptation, regulation and control was in-
tended to give efficacy to the American philosophy of life,
viz., Democracy, its proper consideration must include those
written and unwritten rules and principles of social proced-
ure in accordance with which government becomes organized
and operative and by which the people, living together in a
community, govern themselves, through conference, concur-
rence and collaboration.
Majority and Mi nor it
y
are terms connoting an intra-group
procedural relationship. The American Constitutional con-
ception of a majority is that group of persons numbering more
than one-half of the persons participating in a socially pre-
determined, commonly accepted, institutional procedure for
the purpose of reaching a group decision. This institutional
procedure may specify that more than one-half of the total
group membership or of a quorum is required. The essential
principle which obtains in American democracy is that the
procedure governing the process of political self-determina-
tion is fundamental; that it must be definite, and known in
advance as the process which shall validate decisions--not
for a majority or minority group, but for the whole community.
The decision when made is for 100$ of the membership; obedi-
ence to this decision by the whole membership is the assumed
test of loyalty.
A minority denotes those persons acting in a group--for
the purpose of recording dissent --whose numerical strength is
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less than the numerical strength of the group which under the
predetermined rule constitutes a majority. The term "plurali-
ty" refers to the largest minority- -when under the instituted
procedures a plurality is adequate for decision. Thus, it
is evident that the meaning of the terms "majority" and "min-
ority" has reference to numerical adequacy and inadequacy for
reaching a decision under predetermined rules that govern
the intra-group relationship. It is only when groups are im-
personated as having an authoritative significance in the
process of social evaluation that they come to. have rights
--and then only to the extent of and in accordance with the
nature of the attributes of personality accorded to such
entities
.
Democracy recognizes the right of all persons to enter
into associations. The American Constitution defines this
right of association to mean the right of persons to organize
into groups, as functional entities, to achieve socially ap-
proved ends through socially approved means. Since democra-
cy conceives of groups as functioning units, and since its
success does not depend upon any system of exploitation, the
American Constitution provides that each group justify its
existence through the service which it renders to the coiti-
' munity. This means that the membership of the community and
|
of each group within the community has a right to service
from every association of persons, consistent with the nature
of that group. To fulfill this obligation, the Constitution
[
|

accords to the members of every group the constituent right,
as determined by the law governing that form of organization,
to self-determination, the right to share in the control and
management of the group, the right to hold the servants of
the group responsible to them, and consequently, the right to
to
give support/or withhold support from the group leaders. The
matter of majority and minority rights, therefore, resolves
itself into the most expedient way of deciding whose leader-
ship the constituent personnel will follow. This same matter
of expediency is the root and the crux of the procedure which
constitutes due process insofar as it is used to determine
and express the will of the entire community in (1) deciding
questions of policy--constitutional amendments, declarations
of war, etc., (2) electing executives and r epre sentat ives--
presidents, governors, legislators, selectmen, etc., (5) le-
gislation-referenda, resolutions, laws, etc.
Minority groups have the important right attributed to
every citizen and no other right than that of exercising the
function of informed critical agencies for the community.
Concretely, they have the right to question or challenge the
principles, policies and methods of the majority and other
minority groups; the ri^ht to petition for a redress of
grievances; and the right of appeal to the whole body for
leadership. These rights are secured not alone by the Bill
of Rights, but also by such procedural inventions as the
Initiative, Referendum, Recall, Proportional Representation

and the opportunity to organize opposition in political
forums and in the courts.
The American Constitution particularly protects members
of minority groups in their rights to life, liberty, and
property by securing to them through the written and unwrit-
ten provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions the
substantive rights of freedom of conscience and religious
worship, freedom to acquire property, freedom from unwarranted
arrest and expropriation, freedom of expression (oral and
written), the right to peaceable assembly and the right to
due process of law (including the right to contract, i.e.,
the right to choose a vocation and the right to work). No
member of any minority group--no person, irrespective of his
membership in any group--may be deprived of any of these
rights without due process of law. "Congress may not make
any process 'due process'". Thus, these rights have been
set forth as superior to the implementation of government
by reason of the fact that the American Constitution has
placed interdictions, as far as the abrogation of any of
these guaranties is concerned, upon the whole community in
its usual right to act as a sovereign body by adopting the
will of the majority.
The foregoing necessarily Implies that every group,
whose methods and ends carry social approbation, has a right
to exist; this means the right to function as a properly
sanctioned and integrated unit in the social order. Neither

a majority nor a minority group, as such, has any right to
exercise powers; it can only express concurrence or dissent
as a means of reaching group decision with respect to pro-
posed action to be taken by the whole community. Therefore,
when a majority or minority group undertakes to deprive or
to deny to any other group within the community the right to
exist, it is itself acting beyond the limits of the instituted
procedures, i.e., it is acting ultra vires, and therefore,
because it thus renders a disservice, forfeits its own right
to exist.
A seeming exception to the rule that no group has the
right to exert force or duress upon any other group within
the community is the instance of the politically-organized
group instituted for the purpose of effectuating "the will
of the people" by compelling conformity thereto in accord-
ance with the instituted procedures. This is no real excep-
tion because this group is the only one which carries com-
munity sanction in the use of force within the defined limits
of the American Constitution.
No group has a right to revolt except when the prede-
termined constitutional procedures for reaching a decision
are denied to it. Conversely, when such procedures are
denied, the right of revolution is assumed as a remedial
procedure of last resort--the members of such group, however,
assuming responsibility for their acts. Thus, the residual
right of a community to revolt against the usurpation of de-

legated powers constitutes its right to re-establish the
American Constitutional system of law and order.
In time of war, minority group members have neither
fewer nor lesser rights than they have in time of peace;
members of a majority group, likewise, do not have any more
nor greater rights in one instance than in the other. The
varied experiences which individual persons and minority
groups obviously encounter in the exercise of the rights
which are asserted to exist at all times is due, not to the
fact that rights are suspended or abolished in war time or
that the instituted procedures are different or that the
American Bill of Rights becomes inoperative, but rather
that the manner in which such instituted rights may be ex-
ercised by any person to earn approbation is different. In
other words, because wartime conditions are conditions of
struggle for national existence, the exercise of procedural
rights which would tend to impair the efficacy of group ac -
tion must of necessity be conditioned thereby.
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In no part of the widely variant field of Political Philosophy have greater
inconsistencies of reasoning developed—in none of its meanderings has "dem-
ocratic" dogma been more basely degraded to serve undemocratic exploitative
en(js—than in the voluminous literature which deals with the postulated
"rights" of majorities and minorities. In these circumstances there is need for
incisive analysis and concreteness of expression. The need for concreteness
makes two initial demands: (1) that analysis and discussion be limited to a
single system of laws; and (2) that the keywords used to classify data and
interrelate concepts be clearly defined.
The first condition is met by limiting the discussion to the American
system of laws.
Definitions follow:
Rights in a legal and constitutional sense are those attributes of person-
ality with which free, self-determining units of the community—individuals,
corporations, or other groups or things—become endowed. These attributes,
called rights, accrue to "persons" by virtue of relations which are sanctioned
by the recognized dominant or governing group within the community.
Natural rights do not exist in society, unless and except as the term be
used to mean the attributes which naturally accrue to constituent members of
a self-determining group who as such have the right to participate in and/or
share the benefits of the instituted or constitutional social processes. The
"natural and inherent" rights of a "person" as a member of a majority group
are social rights "inalienable" as long as this person maintains a participating
membership in the constitutional group numerically adequate to make decisions.
When, in the process of taking a division, the individual is not in the deter-
mining group, he automatically becomes a member of a minority group.
The relationship of major or minor carries with it no right or benefit
other than that which accrues to the membership as a whole. Each has the right
to think, to feel, to give expression to his thoughts and feelings and be recorded
for or against any alternative formally presented. In either case the relation
of major or minor is incidental to a predetermined procedure established for
the common welfare of all members alike.
Each plays the same role—voting; an expression of concurrence in or
opposition to a specific proposal. This is not a "natural and inherent" right.
It rests on a constituent agreement which is superior to the institution to which
the procedure is applied—a rule of association adopted by the membership
group to mark out the manner of reaching decisions with respect to assumed
benefits and responsibilities that are to be commonly shared. The term inalien-
able constitutional rights is one sadly abused in common parlance when
applied to "majorities and minorities".
Rights, as has been said, are attributes of "persons". The term "persons"
is used in this case to distinguish the constituent membership units of the
community who have entered into and established the association to which this
procedure applies. Human biological beings, as such, have no rights or duties
or responsibilities. They are not, as such, constituent units of a community.
As biological units, individuals and groups are "things". They become persons
only if and when they have rights attributed to them in the fundamental
agreement called the Constitution.
An outlaw is not a person. A dead man is a thing; but his estate is
impersonated. Any entity, corporeal or incorporeal, which is recognized to
have the capacity to enter into relations governed by the "Law of Persons" has
rights determined by those sanctioned relations accordingly consummated.
Consequently, only to the extent that groups (majorities or minorities) are
endowed with attributes of personality through impersonation in the American
system of laws governing one or another group of persons, may they be held
to have rights—and in the American system the right relates to the democratic
process of group self-determination.
Our Constitution embodies two conceptions of rights: fundamental sub'
stantive rights; and fundamental procedural rights. Fundamental substantive
rights (e.g., those set up in the "Bill of Rights") are recognized as superior to
and sanctioned by the people as formulated in the Constitution. They are
attributes of personality without which endowed powers cannot be exercised
and which exist only as they are formulated and established as being superior
to constitutional implementations. Fundamental procedural rights are part and
parcel of or subject to the Constitution. They are those attributes of personality
which eminate from the willed-relations entered into pursuant to the established
law and which may be exercised properly by the person to whom they accrue
only within the limits of the constitution. Thus, constitutional rights, both
substantive and procedural, even as they may not be abridged or denied with'
out due process of law, may not be exercised without restraint. The so-called
"natural rights" are really those substantive rights which eminate from the
relations existing between the governors and the governed; they are the rights
which persons have against the usurpation of delegated powers by the agents
of the community.
The American Constitution is conceived of as a covenant between two
persons—the community (i.e., "the people") impersonated as sovereign and
each individual member thereof impersonated as subject—to follow specified
procedures when making decisions about questions of common interest, policies
to be adopted, or action to be taken; and by the terms of which responsibilities
may be established. Since this complex pattern of social adaptation, regulation,
and control was intended to give efficacy to the American philosophy of life,
viz., Democracy, its proper consideration must include those written and un-
written rules and principles of social procedure in accordance with which
government becomes organized and operative and by which the people, living
together in a community, govern themselves, through conference, concurrence,
and collaboration.
Majority and Minority are terms connecting an intra-group procedural
relationship. The American Constitutional conception of a majority is that
group of persons numbering more than one-half of the persons participating
in a socially pre-determined, commonly accepted, institutional procedure for
the purpose of reaching a group decision. This institutional procedure may
specify that more than one-half of the total group membership or of a quorum
is required. The essential principle which obtains in American democracy is
that the procedure governing the process of political self-determination is
fundamental; that it must be definite, and known in advance as the process
which shall validate decisions—not for a majority or minority group, but for
the whole community. The decision when made is for 100% of the mem-
bership; obedience to this decision by the whole membership is the assumed
test of loyalty.
A minority denotes those persons acting in a group—for the purpose of
recording dissent—whose numerical strength is less than the numerical strength
of the group which under the predetermined rule constitutes a majority. The
term "plurality
,,
refers to the largest minority—when under the instituted
procedures a plurality is adequate for decision. Thus, it is evident that the
meaning of the terms "majority" and "minority" has reference to numerical
adequacy and inadequacy for reaching a decision under predetermined rules
that govern the intra'group relationship. It is only when groups are im-
personated as having an authoritative significance in the process of social
evaluation that they come to have rights—and then only to the extent of and
in accordance with the nature of the attributes of personality accorded to
such entities.
Democracy recognizes the right of all persons to enter into associations.
The American Constitution defines this right of association to mean the right
of persons to organize into groups, as functional entities, to achieve socially
approved ends through socially approved means. Since democracy conceives
of groups as functioning units, and since its success does not depend upon any
system of exploitation, the American Constitution provides that each group
justify its existence through the service which it renders to the community.
This means that the membership of the community and of each group within
the community has a right to service from every association of persons, con-
sistent with the nature of that group. To fulfill this obligation, the Constitu-
tion accords to the members of every group the constituent right, as determined
by the law governing that form of organization, to self-determination, the right
to share in the control and management of the group, the right to hold the
servants of the group responsible to them, and consequently, the right to give
support to or withhold support from the group leaders. The matter of majority
and minority rights, therefore, resolves itself into the most expedient way of
deciding whose leadership the constituent personnel will follow. This same
matter of expediency is the root and the crux of the procedure which con-
stitutes due process insofar as it is used to determine and express the will of
the entire community in ( 1 ) deciding questions of policy—constitutional amend-
ments, declarations of war, etc., (2) electing executives and representatives
—
presidents, governors, legislators, selectmen, etc., (3) legislation—referenda,
resolutions, laws, etc.
Minority groups have the important right attributed to every citizen and
no other right than that of exercising the function of informed critical agencies
for the community. Concretely, they have the right to question or challenge
the principles, policies, and methods of the majority and other minority groups;
the right to petition for a redress of grievances; and the right of appeal to the
whole body for leadership. These rights are secured not alone by the Bill of
Rights, but also by such procedural inventions as the Initiative, Referendum,
Recall, Proportional Representation, and the opportunity to organize opposition
in political forums and in the courts.
The American Constitution particularly protects members of minority
groups in their rights to life, liberty, and property by securing to them through
the written and unwritten provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions
the substantive rights of freedom of conscience and religious worship, freedom
to acquire property, freedom from unwarranted arrest and expropriation,
freedom of expression (oral and written), the right to peaceable assembfy, and
the right to due process of law (including the right to contract, i.e., the right
to choose a vocation and the right to work). No member of any minority
group—no person, irrespective of his membership in any group—may be
deprived of any of these rights without due process of law. "Congress may
not make any process 'due process' ". Thus, these rights have been set forth
as superior to the implementation of government by reason of the fact that
the American Constitution has placed interdictions, as far as the abrogation
of any of these guaranties is concerned, upon the whole community in its
usual right to act as a sovereign body by adopting the will of the majority.
The foregoing necessarily implies that every group, whose methods and
ends carry social approbation, has a right to exist; this means the right to
function as a properly sanctioned and integrated unit in the social order.
Neither a majority nor a minority group, as such, has any right to exercise
powers; it can only express concurrence or dissent as a means of reaching
group decision with respect to proposed action to be taken by the whole com-
munity. Therefore, when a majority or minority group undertakes to deprive
or to deny to any other group within the community the right to exist, it is
itself acting beyond the limits of the instituted procedures, i.e., it is acting
ultra vires, and therefore, because it thus renders a disservice, forfeits its own
right to exist.
A seeming exception to the rule that no group has the right to exert force
or duress upon any other group within the community is the instance of the
politically-organised group instituted for the purpose of effectuating "the will
of the people" by compelling conformity thereto in accordance with the in-
stituted procedures. This is no real exception because this group is the only
one which carries community sanction in the use of force within the defined
limits of the American Constitution.
No group has a right to revolt except when the predetermined constitu-
tional procedures for reaching a decision are denied to it. Conversely, when
such procedures are denied, the right of revolution is assumed as a remedial
procedure of last resort—the members of such group, however, assuming re-
sponsibility for their acts. Thus, the residual right of a community to revolt
against the usurpation of delegated powers constitutes its right to re-establish
the American Constitutional system of law and order.
In time of war, minority group members have neither fewer nor lesser
rights than they have in time of peace; members of a majority group, likewise,
do not have any more nor greater rights in one instance than in the other.
The varied experiences which individual persons and minority groups obviously
encounter in the exercise of the rights which are asserted to exist at all times
is due, not to the fact that rights are suspended or abolished in war time or
that the instituted procedures are different or that the American Bill of Rights
becomes inoperative, but rather that the manner in which such instituted rights
may be exercised by any person to earn approbation is different. In other
words, because wartime conditions are conditions of struggle for national
existence, the exercise of procedural rights which would tend to impair the
efficacy of group action must of necessity be conditioned thereby.
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